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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the fundamental distinction
between justification and excuse in the theory of
criminal law as it figures in relation to the partial
defence of provocation. It is argued that, by
contrast with German and other Continental criminal
law systems, the distinction between justification
and excuse has not been given enough weight in the
development of Anglo-American criminal law doctrine.
Although much attention has been paid to principles
of legislation and problems of procedural justice and
punishment, substantive issues concerning the grounds
of criminal responsibility - such as those of
justification and excuse - remained largely
untouched. In recent years, however, there has been a
revival of interest in justification and excuse in
Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence. The governing
task of the present work is to explore the
implications of this approach in depth, arguing that
the defence of provocation provides a particularly
interesting site because of its potential
interpretation as either justification- or excuse-
based. The analysis focuses, in particular, on the
defence of provocation as it operates in English
law, although it includes references to other legal
9
systems.
The distinction between justification and excuse
is crucial in tracking down the rationale of various
pleas aimed at debarring or curtailing criminal
liability. In general, claims of justification
dispute the unlawful character of an act which
nominally violates the law. Claims of excuse, on the
other hand, do not challenge the unlawfulness of the
act - rather, they presuppose an unlawful act - but
call in guestion the blameworthiness of the actor for
having committed the wrongful act. Nevertheless,
attempts at a clear-cut classification of criminal
defences as justifications or excuses run up against
serious difficulties. These difficulties have much to
do with fact that elements of both justification and
excuse often appear to intersect in the same criminal
defence, something particularly noticeable in the
defence of provocation. Provocation, when pleaded as
a partial defence to murder in English law, does not
lead to complete acguittal but to the reduction of
the crime to the lower criminal category of voluntary
manslaughter. Besides its position as a partial
defence to murder, provocation may also be pleaded as
a factor in the mitigation of sentence as regards
criminal offences other than murder. Conceptually the
defence rests on two interrelated elements, namely,
the wrongful act of provocation and the loss of
self-control. On the assumption that the former
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element pertains to justification whereas the latter
to excuse, the rationale of the defence in law seems
difficult to locate.
Following a delineation of the doctrine of
provocation in English law, the thesis explores the
way provocation can be coneptualised as a partial
justification or as a partial excuse and examines the
implications of either approach in a number of
related issues. These issues include the "reasonable
man" test, the requirement of proportionality, the
distinction between murder and voluntary
manslaughter, provocation and mistake, the relation
between provocation and self-defence, cumulative
provocation. Although these issues are examined in
the doctrinal context of provocation, the arguments
put forward in the thesis outline the contours




This thesis examines the question of criminal
liability in terms of the theoretical distinction
between justification and excuse, using the defence
of provocation to focus the issues. It proceeds from
the conviction that much of the ambiguity surrounding
the theory of defences in Anglo-American law could
have been dispensed with had the distinction been
given sufficient weight - as happened particularly in
German law - while the law was developing. Certainly,
the increasing literature on justification and excuse
- notably the work of George Fletcher - in recent
years shows a renewed interest in the benefits of
this approach to conceptualising criminal liability.
[1] The present work focuses for the most part on
how the notions of justification and excuse figure in
the doctrine of provocation. Nevertheless, the
problems it examines and the theoretical approach it
adopts in dealing with these problems go beyond the
confines of this particular defence. Throughout the
thesis, the arguments put forward in discussing
specific issues concerning the defence of provocation
also indicate the contours of a general theory of
criminal responsibility. This introduction has two
main objectives. First, it offers a general account
of the distinction as developed in German criminal
theory and outlines its import in the domain of
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criminal responsibility and, in particular, in the
analysis of criminal defences. Second, it delineates
the possible role of justification and excuse in the
jurisprudence of provocation and maps out the main
themes around which the subsequent chapters will
revolve.
1. On Distinguishing Between Justification and
Excuse
By contrast with the general trend in Anglo-
American law, the distinction between justification
and excuse has been instrumental in the formation
of most Continental criminal law systems. [2] The
distinction, first recognized in German criminal
theory, was preceded and facilitated by a series of
important theoretical developments. In German theory,
the distinction is related to the elaboration of the
even more fundamental differentiation between
wrongfulness and blameworthiness. Although initially
expressed in these general moral terms, this
differentiation was brought closer to law as such
through a contrast between unlawfulness
(Rechtswidrigkeit) and guilt (Schuld). The latter
distinction was first recognized in the domain of
private law [3] and subsequently in criminal theory.
The first step towards forging a notion of guilt
separate from unlawfulness has to do with the idea
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that the normative principles of law that determine
wrongfulness are not reducible to the body of enacted
legal rules. According to Kant, this transcendental
conception of law, captured in the notion of the
legal norm, refers to the conditions of freedom that
allow diverse choices in society to harmonise with
each other. [4] The legal norm is perceived as pre¬
existing and transcending the enacted rule which
merely prescribes what is to happen if the norm is
violated. Whereas the legal rule is obligatory on
the basis of formal criteria, the legal norm is
obligatory on the basis of its inherent rightness.
Unlawfulness is defined primarily by relation to
the legal norm. A criminal act is taken to violate
the legal norm which informs a legal provision rather
than the particular provision as such for this merely
lays down the legal conseguences of the violation.
The distinction between legal norm and enacted law -
as articulated by Karl Binding [5] - allowed German
theory to advance a conception of unlawfulness
independent of the statutory definition of criminal
offence. This development was, in turn, essential to
distinguishing between wrongfulness/unlawfulness and
guilt/blameworthiness and, subseguently, between
justification and excuse.
Binding's second important contribution was his
analysis of guilt in terms of intention, recklessness
14
and negligence.[6] Although he still accepted the
view - dominant in German theory at his time - that
guilt is indispensable to wrongfulness, his theory
of guilt is understood to have facilitated the later
formulation of a notion of guilt separate from
unlawfulness.
The theoretical distinction between wrongfulness/
unlawfulness and guilt/blameworthiness is associated
with the development of the so called "tripartite"
system in German criminal theory. Crime was defined
as an act which a) meets the statutory reguirements
of a legal provision (Tatbestandsmassigkeit), b) is
objectively unlawful (Rechtswidrig) and c) can be
subjectively attributed to the actor (Schuldhaft).[7]
In this respect, guilt was viewed as the subjective
or internal relationship between the actor and the
prescribed harm and was demarcated from the objective
or external unlawfulness of the act. The subjective
link between the actor and the harm captured in
the notion of guilt referred to the elements of
intention, recklessness and negligence. This approach
is known as the psychological" theory of guilt. [8]
Nevertheless, this clear-cut dichotomy between
objective (relevant to wrongfulness/unlawfulness) and
subjective (relevant to guilt) elements of crime
was finally abandoned in the light of further
developments in German criminal theory. It was
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accepted that wrongfulness/unlawfulness cannot be
adequately canvassed without including a subjective
element and, by the same token, that the notion of
guilt rests on objective as well as subjective
preconditions. In connection with this development,
the "psychological" theory of guilt was seen as
inadequate and was abandoned in favour of the so
called "normative" theory of guilt. [9] According to
the latter, the requirements of guilt are not
restricted to intention, recklessness and negligence,
but include in addition considerations of capacity
and control. Lack or impairment of the actor's
ability to comply with the demands of the law would
exclude or mitigate blame, notwithstanding his acting
intentionally, recklessly or negligently.
This final form of the distinction between
wrongfulness/unlawfulness and guilt/blameworthiness
provided the keystone for the subsequent demarcation
of justification from excuse. James Goldschmidt was
the first to elaborate a convincing account of
justification and excuse in German criminal
theory, and his theory rests on the fundamental
differentiation between legal norm (Rechtsnorm) and
norm of responsibility (Pflichtnorm).[10] Goldschmidt
demonstrated that a formally expressed legal norm - a
legal provision - which stipulates certain external
conduct is tacitly complemented by a norm of
responsibility which requires one to regulate his
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internal stance so that his actions do not conflict
with the legal norm. The distinction between
justification and excuse is attuned to that between
legal norm and norm of responsibility. Justifications
dispute the unlawfulness of a prima facie
infringement of a legal norm; excuses challenge the
violation of a norm of responsibility - i.e. the
correspondence between internal stance and external
conduct according to the legal norm. In cases of
justification the exclusion of punishment is
traceable to what Goldschmidt calls a "greater
objective interest", whereas in those of excuse it is
traceable to what he calls a "stronger subjective
motivation". The distinction between justification
and excuse, first captured in Goldschmidt's theory,
was subjected to further elaboration and refinement,
and is now fully recognized in German law and in
other continental legal systems.
An act which satisfies the formal reguirements of
a criminal offence is deemed nonetheless not unlawful
if covered by a permissive or justificatory
provision. Justifications complement or modify the
primary prohibitory rules by allowing for exceptions
under certain prescribed circumstances. Thus, to
plead a justification defence is to claim that, in
the circumstances, an act which appears to violate
a prohibitory rule falls under a justificatory
provision. Self-defence provides the paradigmatic
17
defence here. Excuses, by contrast, do not dispute
the unlawfulness of the act but call in question the
actor's blameworthiness for his unlawful act. German
criminal theory recognizes a differentiation between
excusing conditions pertinent to the exclusion or
reduction of blameworthiness and excusing conditions
pertinent to the exclusion of mens rea as a necessary
(although not sufficient) element of guilt. Cases
where acting contrary to the law comes as a result of
the extraordinary psychological pressure to which the
actor was subjected are subsumed under the first
category of excuses. In such cases the wrongful act
is committed with both knowledge and intention - i.e.
with mens rea or with a "guilty" mind - but
blameworthiness and hence culpability is precluded
or diminished by reason of the overwhelming
circumstances the actor found himself in (e.g.
duress). On the other hand, excusing conditions
pertinent to the exclusion of guilt are understood to
negate the necessary volitional or cognitive elements
of guilt (insanity, mistake of law). The distinction
between justification and excuse offers a basic
theoretical formula for a general classification of
criminal defences. The demarcation of different
perspectives of the same defence - or, in a sense, of
different defences operating under the same name -
can also be explained on these grounds. On this basis
one may distinguish, for example, between self-
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defence as a justification and duress as an excuse,
as well as between justifying and excusing necessity.
[11] Nevertheless, although the above distinctions
are now widely accepted in German criminal theory, it
has been argued - notably with reference to excessive
self-defence - that excusing conditions may sometimes
overlap with considerations leading to the reduction
of the objective wrongfulness of the act
(considerations which could be construed as
justificatory in character). [12] For example, in
excessive self-defence, besides the admission of
psychological pressure as grounds for excuse, the
fact that the accused was acting in response to an
unlawful attack is considered sufficient to diminish
the wrongful character of his act (see chapter 5).
The reduction of the objective wrongfulness of the
act on such a basis is often treated in German theory
under the heading of excuse. Examined primarily in
relation to the partial defence of provocation, the
problem of the possible overlap of justificatory and
excusative elements lies at the heart of our analysis
throughout the present thesis.
The distinction between justification and excuse
has had little influence on the development of Anglo-
American criminal law doctrine. Although the
distinction was recognized in the early law,[13]
its possible role in the formulation of distinct
categories of substantive law has been overlooked.
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For example, considering the orthodox view in Anglo-
American law, pleading a legal excuse is aimed at
disputing mens rea as reguired by the statutory
definition of a criminal offence. However, this
identification of the wrongful act with the elements
of mens rea and actus reus makes it difficult to
separate the wrongful act from the guestion of its
attribution to the actor. [14] As H.L.A. Hart
explains with reference to the distinction between
justifiable and excusable homicide:
To the modern [English] lawyer this distinction
[between justification and excuse] has no
longer any legal importance: he would simply
consider both kinds of homicide to be cases
where some element, negative or positive,
reguired in the full definition of criminal
homicide (murder or manslaughter) was lacking.
Hart goes on to note, however, that:
...the distinction between these two different
ways in which actions may fail to constitute a
criminal offence is still of great moral
importance.[15]
Nonetheless, the distinction between justification
and excuse is not without practical importance in
certain cases. Direct reference to the distinction as
understood in English law has been made for instance
in the modern cases of Bourne [16] and Cogan.[17] In
these cases it was accepted that duress and lack of
20
mens rea are excuses and not justifications, and that
therefore one could be convicted as an accessory to
an offence even if the principal is excused on such
grounds. By contrast, other things being egual, an
accessory would not be liable to punishment in those
cases where the principal successfully pleads a
justification defence.
George Fletcher has offered an important lead in
re-awakening interest in the distinction between
justification and excuse in Anglo-American criminal
theory. Fletcher traces the decline of the
distinction to the prevalence of positivist ideas in
Anglo-American law. He argues that the tendency
towards abstracting the judicial decision from the
individual case in order to formulate general rules
governing judges and juries in their decision-making
overlooks the moral foundations of criminal law as
"an institution of blame and punishment".[18]
Fletcher emphasizes that the moral assessment of the
offender cannot but be interwoven with the issues of
criminal condemnation and punishment. In this
respect, excuses allow exceptions in the ascription
of blame and punishment because they block the
inference from the wrongful act to the actor's
character. Such moral assessment of the offender's
character is essential to a theory of criminal
responsibility that makes the distribution of
punishment dependent upon considerations of
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desert. [19 ] [20 ]
Fletcher argues, moreover, that the common law's
reliance on reasonableness - or the "reasonable man"
- as a single standard in resolving legal disputes
tends to camouflage the fundamental distinction
between justification and excuse. This approach is
characteristic of what he terms "flat" legal
discourse - a system in which all the criteria
pertinent to the resolution of a legal problem
revolve around a single norm. In Fletcher's words:
The reasonable person enables us to blur the
line between justification and excuse, between
wrongfulness and blameworthiness, and thus
renders impossible any ordering of the
dimensions of liability. The standard "what
would a reasonable man do under the
circumstances?" sweeps within one inquiry
questions that would otherwise be distinguished
as bearing on wrongfulness or blameworthiness.
Criteria both of justification and excuse are
amenable to the same question. [21]
Fletcher contrasts this with what he calls
"structured" legal discourse, and points to German
law as an example. In this context, legal disputes
are resolved in two stages. The admission of an
absolute norm, at the first stage, is followed by the
introduction of qualifications which limit the scope
of the norm, at the second. The distinction between
justification and excuse is most at home in a system
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which adopts a "structured" approach to solving
legal disputes. In such a system the question of
wrongfulness of the act would logically precede the
question of whether the actor should be held
blameworthy and culpable. The issue of justification
takes precedence over that of excuse. This structured
approach to criminal liability, Fletcher argues, is
ingrained in the rationale of the retributive
theories of punishment.[22] From the viewpoint of
retribution, the question of whether the actor
deserves punishment, or what degree of punishment he
deserves, cannot be considered before detecting the
wrongdoing to be punished. As relevant to the issue
of punishment, claims of excuse may be taken
into account only after a wrongful act has been
identified.
Central to Fletcher's analysis of justification
and excuse is the differentiation of the primary or
prohibitory norm from the norm of attribution.
Primary or prohibitory norms are defined as those
imposing duties of conformity on the individual
members of society who are expected to guide their
conduct accordingly if they are to avoid the
sanctions provided when these norms are infringed.
The prohibitory norms may be complemented by
secondary rules - the rules of justification - which
allow for exceptions to their application in certain
prescribed circumstances. Thus, the prohibitory norm
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"Do not kill" is modified by the provision which
licenses killing in self-defence. The rationale of
the rules of justification pertains to the fact that,
in the specified situation, the conduct in question
is assessed differently than under ordinary
circumstances - i.e. under those in which the
original norm would apply. Besides the primary or
prohibitory norms, the norms of attribution are
specifically addressed to the judges and juries and
map out the grounds for legally excusing someone who
infringed a prohibitory norm. By contrast with the
rules of justification, the norms of attribution do
not modify the primary norms - excuses do not purport
to guide conduct - but allow exceptions in ascribing
culpability for the violation of primary norms.
According to Fletcher:
Wrongful conduct may be defined as the
violation of the prohibitory norm as modified
by all defenses that create a privileged
exception to the norm. The analysis of
attribution turns our attention to a totally
distinct set of norms, which do not provide
directives for action, but spell out the
criteria for holding persons accountable for
their deeds. The distinction as elaborated here
corresponds to the more familiar distinction
between justification and excuse. [23]
The revival of interest in the distinction
between justification and excuse has broken fresh
ground in the jurisprudential analysis of criminal
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defences in Anglo-American law.[24] Taking the
distinction seriously reguires one, first of all, to
take a closer look at those fundamental theoretical
assumptions upon which certain identifiable
conditions or sets of conditions operate as legal
defences. In the previous paragraphs it was pointed
out that guestions of legal justification are
basically act-orientated. The conditions which give
rise to claims of justification are understood to
alter the grounds for the legal and/or moral
appraisal of the relevant act. An act which in normal
circumstances would fall under the legal description
of an offence is now considered to be right or, at
least, legally permissible.[25] The circumstances of
justification, in other words, dictate an approach to
the guestion of wrongfulness of the act different
from that embedded in the primary or prohibitory
norm. In order to bring to light the rationale of a
justification defence, one would have to consider the
possible grounds for excluding unlawfulness under the
rules of justification. Three moral theories of legal
justification have been proposed in this respect.
Briefly, the first theory of justification, based on
the principle of lesser evils, postulates that in a
situation of conflict of interests an act which
preserves the superior interest is justified,
notwithstanding its being in a narrow sense
harmful.[26] Secondly, according to the forfeiture
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theory of justification, the infliction of harm on a
wrongdoer is justified on the admission that, other
things being egual, acting wrongfully entails the
relinguishment of the wrongdoer's rights.[27] The
third moral theory of justification draws support
from the rights-enforcement principle - or the
principle of the vindication of autonomy - and claims
that one is entitled to pursue one's recognized
rights even by inflicting harm on the transgressor.
[28] Although the above theories are informed by
different principles, they are taken to complement
rather than contradict each other (see relevant
analysis in chapter 2).
Excuses, on the other hand, are actor-orientated.
The wrongfulness and unlawfulness of the act in
abstracto remains non-contentious; what is called
into guestion is the relationship between the
wrongful act and the actor. At this point I
would like to draw attention to the important
differentiation between three types of conditions
which, although often all treated under the heading
of excuse, operate in clearly distinct ways. First,
there are those conditions which, other things being
equal, allow exculpation by excluding the imputation
of authorship-responsibility for the wrongful act at
stake. These conditions provide the grounds of a
legal defence by negating the necessary mental
element of the relevant act. Criminal defences
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expressed in the form "I did not know what I was
doing", or "I was not in control of my bodily
movements", dispute authorship-responsibility and
thus, in a sense, question the wrongful act as a
matter of fact. Automatism and mistake of fact offer
the typical examples of this kind of conditions. The
second type of excusing conditions (excuses proper)
operate on the basis that, although the wrongful act
was done with both knowledge and intention, the actor
had no freedom of choice, or acted involuntarily.
These excuses take the form "I did commit the
wrongful act, but I could not have done otherwise
because I was under irresistible coercion". Duress
and excusing - as opposed to justifying - necessity
exemplify this category of excuses. As we shall later
consider, this is the kind of excusative claim that
most accords with the defence of provocation.
Finally, the third class of excuses which includes
insanity and, arguably, mistake of law, challenges
the actor's being amenable to the generally
applicable criteria of criminal responsibility.
[29] This sort of excuse often appears to share
characteristics of the first two categories.
Nevertheless, it is argued that one should draw a
distinction between excuses proper - i.e. those
operating on the admission of an unlawful act - and
those conditions that negate some element of the
definition of a criminal offence. [30]
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2. Justification and Excuse in the Theory of
Provocation
Although the theory of justification and excuse
offers a firm basis for bringing to light the
rationale of the various defences in law, attempts at
clarification along these lines come up against a
number of problems. These problems have much to do
with the fact that often elements both of
justification and of excuse appear to interlink in
the conceptual substructure of a legal defence. [31]
The omnipresent tendency in Anglo-American law to
sweep guestions of justification and excuse under the
objective standard of reasonableness adds to the
confusion. Nowhere are those problems more evident
than in the legal doctrine of provocation. First of
all, the function of provocation as only a "partial"
defence makes it necessary for us to examine how
justification and excuse in this context could be
conceptualized in partial terms. Provocation, when
pleaded as a "partial" defence to murder in English
law, is not aimed at complete exoneration but only at
the reduction of homicide to the lower criminal
category of voluntary or intentional manslaughter.
Conceptually, the defence is understood to depend
equally upon two interrelated elements, namely, a)
the wrongful act of provocation and b) impaired
volition or loss of self-control. The question
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therefore is which of these elements may be seen as
providing the theoretical basis of the defence. Is it
the wrongfulness of the victim's provocative conduct
- which would entitle the actor to some sort of
retaliation - that underpins the nature of
provocation as a partial defence? If this were true,
provocation would be viewed as a justification-based
defence. Considering that the role of provocation is
to reduce murder to manslaughter, such an approach
does seem well attuned to the general assumption that
justifying conditions alter the grounds for the legal
appraisal of the relevant act at stake. Or is it
rather in the admission that the actor was not in
control of himself at the time of his retaliation
that the rationale of the defence lies? If this were
accepted, provocation should be treated as an excuse-
based defence pertinent to those excuses operating on
the admission of a wrongful act (excuses proper).
Given, however, that as a partial defence to murder,
provocation is aimed at reducing the criminal
category of homicide - and as such it has to do with
the determination of the criminal offence - the
leading view that these excuses are identifiable on
the level of attribution might perhaps appear at odds
with the interpretation of the defence as an excuse.
I would agree with J. Dressier when, considering the
position in Anglo-American law, he asserts that:
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Confusion surrounds the provocation defence. On
the one hand, the defence is a concession to
human weakness; the requirement that the
defendant act in sudden heat of passion finds
its roots in excuse theory. On the other hand
the wrongful conduct requirement may be, and
certainly some decisions based on that element
are, justificatory in character. It is likely
that some of the confusion surrounding the
defence is inherent to the situation, but it is
also probably true that English and American
courts were insufficiently concerned about the
justification-excuse distinctions while the law
developed. [32]
In the following chapters I shall attempt to
offer a fuller account of these divergent theoretical
approaches to provocation as a partial justification
and as a partial excuse, and highlight the
implications of either approach in a number of
related issues. I shall be arguing that,
notwithstanding that both provocation and loss of
self-control are indispensable elements of the
defence, the excusative element should be given the
priority. In this respect, one should point out, the
fact that the plea of provocation is essentially
aimed at the reappraisal of homicide does not
contradict its conception as an excuse.
Chapter 1 examines different descriptions of
provocation and offers an overview of the defence in
English law. Moreover, this chapter maps the
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justification-excuse distinction onto provocation and
pinpoints certain problematic areas to be developed
in later chapters. Following an outline of the
distinction between murder and manslaughter, the main
problems surrounding the law of provocation are
highlighted as they emerge from the discussion of
leading cases. Chapter 2 examines more closely how
provocation can be conceptualised as a partial
justification or as a partial excuse and attempts a
critical survey of the partial justification doctrine
and its implications in comparison with the partial
excuse doctrine. Chapter 3 sets out the excusative
element in provocation and discusses the
interpretation of the defence as a concession to
human weakness. The agenda for chapter 4 includes a
comparative analysis of the objective standard of
"reasonable man" as it figures in the doctrine of
provocation and that of mistake of fact. The role of
provocation in reducing the legal category of
homicide and the principle of proportionality are
further examined thereafter. Chapter 5 takes up
problems of possible overlap between provocation and
excessive self-defence, and explores a number of
theoretical issues on the basis of a comparative
analysis of self-defence and provocation. Finally,
chapter 6 focuses on the problem of cumulative
provocation and examines how the ensuing plea might
be dealt with in law in the light of the theoretical
31
propositions put forward in the thesis.
32
NOTES
1. See, e.g.: G. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law,
(1978), esp. chapter 10; Fletcher, "The Right and the
Reasonable", Harvard Law Review (1985), 949;
Fletcher, "The Individualization of Excusing
Conditions", Southern California Law Review 47
(1974), 1269; Fletcher, "Should Intolerable Prison
Conditions Generate a Justification or an Excuse for
Escape?", U.C.L.A. Law Review 26 (1979), 1355.
See also: H. Fingarette, "Rethinking Criminal Law
Excuses", Yale Law Journal 89 (1980), 1002; J.
Dressier, "New Thoughts about the Concept of
Justification in the Criminal Law: A Critique of
Fletcher's Thinking and Rethinking", U.C.L.A. Law
Review 32 (1984), 61; Dressier, Understanding
Criminal Law, New York (1987), 179-190; Dressier,
"Justifications and Excuses: A Brief Review of the
Concepts and the Literature", Wayne Law Review 33
(1987), 1155. A. Eser, "Justification and Excuse",
American Journal of Comparative Law 24 (1976), 621;
K. Greenawalt, "The Perplexing Borders of
Justification and Excuse", Columbia Law Review 84
(1984), 1897; F. McAuley, "The Theory of
Justification and Excuse: Some Italian Lessons",
American Journal of Comparative Law 35 (1987), 359;
P. Robinson, "Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic
Analysis", Columbia Law Review 82 (1982), 199 at 291;
"A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm as a
Prerequisite for Criminal Liability", U.C.L.A. Law
Review 23 (1975), 266; P. Alldridge, "The Coherence
of Defences", Criminal Law Review [1983], 665; L.
Heintz, "The Logic of Defenses", American
Philosophical Quarterly 18 (July 1981), 243; I.H.
Dennis, "Duress, Murder and Criminal Responsibility",
33
Law Quarterly Review 96 (1980), 208.
2. The distinction between justification and excuse
is now fully recognized for example in Italian,
Spanish and Greek criminal law doctrine.
3. As Jhering first explained, the negation of the
subjective blameworthiness of the actor does not
necesarily preclude the wrongful act from having
certain legal conseguences.
R. Jhering, Das Schuldmoment im Romischen Privatrecht
4. (1867); guoted in A. Eser, "Justification and
Excuse", American Journal of Comparative Law 24
(1976), p.625.
4. I. Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice;
quoted in G. Fletcher, "The Right and the
Reasonable", Harvard Law Review (1985), p.965.
5. K. Binding, 1 Die Normen und ihre Ubertretung 135
(1872); quoted in A. Eser, supra note 3, p. 625.
6. K. Binding, supra note 5, p. 625.
7. As elaborated by E. Beling and v. Liszt; see A.
Eser, supra note 3, pp.625-627.
Nevertheless, the "tripartite" approach to crime
has been met with scepticism by some authors who
argue that the satisfaction of the formal
requirements of a criminal law provision is but an
element of the unlawfulness/wrongfulness of the act.
They propose, instead, a twofold approach to criminal
liability based solely on the distinction between
wrongfulness and guilt. See, e.g.: Schmidhauser,
Strafrecht, Allgemeiner Teil 141 ff. (2nd ed. 1975);
see Eser, supra note 3, p.627.
8. See A. Eser, supra note 3, p. 626-627.
34
9. As articulated by R. Frank and J. Goldschmidt;
see A. Eser, supra note 3, p. 627.
10. J. Goldschmidt, "Der Notstand, ein
Schuldproblem", 4 Osterr. Zeitschrift fur Strafrecht
144 ff. (1913); quoted in A. Eser, supra note 3, p.
628.
11. As P. Robinson points out:
Nor is there necessarily any problem even
with recognizing two different categories of
defense under the same label at the same time
and in the same jurisdiction. A jurisdiction
may properly provide a "self-defense"
justification and a "self-defense" excuse.
Such multiple defenses may even occur in the
same provision...
He argues, however, that "when this is done, the
potential for misunderstanding and confusion
increases significantly".Criminal Law Defenses: A
Systematic Analysis", 82 Columbia L. R. (1982) 199 at
p. 240. And see: M. Gur-Ayre, "Should the Criminal Law
Distinguish Between Necessity as a Justification and
Necessity as an Excuse?", Law Quarterly Review 102
(1986), 71.
12. See A. Eser, supra note 3, p. 636.
13. See e.g. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of
England, vol.4, ch.14, pp.180-186.
Blackstone distinguishes between justifiable homicide
"as it is committed for the prevention of any
forcible and atrocious crime" (p.180), and excusable
homicide which could be of two sorts: "either per
infortunium, by misadventure; or se defendendo, upon
a principle of self-preservation" (ibid., p.182).
14. See e.g. Stephen, 3 History of the Criminal Law
of England (1883) 11; J. Hall, General Principles of
35
Criminal Law (1960) 233; see also: J. Hall, "Comment
on Justification and Excuse", American Journal of
Comparative Law (1976), 638.
15. H.L.A. Hart, "Prolegomenon to the Principles of
Punishment", in Punishment and Responsibility,
(1968) p.13. J.L. Austin distinguishes between
justification and excuse as follows:
In the one defence, briefly, we accept
responsibility but deny that it [the act] was
bad; in the other, we admit that it was bad
but don't accept full, or even any,
responsibility.
"A Plea for Excuses", in The Philosophy of Action,
( 1968 ) , 19 at 20.
According to Robinson:
Justifications and excuses may seem similar
in that both are general defenses which
exculpate an actor because of his
blamelessness...The conceptual distinction
remains an important one, however. Justified
conduct is correct behaviour which is
encouraged or at least tolerated. In
determining whether conduct is justified, the
focus is on the act, not the actor. An excuse
represents a legal conclusion that the
conduct is wrong, undesirable, but that
criminal liability is inappropriate because
some characteristic of the actor vitiates
society's desire to punish him. Excuses do
not destroy blame . . . rather, they shift it
from the actor to the excusing conditions.
The focus in excuses is on the actor. Acts
are justified; actors are excused.
Supra note 11, p.229.
16. Bourne (152), 36 Cr.App.R. 125.
17. Cogan (1976), Q.B. 217.
For an account of the justification-excuse
distinction as it relates to English criminal law and
procedure, see: J.C. Smith, Justification and Excuse
in the Criminal Law, The Hamlyn Lectures, (1989).
36
18. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law, (1978), p.467.
And see "The Individualization of Excusing
Conditions", Southern California Law Review 47,
(1974), 1269.
19. See Fletcher, supra note 18, p.800.
20. Excusing conditions are treated under four
theories of criminal responsibility. The first such
theory holds that the attribution of blame and
punishment presupposes a negative moral judgement of
the actor's character as manifested by his
voluntarily committing a wrongful act (the
desert/voluntariness thesis). Because excusing
conditions block the inference from the wrongful act
to a flawed character, they render blame and
punishment inappropriate. See, e.g.: G. Fletcher,
supra note 18; M. Bayles, "Character, Purpose and
Criminal Responsibility", Law and Philosophy 1
(1982) 5-20; J. Feinberg, Doing and Deserving,
(1970).
The second theory of criminal responsibility
centres on the idea that the attribution of blame
and punishment is appropriate only if the actor was
"given a fair opportunity to choose between keeping
the law reguired for society's protection or paying
the penalty" (the fairness/voluntariness thesis)
(H.L.A. Hart, "Prolegomenon to the Principles of
Punishment" in Punishment and Responsibility,
( 1968), pp. 22-23). This theory hinges also on the
assumption that blame and punishment presuppose moral
responsibility, but it places the emphasis on a
contractarian thesis rather than a desert thesis.
From this viewpoint, Hart explains the rationale of
excuses as follows:
One necessary condition of the just
application of a punishment is normally
expressed by saying that the agent "could
37
have helped" doing what he did, and hence the
need to inquire into the "inner facts" is
dictated not by the moral principle that only
the doing of an immoral act may be legally
punished, but by the moral principle that no
one should be punished who could not help
doing what he did. This is a necessary
condition (unless strict liability is
admitted) for the moral propriety of legal
punishment and no doubt also for moral
censure; in this respect law and morals are
similar. But this similarity as to the one
essential condition that there must be a
"voluntary" action if legal punishment or
moral censure is to be morally permissible
does not mean that legal punishment is
morally permissible only where the agent has
done something morally wrong.
Hart, "Legal Responsibility and Excuses", in
Punishment and Responsibility, (1968), pp. 39-40.
See also: Hart, The Concept of Law, (1961), p.173; H.
Morris, "Persons and Punishment", The Monist 52
(1968), 475-501.
According to the third - utilitarian - theory of
criminal responsibility, moral responsibility is not
a necessary condition for criminal responsibility.
Admitting excuses is seen as a further requirement of
a criminal justice system orientated towards the
promotion of the greater net benefit for society. In
other words, excuses are regarded as cases where the
exemption from punishment outbalances the advantages
of punishing. Criminal punishment, as pertinent to
the "failure to be motivated to avoid a forbidden
consequence or to be indifferent to a substantial
risk that it occur", presupposes a voluntary act. In
this respect, excuses exclude punishment for an
otherwise unjustified and unlawful act because, by
negating voluntariness, they block the manifestation
of "any defect of standing motivation or character"
See: R. Brandt, "A Motivational Theory of Excuses
in the Criminal Law", Criminal Justice Nomos XXVII,
(1985), 165; "A Utilitarian Theory of Excuses",
Philosophical Review 78, (1969), 337.
38
Finally, the so called "objective" theory of
criminal responsibility is the only one which refuses
a place to the voluntariness thesis. This theory
holds that one should not be liable to criminal
punishment if he acted as a reasonable person with
"ordinary intelligence and reasonable prudence" would
have acted in the circumstances. The objective theory
rejects the idea of individualizing excusing
conditions, arguing that one cannot have a full
picture of a person's capacities and limitations (the
problem of proof). The individualization of the
criteria of liability is, moreover, incompatible with
a system of criminal law whose main aim is "to induce
external conformity to rule". See: 0. Holmes, The
Common Law, (1964), 42,43,87.
For a critical approach to the above theories
see: J.R. Lindgren, "Criminal Responsibility
Reconsidered", Law and Philosophy 6 (1987), 89.
21. G. Fletcher, "The Right and the Reasonable",
Harvard Law Review (1985), 949 at pp. 962-963.
22. Fletcher, supra note 20, p.961.
For another view on the relationship between excuses
and retribution, see: J. Dressier, "Reflections on
Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral Theory, New Excuses and
the Model Penal Code", Rutgers Law Journal 19 (1988)
671.
23. Fletcher, supra note 18, p.458.
24. I would agree with the view that:
The criminal theory concerning justification
and excuse can no longer be ignored by the
courts. Its primary contribution is
consistency in the development of the law, a
goal which the courts themselves proclaim as
most desirable. Without the theory to
guide the courts, aspects of the law of self-
defence, duress, necessity and, until only
39
recently, provocation, have developed in an
inconsistent fashion.
Stanley Meng Heong Yeo, "Proportionality in Criminal
Defences", Criminal Law Journal 12 (1988), p.227.
25. According to G. Williams:
A defence is justificatory (for the purpose of
the criminal law) whenever it denies the
objective wrongness of the act... Normally a
justification is any defence affirming that the
act, state of affairs or conseguences are, on
balance, to be socially approved, or are
matters about which society is neutral.
"The Theory of Excuses", Criminal Law Review [1982]
732, at p.735. See also, G. Williams, "Offences and
Defences", Legal Studies 2,3, (Nov. 1982), p.238.
26. In Robinson's words:
The harm caused by the justified behaviour
remains a legally recognised harm which is to
be avoided whenever possible. Under the special
justifying circumstances, however, that harm is
outweighed by the need to avoid an even greater
harm or to further a greater societal
interest...
Supra note 11, p.213.
And as G. Williams argues by reference to the
justification of self-defence:
Self-defence is classified as a justification
on the basis that the interests of the person
attacked are greater than those of the
attacker. The aggressor's culpability in
starting the fight tips the scales in favour of
the defendant.
"The Theory of Excuses", supra note 24, p.739.
Fletcher points out that "All justificatory arguments
can be reduced to a balancing of competing interests
and a judgment in favour of the superior interest".
Fletcher, supra note 18, p.769.
27. See S.H. Kadish, "Respect for Life and Regard for
Rights in the Criminal Law", California Law Review 64
40
(1976), p.871, at pp.883-884.
28. Kadish, supra note 26, pp. 884-886.
From this point of view, the justification e.g. of
self-defence pertains to the right of a person, whose
sphere of autonomy is threatened, to repel the
aggression and restore the integrity of his domain.
As Fletcher points out:
...in contrast to the necessary defence as a
variation of lesser evils, the aggressor's
culpability appears to be irrelevant; what
counts is the objective nature of the
aggressor's intrusion.
Supra note 1, p.862.
According to D. Hoekema:
To have a right is to have the moral authority
or permission - i.e., to have the right - to
prevent violation of one's right. I shall refer
to the right to prevent violations of one's
rights as a second-order right... Every right,
in other words, includes a second-order right.
This thesis draws its support from the way in
which rights enter into the moral evaluation of
actions. Force and coercion are prima facie
wrong, because they take from their victims
the freedom to choose their actions in the
usual way. The assertion of the need to protect
a right, however, is a defence for the use of
force and coercion. The moral basis of this
defense is the second-orderright each person
has to protect the exercise of his rights.
Rights and Wrongs, (1986), p.113.
29. For an interesting account of the grounds for
distinguishing between different types of excusing
conditions, see J. Hruschka, "Imputation", Brigham
Young Univ. Law Review (1986), p. 669.
30. According to G. Williams:
...a defence is an excuse when (1) it amounts
to a denial of the proscribed state of mind
or negligence, or when (2) it affirms that the
defendant was not fully free and responsible
agent so as to be held accountable...
41
In contrast with the above approach, Fletcher and
Robinson reject that mens rea or negligence raise
guestions of excuse, arguing that those issues
pertain only to the definition of a criminal offence.
And see Hruschka, supra note 28, p. 701.
31 K. Greenawalt traces the distinction between
justification and excuse to the distinction between
"warranted action and unwarranted action for which
the actor is not to blame", and asserts that:
The difficulty in distinguishing rests on
the conceptual fuzziness of the terms
"justification" and "excuse" in ordinary usage
and on the uneasy guality of many of the moral
judgments that underlie decisions that behavior
should not be treated as criminal. Beyond these
conceptual difficulties, there are features of
the criminal process, notably the general
verdict rendered by lay jurors in criminal
trials, that would impede implementation in
individual cases of any system that
distinguishes between justification and excuse.
Greenawalt argues against the systematization of
criminal defences on the basis of the justification-
excuse distinction in Anglo-American law, but he does
not dispute the merits of this sort of analysis for
both the moral and legal discourse. "The Perplexing
Borders of Justification and Excuse", Columbia Law
Review 84 (1984), 1897, pp. 1898, 1927.
32. Dressier, "Provocation: Partial Justification or
Partial Excuse?", Modern Law Review 51 (1988), 467 at
480. As Dressier points out elsewhere:
...careful analysis of the language and of
the results of common law heat of passion
cases demonstrates that there is an uncertainty
whether the defence is a sub-species of
justification or of excuse.
"Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defence in Search
of a Rationale", 7 3 Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology (1982), 421 at p. 428.
42
CHAPTER 1: PROVOCATION AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY
1. Prefatory Note
In English law, provocation is treated as a
separate partial defence aimed only at the reduction
of murder to voluntary manslaughter. Further, as a
factor in mitigation, provocation is taken into
account at the sentencing stage to reduce the degree
of punishment, following conviction of a criminal
offence other than murder. The appropriate amount of
punishment is determined according to the
discretionary power allocated by the law to the
sentencer-judge. Mitigation presupposes, among other
things, that different degrees of culpability can be
established within the purview of the same criminal
offence. The correspondence of punishment to
culpability represents a fundamental principle of
justice, reflected in the admission of discretion at
the sentencing stage. Egually fundamental is the
principle that a verdict of guilty would not be
warranted, unless the conditions of the criminal
offence one is charged with are fully met. Partial
defences operate in this direction. Although they do
not relieve the actor of all criminal responsibility,
as total defences do, they reduce the criminal
category in which the wrongful act is subsumed.
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In English law, these defences - provocation,
diminished responsibility and the rule relating to
suicide pacts - are traditionally confined to the law
of homicide. Two interrelated questions have thus
arisen thereby: first, are partial defences dependent
exclusively upon the fact that in English law a
conviction of murder entails a mandatory penalty
(life imprisonment)? A positive answer to this
question could mean that partial defences as a
distinct category would be superfluous, if discretion
as to the punishment for murder were recognized.
Second, if it is accepted that partial defences are
endowed with a substantial status, that is,
independent of the fixed penalty provided for murder,
then why not extend their scope to offences other
than murder, possibly by creating new offence
categories? To answer these questions would require
one to trace the relationship of partial defences to
the criteria of criminal liability as embedded in the
demarcation of legal categories of homicide. By
focusing primarily on provocation, this is the main
task of the present work.
Following a general illustration of the
distinction between murder and manslaughter, this
chapter maps out the main problems besetting the
defence of provocation as it operates in English law.
These problems will subsequently be revisited in the
light of the theoretical analysis of provocation as a
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partial justification or partial excuse in chapters 2
and 3.
2. On the Distinction Between Murder and
Manslaughter in English Law: Problems of
Classification
The traditional common law distinction of unlawful
homicide into murder and manslaughter has been
established on the basis of important differences
pertinent to the so called "internal" elements of
crime. [1] Those differences are reflected in the
moral and legal weight attached to the relevant
crimes. Whereas both types of homicide share the same
external elements - i.e. the unlawful killing of a
human being within the Queen's Peace and where the
death occurred within a year and a day of the last
act done by the actor to the victim - they differ
significantly as regards the actor's state of mind at
the time of his act. Those mental states determine
the gravity of homicide and, accordingly, its legal
categorization. However, the exact identification of
the relevant mental states has been a matter of
dispute both in practice and in theory; in practice
because the reguired state of mind often appears
inaccessible to the legal methods of proof and in
theory the major problem has been to articulate
comprehensive criteria in order to conceptualize
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those states and how they relate to different
categories of homicide. For this purpose the notion
of "malice aforethought" has traditionally played the
decisive part. Thus, unlawful homicide is to be
categorized as murder only if is accompanied by
malice aforethought. [2] Anything less than that
is to be subsumed under the wider category of
manslaughter.
Questions have arisen, nonetheless, about what
the precise meaning of malice aforethought should be.
In early law, the term was taken to denote
deliberation or premeditation. However, according to
the currently preponderant view, malice aforethought
does not necessarily involve premeditation. [3]
Malice aforethought exists where a person
intentionally commits an act resulting in
the death of any person, knowing that such
act would necessarily cause death or
grievous bodily harm to some person, whether
such person is the person actually killed
or not. [4]
Thus, an intention to kill or cause grievous bodily
harm is deemed sufficient for conviction of murder,
if death results. Nevertheless, in order to encompass
within the category of murder those homicides due to
gross negligence, attempts have been made to expand
the meaning of malice aforethought. The guestion of
whether gross negligence or recklessness could
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buttress a conviction of murder has been a source of
controversy in English law.
Briefly, in Smith [5], the House of Lords
expounded the requirement of intention in murder in
terms broad enough to engulf cases of extreme
recklessness. In Hyam [6], the majority of the House
of Lords adopted the view that malice aforethought
should be deemed present whenever the defendant
foresaw death or serious bodily harm as being "highly
probable". Following strong criticisms, the House of
Lords in Moloney [7] reinstated the position that
malice aforethought requires proof either of an
intention to kill or of an intention to cause
grievous bodily harm. Recklessness in the above sense
has thereby been excluded from the mens rea of
murder. Although the currently dominant view appears
thus to identify malice aforethought with an
intention to kill, the foresight of consequences is
considered as relevant to the question of whether the
killing was in fact intentional. [8] However, this
aproach to the requirement of malice aforethought has
not done enough to remove the ambiguity that has long
dogged the analysis of homicide.
Moreover, English law's sub-distinction of
manslaughter to "voluntary" and "involuntary" has
added to the confusion. Considering the current
approach to malice aforethought as denoting
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intentionality, the term "voluntary" might perhaps be
misleading if taken as synonymous to "intentional".
As we shall later consider, however, one may argue
that the two terms cannot be used interchangeably.
The category of involuntary manslaughter embraces
those killings where the actor did not possess the
malice aforethought reguired for murder.Nevertheless,
the actor is still to blame to a lesser degree on the
presumption that he foresaw - although he did not
intend - or should have foreseen death or serious
bodily harm as a result of his action. Involuntary
manslaughter may be established in three ways: first,
by showing that the accused was "grossly negligent"
as to the occurrence of death or serious bodily harm.
This would obtain whenever the accused failed to
realize what the consequences of his action may be -
consequences which a "reasonable person" is expected
to anticipate and forestall. The reasonable man test
is applied here to determine whether, other things
being equal, the actor did not meet the required
standards of care. [9] However, only death or
grievous bodily harm, when they are considered
foreseeable according to the standard, would suffice
to establish gross negligence. Problems arise about
the determination of the point beyond which the
negligence should be regarded as "gross" and, in
relation to this, about singling out those of the
accused's characteristics that may be taken into
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account. Second, involuntary manslaughter may be
established whenever death occurred as a result of
some other unlawful activity, if such an activity was
likely to cause some physical harm (constructive
manslaughter). In the past, killings that took place
while the agent was committing a violent felony were
automatically classified as murder. Nevertheless,
this does not represent the present law which treats
such a killing as manslaughter irrespective of the
seriousness of the "original" crime. The seriousness
of the initial crime may perhaps be treated as an
aggravating factor at the sentencing level. In
Church, Davies L.J. stated the doctrine of
constructive manslaughter as follows:
The unlawful act must be such as all sober
and reasonable people would inevitably
recognize must subject the other person to,
at least, the risk of some harm resulting
therefrom, albeit not serious harm. [10]
It is not required thereby, under the present law, to
prove that the actor really anticipated the
occurrence of any harm to the victim as a consequence
of his unlawful activity. This position has been
reaffirmed by the House of Lords in Newbury. [11]
Third, involuntary manslaughter may also be
established in some cases where the accused foresaw
death or grievous bodily harm as a possible result of
his actions, even though he did not believe it was
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"highly" likely to follow (subjective recklessness as
defined in Cunningham). [12]
Finally, the category of voluntary manslaughter -
to which murder is reduced following a successful
plea of provocation - includes those killings which,
intentional though they may be, are taken to fall
short of murder. The following analysis is meant to
be a first step towards clarifying the role of
provocation to delineating the scope of this
category.
3. Provocation and Gradation of Liability for
Homicide
According to the preponderant view in English
law, the reduction of murder to voluntary
manslaughter on the ground of provocation does not
call in question the element of malice aforethought.
[13] On the assumption that both murder and voluntary
manslaughter involve an intentional killing, such an
approach makes it easier to accept the reduction of
the offence category without questioning liability
for the lesser offence. This sort of analysis, in
other words, allows one to circumvent the puzzling
question of why provocation does not undercut the
lesser crime, as it does for the more serious
one.[14] The construction of provocation as operating
outside the mens rea of murder is examined below
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under the heading of offence modification.
The operation of provocation as a partial defence
to murder has been described on the basis of two
theoretical models. First, the formulation of
provocation as a "failure-of-proof" defence entails
that a successful plea of provocation in fact negates
the element of malice aforethought reguired for
murder, without affecting the mental element
pertinent to the lesser offence. According to
Robinson:
General defenses differ conceptually from
failure of proof defenses in that the former
bar conviction even if all elements of the
offense are satisfied, whereas the latter
prevent conviction by negating a reguired
element of the offense....[the failure of proof
defense of provocation] is said to negate the
reguired malice element of murder, and thereby
reduces the defendant's liability to
manslaughter. [15]
On the other hand, the formulation "offence
modification" portrays provocation as a sui generis
defence which operates outside the mens rea and actus
reus of murder, by virtue of impaired volition or, in
Robinson's words, "extreme emotional disturbance".
[16] In order to make out which of the two
interpretations befits provocation better, one would
have to fathom the rationale of the distinction
between murder and voluntary manslaughter in law and
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circumscribe the purported scope of each category.
The interpretation of provocation as a failure-of-
proof defence does not accord with the tradition of
identifying the internal element - or the subjective
condition - in murder with knowledge, intention and
foresight of consequences. From this viewpoint, in
other words, defining the internal element in these
terms is inadequate to capture all its latent
dimensions. If knowledge, intention and foresight
were the only requirements of the subjective
condition of murder, one could claim that provocation
should rather provide a complete defence- i.e. on the
assumption that it negates these elements - or be
counted out as a legal defence altogether. [17] The
monolithic analysis of the internal element in crime
in narrowly mentalistic terms accounts for arguments
in this direction. It becomes evident, therefore,
that understanding provocation as a failure-of-proof
defence would presuppose a broader interpretation of
the subjective condition of murder, incorporating
considerations of both cognition and control. [18]
The formulation of provocation as an offence
modification transposes the ambit of the defence
outside the confines of the traditional - cognitive -
definition of the internal element in murder. As an
offence modification, provocation operates outside
the mens rea of murder - arguably, on the basis of
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impaired volition - and as such it does not dispute
the intentional character of the killing. [19]
Nevertheless, in so far as murder and voluntary-
manslaughter are viewed as separate offence
categories, the import of the formula "offence
modification" is bound to be difficult to conceive.
At first glance, such a formula seems to suggest that
voluntary manslaughter is but a form of mitigated
murder. However, considering that in English law
murder, as a distinct category of intentional
homicide, is not open to gradation - something which
accounts for the fixed penalty provided - the idea of
"murder modification" would appear misplaced. That is
to say, no logical distinction could be drawn between
modifying and negating murder, in so far as the
actor's culpability for murder is not considered to
be a matter of degree.
The formulation of provocation as an offence
modification seems most at home in a system which
subsumes all intentional homicides under the heading
of murder. If the borderline between murder - as a
specific form of intentional homicide - and
intentional homicide - as a more general category
that encloses murder - were disposed of, speaking of
degrees of murder would not be illogical. [20] This
would entail widening out the scope of murder in law
so as to make room for different degrees of
culpability. The restricted interpretation of the
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internal element of murder in terms of knowledge,
intention and foresight may then be sufficient to
capture the minimum subjective requirements of this
category. Nevertheless, the formula "offence
modification" could make sense only if provocation is
treated as an independent partial defence. This, in
turn, presupposes the demarcation of formal sub¬
categories of murder in law, corresponding to
different degrees of culpability. "Murder" would thus
be viewed as an overarching offence category
embracing a number of independent murder offences.
Although each of these offences would be treated
under the general rubric of murder, the actor's
degree of culpability would account for their formal
differentiation in law. In this respect, the
provocation defence - as an offence modification -
would be aimed at the reduction of the category of
murder by diminishing the actor's degree of
culpability. In such a case, however, provocation
could also be perceived as a failure-of-proof defence
by reference to a specific offence sub-category of
murder. On the other hand, if murder were to be
treated as a single offence category, provocation
could only operate as a factor in the mitigation of
sentence - something which would entail discretion as
to the degree of punishment for murder.
Hart adopts the distinction between "informal"
and "formal" mitigation. He speaks of informal
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mitigation in those cases where it is left to the
judge to impose a penalty below the maximum level
provided by the law, by taking into account, among
others, certain mitigating factors. Formal
mitigation, on the other hand, refers to those cases
where, according to law, certain mitigating
considerations should always remove the wrongful act
into a lower criminal category. Provocation, when
pleaded as a partial defence to murder, offers the
typical example of formal mitigation. [21] Hart's
treatment of provocation as a case of formal
mitigation appears to accord best with the
formulation of the partial defence as an offence
modification.
The approaches to provocation as a failure-of-
proof defence or as an offence modification may
satisfactorily illustrate the function of the legal
defence from different angles. What remains to be
considered further, nonetheless, are the grounds upon
which provocation cuts down the level of criminal
liability for an intentional killing. Indeed, if one
does not confine oneself to the view that the only
good reason for treating provocation as a partial
defence is the (technical) issue of the fixed penalty
provided for murder in English law, [22] one has to
offer an account of how provocation affects the legal
assessment of homicide. One is invited, in other
words, to examine how provocation disallows
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conviction of murder, if it does not negate the
actor's intention to kill or cause grievous bodily
harm.
In order to bring to light the rationale of the
partial defence, one has to ponder the grounds upon
which provocation reduces the gravity of intentional
homicide. Depending upon which element of provocation
is given priority, those grounds may be justificatory
or excusative in nature. The first pertain to
considerations that "externally" or "objectively" -
i.e., irrespective of the actor's state of mind -
curtail the wrongful character of the act in
guestion. The second pertain to considerations that
render the level of wrongdoing dependent upon the
actor's state of mind at the time of his act.
Because provocation allows room for both sorts of
considerations, the rationale of the legal defence
has been difficult to detect. As P. Alldridge
remarks:
The defence [of provocation] must be either
a partial excuse (in which case the centre of
inguiry will be whether or not the defendant
lost his/her self-control) or a partial
justification (in which case the centre of
the inguiry will be what was actually done
by the deceased to the defendant - to what
extent the deceased "asked for it") ...It is
interesting to note that both these conditions
obtained at common law. [23]
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If provocation is taken as a partial excuse, its
role in reducing the criminal category of homicide
might perhaps seem at odds with the idea that excuses
are aimed at disputing the attribution of blame to
the actor rather than at determining the wrongfulness
of the act. As Fletcher points out, nonetheless,
although the gradation of most criminal offences
turns on the degree of wrong, the gradation of
homicide hinges on the actor's degree of culpability.
We are not likely to have learned the
principle of graduated culpability from any
other offense [than homicide]. It is true
that many contemporary statutes recognise
degrees of larceny and robbery. But the
differentiation in these offenses turns on
the scale of wrong, rather than the degree
of culpability. [24]
Fletcher argues that, with homicide, considerations
of human interaction between the actor and the victim
are taken into account to make out the actor's degree
of control and hence his degree of culpability.[25]
It still remains ambiguous, however, whether the
reduction of the actor's degree of culpability in
provocation pertains to his loss of self-control or,
rather, to the victim's wrongful contribution to his
own demise. [26] The analysis of provocation on the
basis of justification and excuse follows a general
account of the doctrine of provocation in English law
in the remaining subdivisions of this chapter.
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4. The Defence of Provocation in English Law
English law recognizes provocation as a partial
defence to murder reducing this crime to voluntary
manslaughter. [27] Pleading provocation would
presuppose that the prosecution has provided
sufficient evidence to justify the jury's returning a
verdict of murder. Only on that basis need the
partial defence be considered. This, as pointed out
previously, may seem problematic if it is accepted
that provocation in fact negates the malice
aforethought element of murder. Devlin J. defined
provocation as follows:
Provocation is some act, or series of acts,
done by the dead man to the accused, which
would cause in any reasonable person, and
actually causes in the accused, a sudden and
temporary loss of self-control, rendering the
accused so subject to passion as to make
him or her for the moment not master of his
mind. [28]
Lord Devlin's definition admits the application of an
objective test aimed at establishing whether the
provocation offered was serious enough to overcome
the capacity for self-control of a reasonable person.
This is not sufficient, however. In parallel, the
plea must also satisfy what is termed the "subjective
test", in other words, the requirement that the
accused himself did in fact lose his self-control as
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a result of the provocation received.
According to Lord Devlin's definition, for the
defence to be accepted, the provocation should have
rendered the accused "so subject to passion as to
make him or her for the moment not master of his
mind". At first glance, this might seem to suggest
that the subsequent killing, intentional though it
may be, is not accompanied with the necessary malice
aforethought for murder. [29] In this respect,
however, it would be contradictory to insist that the
plea of provocation becomes necessary only when
malice aforethought for murder has been established,
for it is exactly malice aforethought that the
defence calls in question. On the other hand, taking
malice aforethought merely to denote intention,
requires one to offer a cogent account of the
grounds upon which provocation reduces murder to
voluntary manslaughter - that is, if both offences
involve a killing committed intentionally or with
malice aforethought.
There have been cases in the early law where
provocation was accepted as a defence to attempted
murder. [30] This position does not represent the
present law, however, which takes provocation as a
defence to murder only. [31] This approach has been
criticized on the ground that, in so far as murder
and attempted murder share the same internal
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elements, it is difficult to conceive how the defence
could affect the one but not the other. In this
respect, it seems morally questionable to let the
actor be stigmatized the same way as someone who was
in fact disposed to murder. [32]
The position of the provocation defence in
English law is further illustrated by cases and
legislation. Section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957
provides that:
Where on a charge of murder there is evidence
on which a jury can find that the person
charged was provoked (whether by things done
or by things said or both together) to lose
his self-control, the question whether the
provocation was enough to make a reasonable
man do as he did shall be left to be determined
by the jury; and in determining that question
the jury shall take into account everything
both done and said according to the effect
which, in their opinion, it would have on a
reasonable man.
The provision adopts an approach wider than had
previously been accepted to the question of what may
constitute provocation in law for it includes not
only "things done" but also "things said". In common
law, the general position was that verbal assaults do
not amount to provocation sufficient to reduce murder
to manslaughter.[33] Some form of physical aggression
was necessary, with one notable exception, namely,
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the case where the actor found his or her spouse in
an act of adultery and killed either or both parties
on the spot. [34] As regards this latter case, it is
not clear, however, whether a lawful marriage was
reguired. [35] It was accepted, moreover, that an
unexpected confession of adultery may constitute
sufficient provocation, although in Holmes the House
of Lords ruled explicitly the opposite. [36] Under
s.3 of the Homicide Act, there is no restriction as
to what may constitute provocation in law. [37] As
Lord Diplock said in Camplin:
[s.3] abolishes all previous rules of law as to
what can or cannot amount to provocation... The
judge is entitled, if he thinks it helpful, to
suggest considerations which may influence the
jury in forming their own opinion as to whether
the test is satisfied; but he should make it
clear that these are not instructions which
they are reguired to follow; it is for them and
no one else to decide what weight, if any,
ought to be given to them. [38]
After the Homicide Act 1957, the fact that the
victim's act was lawful does not exclude the
possibility of its being considered as amounting to
provocation. As G. Williams explains:
The Homicide Act, in allowing insults as
provocation, inevitably alters the position,
because an insult uttered in private is neither
a crime nor even a tort. Section 3 contains no
restriction to unlawful acts, and the courts
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seem to be ready to allow any provocative
conduct to be taken into consideration, even
though that conduct was itself provoked by the
defendant. [39]
As we shall later examine, this approach is taken to
indicate a shift towards the approach to provocation
as a partial excuse.
In the past, a mistaken belief as to provocation,
unreasonable though it may have been, did not have to
exclude the defence. The current position seems to
be, nonetheless, that the courts would be reluctant
to accept a mistake regarding the conditions of a
defence, unless the mistake is held to be reasonable.
Similar considerations apply to those cases where the
accused's reaction to provocation is put down to
self-induced intoxication. [40]
After the 1957 legislation, the judge must put
the issue of provocation to the jury whenever there
is some evidence that the accused was provoked to
lose his self-control. It is not reguired, as was the
case previously, that the judge should first be
satisfied that the defendant lost his self-control,
or that the provocation was sufficient to lead a
"reasonable man" to respond in the same manner.
Nevertheless, once the guestion of provocation is
introduced, the judge can still direct the jury in
their deliberation on whether the victim's conduct
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amounted to provocation or on whether a "reasonable
person" would have responded to the provocation
offered the way the accused did. Thus, the judge's
direction may still affect the final outcome,
although not in the same way as before the
introduction of the Homicide Act 1957. [41] For the
defence to be accepted, the provocation must be
deemed sufficient to lead a reasonable person to
react as the accused did. It was seen as problematic
whether the phrase "do as he did" implies losing
self-control or, rather, acting the same way as the
accused did. [42]
Determining the nature and limitations of
the objective standard in provocation has been a
source of difficulty both in legal doctrine and
in practice. Indeed, there has been some concern
that allowing certain personal idiosyncrasies
to be considered as relevant to provocation may
undercut the purported objectivity of the standard.
The two pre-1957 authorities to be discussed
below illustrate the problems surrounding the
"reasonable man" in provocation. The remaining
subdivisions of this chapter take up certain leading
provocation cases. The discussion of those cases will
allow us to identify different aspects of the
disputes besetting the defence and pinpoint the
issues around which the subseguent analysis of
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provocation in terras of justification and excuse will
revolve.
a. P.P.P. v. Mancini (1942)
In this case [43] the accused, a manager of a
club, stabbed to death the victim in a course of a
fist fight. He claimed that he was attacked by the
victim who had an open pocket-knife in his hand, and
that he killed the victim while trying to defend
himself. The original basis of his defence to murder
was self-defence which, if it were accepted, would
have resulted in his full acquittal. At first, the
issue of provocation was not raised. Nevertheless,
the accused was found guilty of murder against which
he appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal and
thence to the House of Lords. He maintained that,
although he did not plead provocation, the judge
should had directed the jury to the defence, given
that there was sufficient evidence as to this matter.
The House of Lords finally dismissed his appeal on
the basis that the judge was under a duty to direct
the jury to provocation only if he had reason to
believe that a "reasonable person" would have reacted
to the provocation the way the accused did. The
requirement that the mode of retaliation must
correspond to the gravity of the provocation offered
has become known as the "reasonable relationship
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rule" or "rule of proportionality". According to Lord
Simon:
The test to be applied is that of the effect
of the provocation on a reasonable man...
so that an unusually excitable or pugnacious
individual is not entitled to rely on
provocation which would not have led an
ordinary person to act as he did. In applying
the test, it is of particular importance (a)
to consider whether a sufficient interval has
elapsed since the provocation to allow a
reasonable man time to cool, and (b) to take
into account the instrument with which the
homicide was effected, for to retort, in the
heat of passion induced by provocation, by a
simple blow, is a very different thing from
making use of a deadly instrument like a
concealed dagger. In short, the mode of
resentment must bear a reasonable relationship
to the provocation if the offence is to be
reduced to manslaughter. [44]
The reasonable relationship rule invites one to
consider how a reasonable person would respond when
confronted with different sorts of provocative
conduct. In this respect, the acceptability of the
accused's plea would depend upon whether his
retaliation measures up to the nature and degree of
the victim's provocation, for this is how a
reasonable person is assumed to react. It is pointed
out that in determining whether the accused's
response was, in the above sense, "reasonable", one
has to consider the provocation offered in the light
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of the circumstances. This requires one to consider,
among other things, whether enough time elapsed
between provocation and retaliation to allow a
reasonable person to regain his composure. If this
were the case, the accused would not be able to rely-
on the defence. It is thus implied that an act of
retaliation which, in the heat of the moment, may be
regarded as "reasonable", would not be viewed as such
when committed "in cold blood". The reasonable
relationship rule suggests, moreover, that some
degree of action-control is still possible,
notwithstanding one's acting, due to provocation, in
the heat of passion.
This approach has been rightly criticized in many
respects. First, it seems contradictory to require
the provoked actor to respond as a "reasonable
person" - that is, in proportion to the victim's
affront - and yet to hold him liable on the
assumption that a "reasonable person", when provoked,
does not lose control. The association of the
"reasonable man" with the proportionality requirement
could be misleading if one relates the standard with
a judgement on the accused's mode of retaliation
rather than with the accused's giving way to passion
in the first place. Fletcher is correct when he
asserts that:
...in the context of provocation, the
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reasonable person is hardly at home. First, as
everyone is prepared to admit, the reasonable
person does not kill at all, even under
provocation. Therefore it is difficult to
assess whether his or her killing should be
classified as manslaughter rather than
murder.... The underlying question is whether
the accused should be able to control the
particular impulse or emotion that issues
in the killing. Yet the intrusion of this
mythical standard sometimes induces judges and
legislative draftsmen to think that the issue
is whether if the average person would have
killed under the circumstances, the killing
should be partially excused. The test cannot be
whether the average person would have killed
under the circumstances, for that test should
more plausibly generate a total excuse. [45]
Indeed, considering that provocation is pleaded
as a partial defence to murder, the rule of
proportionality should imply that only an attack that
endangers the actor's life may count as adequate
provocation. Such an approach, however, blurs the
line between provocation and self-defence and, in so
far as a degree of liability remains, provocation may
be viewed as a variation of excessive self-defence
rather than as a separate defence on its own right,
(see chapter 5). [46] The Homicide Act 1957 provides
that the jury - in determining the issue of
provocation - should be invited to consider "whether
the provocation was enough to make a reasonable man
do as he [the accused] did". This wording has been
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taken to suggest that the question for the jury is
not whether a reasonable person might have lost his
self-control under the provocation received but,
rather, whether a reasonable person would have
responded to the provocation the way the accused
did.[47] Such an approach to the matter seems again
to imply that acting "in the heat of the moment" does
not exclude some degree of action-control; it makes
room, in this respect, for the reasonable
relationship requirement to apply. In Phillips, Lord
Diplock argued as follows:
Counsel contended, not as a matter of
construction but as one of logic, that once
a reasonable man had lost his self-control
his actions ceased to be those of a
reasonable man and that accordingly he was
no longer fully responsible in law for them
whatever he did. This argument was based on
the premise that loss of self-control is not
a matter of degree but is absolute; there is
no intermediate stage between icy detachment
and going berserk. This premise, unless the
argument is purely semantic, must be based
upon human experience and is, in their
Lordship's view, false. The average man
reacts to provocation according to its
degree with angry words, with a blow of the
hand, possibly if the provocation is gross
and there is a dangerous weapon to hand,
with that weapon. [48]
One might read the above as a re-statement of the
reasonable relationship rule, the only difference
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to the pre-1957 position being that the issue
should now be decided by the jury. As pointed out
before, the requirement of proportionality, if
interpreted as relating to the actor's mode of
retaliation, should militate against any provocation
that does not involve a threat to life. Where the
actor's life is not endangered, this requirement
might perhaps indicate that the provoker's killing
was not intended - something that would suggest a
conviction of involuntary rather than voluntary
manslaughter. As we shall later consider, one could
not but accept that loss of self-control in general
is a matter of degree; losing one's self-control to
the degree that one commits an intentional killing,
however, allows no room for the above interpretation
of the proportionality requirement. In provocation,
proportionality may have a role to play, but
certainly not in relation to the actor's mode of
retaliation.
Mancini has now been overruled by s.3 of the
Homicide Act 1957 which, as has been said, provides
that the judge is under the duty to leave the issue
of provocation to the jury whenever there is some
evidence that the accused was provoked to lose his
self-control. The judge should do so even if, in his
view, the accused's reaction was not that expected
from a reasonable person in the circumstances.[49]
This has been an important change in the law of
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provocation. Nevertheless, the judge is still
entitled to draw the jury's attention to those
matters that, in his opinion, should be taken into
account in their consideration of whether the accused
reacted as a reasonable person would. The
relationship of the accused's response to the nature
and degree of the provocation offered is considered
in this respect. In Brown, Talbot J. expounded the
issue as follows:
...when considering whether the provocation
was enough to make a reasonable man do as the
accused did, it is relevant for the jury to
compare the words or acts or both of these
things which are put forward as provocation
with the nature of the act committed by the
accused. It may be, for instance, that a jury
might find that the accused's act was so
disproportionate to the provocation alleged
that no reasonable man would have so acted. We
think therefore that a jury should be
instructed to consider the relationship of the
accused's acts to the provocation when asking
themselves the guestion: "Was it enough to make
a reasonable man do as he did?" [50]
The problems surrounding the issue of
proportionality in provocation, as we shall later
consider, might prove more tractable if the defence
is examined in the light of the justification-excuse
distinction.
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b. P.P.P. v. Bedder (1954)
In this case, [51] the accused, who was suffering
from sexual impotence, attempted to have intercourse
with a prostitute to see whether he could overcome
his condition. He failed, however, and the woman
taunted him and kicked him so that he lost his self-
control and stabbed her to death. Charged with
murder, he claimed that, because the insult was
directed at his impotence about which he was
particularly sensitive, it constituted sufficient
provocation to support the reduction of the offence
to manslaughter. He was convicted of murder,
nonetheless, and appealed to the Court of Criminal
Appeal and thereafter to the House of Lords which
finally upheld his conviction. The House of Lords
adopted the view that considerations regarding any
physical peculiarities of the accused lie outside the
scope of the objective test and that therefore they
should not be taken into account in deciding the
issue of provocation. The "reasonable man" standard,
it was pointed out, does not make any room for the
personal idiosyncrasies of the accused, for this
would contradict its intended role as an objective
standard in law. Lord Simonds, in dismissing the
appeal, reasoned as follows:
It was urged on your Lordships that the
hypothetical reasonable man must be confronted
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with all the same circumstances as the accused,
and that this could not be fairly done unless
he was also invested with the peculiar
characteristics of the accused. But this makes
nonsense of the test. Its purpose is to invite
the jury to consider the act of the accused by
reference to a certain standard or norm of
conduct and with this object the "reasonable"
or the "average" or the "normal" man is
invoked. If the reasonable man is then deprived
in the whole or in part of his reason, or
the normal man endowed with abnormal
characteristics, the term ceases to have any
value. [52]
The decision in Bedder was subjected to strong
criticisms as being based on a misinterpretation of
the role of the objective standard in relation to
excusing conditions. Indeed, the above reasoning
manifests a difficulty in distinguishing those
individual characteristics of the actor that may bear
upon the ascription of blameworthiness from those
that do not. [53] Losing sight of this distinction,
however, is liable to lead to morally contestable
decisions. The approach adopted in Bedder is not
unrelated to treating the "reasonable man" as a
criterion upon which the judicial decision can be
abstracted from the individual case to formulate
rules of general application. Fletcher, criticizing
such an approach to the objective standard in
provocation, remarks:
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Once we forget that the problem is the analysis
of those impulses that we are fairly expected
to control, it follows that judges would have
difficulty distinguishing between a head injury
and a bad temper. Once the moral perspective on
provocation is lost, the concern develops that
the individuation of the standard might lead to
its total collapse. Not knowing where to draw
the line, judges would prefer not to include
any unusual physical feature of the defendant.
[54]
The role of the "reasonable man" in provocation
is an issue to be examined - from different angles -
throughout the present thesis.
c. R. v. Davies (1975)
In this case [55] the accused shot and killed his
wife who had left him for another man. Armed with a
gun, the accused went to the place of her work to
discuss a reconciliation, as he said, and there he
saw the other man shortly before his wife appeared.
He claimed that he became so enraged to see him there
that when she appeared he lost his self-control and
shot her. His plea of provocation was rejected,
however, and he was convicted of murder. He
thereafter appealed unsuccessfully to the Court of
Criminal Appeal. In this case, the changes brought
about by the Homicide Act 1957 to the law of
provocation were delineated by Lord Widgery as
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follows:
It seems tolerably clear that it makes two
amendments at any rate. First of all it allows
words as opposed to acts to be considered as
provocative for present purposes, and secondly
it seems to provide in the plainest terms that
any reference to the reaction of a reasonable
man to the provocation supplied is something
which must be determined by the jury and cannot
be determined by the judge.... Reading s.3 of
the Act, it is quite apparent that a different
test is applied because there one has to
consider whether a reasonable man would act as
he did, that is to say would act as the accused
had done. ...whatever the position at common
law, the situation since 1957 has been that
acts or words otherwise to be treated as
provocative for present purposes are not
excluded from such consideration merely because
they emanate from someone other than the
victim.
The basis of the appellant's argument was that the
trial judge directed the jury to the issue of
provocation only as regarded his wife's conduct since
the time she left the appellant. The appellant
claimed that the judge omitted to do the same as to
the presence of her paramour when the killing took
place. The appeal was dismissed, nonetheless, because
it was held that directing the jury to the issue of
provocation on the latter basis would not have
altered their final decision, because the paramour's
conduct was seen as inseparable from that of the
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accused's wife. [56]
As Lord Widgery pointed out, the question of
whether the accused reacted to the provocation as a
reasonable person is now to be determined by the
jury. And in Camplin (see infra), Lord Morris
asserted that "All questions are for the jury... The
courts are no longer entitled to tell juries that a
reasonable man has certain stated and defined
feature". [57] Shifting this question to the jury,
however, did not make the function of the "reasonable
man" standard in provocation any clearer. Indeed,
considering the discrepancies as regards the way in
which provocation cases have been decided, it seems
difficult to offer a comprehensive account of how the
objective standard operates in this context. The
analysis of provocation on the basis of the
justification-excuse distinction in the following
chapters would allow us to envisage different
perspectives on the standard and to demonstrate its
possible role in relation to the defence.
d. P.P.P. v. Camplin (1978)
In the case [58] at issue the accused, a fifteen
year old boy, went to the victim's house after having
a few drinks. The accused was blackmailing the victim
over a homosexual relationship the latter had with
one of the accused's friends. The accused claimed
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that he was beaten and was sexually assaulted by the
victim. Overpowered by shame and resentment while the
victim was taunting him, the accused killed the
victim hitting him twice over the head with a heavy
object. At trial he pleaded provocation as his
defence to murder, but the plea was rejected.
Nevertheless, his conviction was guashed by the Court
of Appeal which accepted the reduction of murder to
manslaughter. The latter decision was subsequently
confirmed by the House of Lords. This case raised the
controversial question of whether the jury should be
directed to take into account the accused's age as
relevant to the issue of provocation. Should the
accused's reaction be assessed according to a
reasonable adult or, rather, according to a
reasonable person of the accused's age? Lord Diplock
stated the applicable test as follows:
The judge should state what the question is,
using the terms of the section. He should then
explain to them that the reasonable man
referred to in the question is a person having
the power of self-control to be expected of the
person of the sex and age of the accused, but
in other respects sharing such of the accused's
characteristics as they think would affect the
gravity of the provocation to him, and that the
question is not merely whether such a person in
like circumstances would be provoked to lose
his self-control, but also would react to the
provocation as the accused did.
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In the later case of Newell, the Court of Appeal made
clear that the jury should be directed to consider as
relevant to provocation only those characteristics of
the accused that are permanent enough to be regarded
as "part of his personality". [59] It was pointed
out, moreover, that the provocation must have been
directed at the particular characteristic which,
according to the defendant, should be taken into
account as relevant to the guestion of provocation.
The opening up of the objective test in
provocation to some degree of individualization was
deemed necessary in order to avoid the morally
controversial decisions to which the rigid
application of the test has led in the past.
Nonetheless, this re-interpretation of the objective
test, significant though it may be, is not without
difficulties. Problems arise, for example, about how
one is to distinguish those individual
characteristics that may bear on the gravity of
provocation from those character traits relating,
rather, to the actor's general capacity for self-
control. Although it is admitted that the second are
not relevant to the defence, drawing the line between
the two can be a matter of dispute. In this respect,
considering that provocation constitutes a defence
for "normal" people, it might be guestionable whether
certain characteristics should be seen as, in a
sense, modifying the applicable standard or, rather,
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as rendering the relevant standard inapplicable. In
the latter case, however, provocation could not
furnish the grounds for the accused's defence to
murder. If the provocation defence cannot be admitted
for this reason, the accused might perhaps rely on
the partial defence of diminished responsibility on
the ground that, due to an abnormality of mind, his
was unable to exercise self-control. [60] In some
cases, moreover, the accused might be able to plead
provocation and diminished responsibility together.
This issue is further discussed under the heading of
cumulative provocation in chapter 6 of this thesis.
Arguably, the attempt to widen the scope of the
objective test in provocation shows a departure from
understanding the "reasonable man" as a legal
standard of liability. Provocation, formely viewed as
a matter of law to be decided by the judge, is now
considered to be a matter of fact to be decided by
the jury. In Smith, it was pointed out that:
No court has ever given, nor do we think ever
can give, a definition of what constitutes a
reasonable man, or an average man. That must be
left to the collective good sense of the jury.
[61]
The role of the "reasonable man" in the context of
the provocation defence may best be understood by
reference to the norms of attribution. The issue, in
this respect, is not how a reasonable person
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would have reacted to the provocation received; it
is, rather, whether the accused - given certain of
his personal characteristics - could have fairly been
expected to retain control in the face of the
provocation received. As Fletcher emphasizes:
The basic moral question in the law of homicide
is distinguishing between those impulses to
kill as to which we as a society demand self-
control, and those as to which we relax our
inhibitions. [62]
Besides its potential role as regards the attribution
of responsibility/blameworthiness, the "reasonable
man" standard has also been considered as relevant to
the question of whether the defendant's claim that he
was provoked to lose self-control can be accepted as
a matter of fact. From this viewpoint, in other
words, the "reasonable man", as well as the related
issue of proportionality, are understood as relating
to the assessment of evidence by the jury. Indeed,
this is how Lord Diplock's re-statement of the
proportionality requirement in Camplin may be viewed
- that is, if the reference to the accused's mode of
retaliation was not intended to prescribe a
"standard" of conduct (see p.33 supra). [63]
Nevertheless, there is still some doubt as to whether
s. 3 in fact requires a certain form of
correspondence between provocation and the mode of
retaliation. [64]
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e. Edwards v. R. (1973)
In the case [65] in question, the accused stabbed
the victim to death during a struggle in the victim's
hotel room. The accused claimed that he went to the
victim's room in order to blackmail him and that,
during a dispute over the blackmail, the victim
attacked him with a knife. Charged with murder, the
accused pleaded self-defence and provocation. The
Full Court of Hong Kong dismissed the accused's
appeal against his conviction of murder. It
recognised, however, that the trial judge should have
directed the jury to the issue of provocation. Thence
the accused appealed to the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council which finally accepted the reduction of
murder to manslaughter. In this case, Lord Pearson
explained the position adopted as follows:
On principle it seems reasonable to say that
(1) a blackmailer cannot rely on the
predictable results of his own blackmailing
conduct as constituting provocation sufficient
to reduce his killing from murder to
manslaughter, and the predictable results may
include a considerable degree of hostile
reaction by the person sought to be
blackmailed, for instance vituperative words
and even some hostile action such as blows with
fists; (2) but if the hostile reaction by the
person sought to be blackmailed goes to extreme
lengths it might constitute sufficient
provocation even for the blackmailer; (3) there
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would in many cases be a question of degree to
be decided by the jury.
The position in English law prior to the
Homicide Act 1957 was that the judge could withdraw
the question of provocation from the jury if he
believed that the victim's affront was - in face of
the accused's conduct - predictable. Nevertheless, if
there was any doubt as to whether the way in which
the victim reacted was predictable, the issue was
left to the jury to decide under proper direction on
the relevant rules of law. The accused would not be
able to rely on provocation if it was accepted that,
although he did not foresee the victim's attack, a
reasonable person would have foreseen such a
possibility. In sum, in common law the judge was
entitled to exclude the defence if the provocation
was self-induced. The same obtained with respect to
those cases where the victim's conduct was deemed
legally justified. After the 1957 legislation, the
judge cannot withdraw the defence from the jury, even
if he has good reason to believe that the provocation
was self-induced. [66] All the judge can do is to
draw the jury's attention to those matters that, in
his view, militate against accepting the defence in
law. [67] It is for the jury to decide, however,
whether the accused's plea of provocation should be
accepted or not. As regards the issue of whether
legally justified conduct could amount to provocation
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in law, one might distinguish between conduct which
is legally justified on the basis of a specific legal
right - i.e. a police officer attempting a lawful
arrest - and conduct which is merely legally
permissible. Patently, conduct which is deemed
legally justified in the first sense is most unlikely
to be accepted as adequate provocation. One might
envisage a case, nonetheless, where morally
offensive conduct which takes place in the course of
a legally justified action constitutes provocation
sufficient to reduce murder to voluntary
manslaughter.
The rule against self-induced provocation, as
pointed out by Lord Pearson in Edwards, does not
exclude the defence in all cases where some sort of
reaction by the victim was predictable. However, it
seems problematic how one is to determine the
threshold beyond which the victim's conduct ,
predictable though it may have been, could still
buttress a plea of provocation. Indeed, if the
accused could rely on the defence only where the
victim's reaction is taken to involve a threat to
life or limb, it might be difficult to distinguish
provocation from self-defence. It would be
misleading, however, to treat under provocation those
cases of self-defence where the accused would not be
entitled to a complete defence as being partly
responsible for the victim's attack. If such cases
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were seen as pertinent to some sort of "culpable"
self-defence, establishing loss of self-control - a
basic element of provocation - would not
be necessary. The problem of self-induced provocation
invites one to perceive the question of culpability
for homicide as presupposing a wider assessment of
the accused's actions. One should fathom, in this
respect, how the actor's culpability in causing the
conditions of his defence may affect the judgement on
whether such a defence should be accepted. [68] It
seems proper to say that the acceptability of the
proposed defence, and hence the classification of the
killing as murder or manslaughter, relates to the
accused's degree of culpability in bringing about the
conditions of his own defence. Thus, to offer an
example, someone who deliberately triggers an attack
in order to kill the aggressor with immunity could
rely neither on self-defence nor on provocation as
his defence (actio libera in causa). Nonetheless,
this would not obtain in a case where the victim's
attack or provocation, was the - predictable or not -
result of a minor affront by the accused. The
acceptability of the proposed defence in cases of
self-induced provocation seems to depend, among other
things, on the nature of the wrongful action on the
part of the accused which incited the victim's
provocation.
The theoretical analysis of provocation on the
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basis of the justification-excuse distinction in the
following chapters will allow us to look at some of
the questions besetting the legal defence from
different angles. A deeper understanding of the
grounds upon which the rationale of provocation as a
partial defence may rest could facilitate the
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CHAPTER 2: RECONSIDERING THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF
PROVOCATION
1. How does Justification or Excuse Relate to
Provocation?
A successful plea of provocation alters the
grounds for the legal classification of homicide.
This formulation conveys in a nutshell the principal
function of the defence in law. But one might argue
that provocation, as pertinent to determining the
offence category in which a killing is to be
subsumed, is a matter neither of excuse nor of
justification. As said before, justifications call in
question the unlawfulness of the act; excuses
challenge the attribution of responsibility for an
unlawful act. It may seem, therefore, that such
defences could only result in complete exculpation of
crime. At first glance, the purported role of
provocation as re-establishing rather than precluding
criminal liability for homicide might appear to
remove the plea from the scope of criminal defences
that could be accounted for as justifications or
excuses.
By the same token, one might claim that, but for
the fixed penalty provided for murder in English law,
provocation would merely operate as a factor in the
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mitigation of sentence. Again, if it were assumed
that justification and excuse are associated only
with those defences whose acceptance leads to
complete exoneration, one may guestion the
application of this sort of analysis to provocation.
According to Hart:
Provocation is not a matter of Justification or
Excuse for it does not exclude conviction or
punishment; but "reduces" the charges from
murder to manslaughter and the possible maximum
penalty from death to life imprisonment. [1]
It was explained in chapter 1 that provocation
can be depicted either as a "failure of proof"
defence, or as an "offence modification". [2] As
Robinson points out, provocation was traditionally
drafted as a defence negating the element of malice
aforethought of murder and, in this sense, it
operates as a failure of proof defence. On the other
hand, provocation is also perceived as an offence
modification, operating outside the mens rea and
actus reus of the crime. This latter interpretation
of provocation captures better the present position
of the defence in English law. Nevertheless, treating
provocation as a failure of proof defence or as an
offence modification does not preclude canvassing the
efence in terms of justification or excuse.
According to Robinson:
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Failure of proof defences are conceptually
indistinguishable from elements of the offense;
offense modifications often differ only in
form; justifications are admittedly independent
of the offense definition but may be viewed as
serving to redefine the criminal conduct of the
offense in the light of special justifying
circumstances; and excuses, while admitting the
commission of the harm or evil prescribed by
the offense definition, raise issues of
responsibility which are often allied to the
culpability requirement contained in offense
definitions. [3]
One would infer from the above that the
interpretation of provocation as a failure of proof
defence or an offence modification could be informed
by considerations that may be either justificatory or
excusative in nature. Indeed, as regards the
possibility to perceive provocation as an excuse-
based defence, Robinson remarks that:
One could argue that the provocation and
extreme emotional disturbance defences merit
treatment as a general excuse. The defenses
appear to operate in an excuse-like manner,
shifting the blame from the actor to the
circumstances. [4]
Given that the plea of provocation is aimed at
the reduction of criminal liability, justification
and excuse - taken here in a broad sense - can still
furnish the grounds upon which the rationale of
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partial defence may be sought. [5] In this respect,
provocation is viewed as an excuse-based defence in
so far as its role in extenuation is set down to the
element of impaired volition or loss of control.
Here, the lack of self-control, although it is not
taken to negate the attribution of responsibility/
blameworthiness altogether, can still challenge the
attribution of responsibility pertinent to the major
criminal offence. A.Von Hirsch and N. Jareborg
explain the relation of the excuse doctrine to
provocation as follows:
Conduct is excused in certain situations where
- although the outcome is not deemed desirable
- the actor should be exempted from blame for
acting as she or he did. Textbook examples are
situations of duress and necessity, where the
defendant injures an innocent victim, in order
to avert a threat to his own life or safety
from another source, human or natural. But the
provoked actor faces no immediate threat from
any such source if he refrains from
retaliating. He is also claiming extenuation
only, not complete exoneration. Theories of
excuse in the substantive criminal law could
thus be applicable only by analogy - to suggest
why provocation constitutes a partial excuse,
warranting reduction of punishment. [6]
By the same token, canvassing provocation as a
partial justification should not mislead one to think
that legal justification - in a strict sense - can
be propounded in partial terms. Claims of legal
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justification dispute the unlawful character of an
act in the circumstances and, in this respect, an act
may be either legally justified or not justified at
all. An analogy may be drawn, nonetheless, in so far
as partial justification is understood to diminish
the wrongfulness of the act by virtue of
considerations independent of the actor's state of
mind. In this respect, the reason for reducing the
level of criminal liability in provocation pertains
not to the actor's loss of self-control but, rather,
to the victim's misdeed that prompts the actor to
retaliate. Provocation operates as a partial
justification on the assumption that the actor is to
some degree morally justified to inflict punishment
on the provoker. Ashworth explains the guestion of
partial justification in provocation as follows:
...the term [partial justification] does not
necessarily imply a connection with the legal
concept of justifiable force (i.e. in self-
defence); its closest relationship is with the
moral notion that the punishment of wrongdoers
is justifiable. This is not to argue that it is
ever morally right to kill a person who does
wrong. Rather, the claim implicit in partial
justification is that an individual is to some
extent morally justified in making a punitive
return against someone who intentionally causes
him serious offence, and that this serves to
differentiate someone who is provoked to lose
his self-control and kill from the unprovoked
killer. [7]
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Moral judgements of justification most commonly befit
acts wilfully chosen for their own merits. In this
respect, the possible parallel between moral and
legal justification would lose ground in so far as it
is accepted that legal justification is primarily
concerned with the "external" manifestation of an
act. If an act is deemed legally justified, the
question of whether it was chosen as such - a
question relevant to moral justification - is to be
laid aside. By the same token, one might say that if
the reduction of criminal liability in provocation
were exclusively connected with the victim's misdeed,
the question of whether the actor was in control of
himself need not be considered. The issue of loss of
self-control might perhaps be taken into account in
determining the appropriate degree of punishment for
the lesser offence. This understanding implies the
application by analogy of the basic assumption that
questions of legal justification must logically
precede those of excuse (see chapter 1). As Fletcher
points out:
A justification negates an assertion of
wrongful conduct. An excuse negates a charge
that the particular defendant is personally to
blame for the wrongful conduct... The structure
that is implicit in this way of stating the
analysis of liability ("excuses for unjustified
violations") is that the concept of wrongful
conduct logically precedes the concept of
personal culpability. The analysis of
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justification must precede the analysis of
excuse. [8]
Besides its position as a partial defence to
murder, provocation is also considered as a factor
taken into account in the mitigation of sentence,
following conviction of a criminal offence other than
murder. One might suggest that, as a matter of
mitigation too, the rationale of provocation could be
sought in either the excusative or the justificatory
element. According to Hart, mitigation rests on the
assumption that, in the circumstances, compliance
with the law would reguire the actor to exert much
greater mental or psychological effort as compared to
"normal people normally placed". [9] In this respect,
the rationale of mitigation bears closer on excuse,
for our primary focus is upon the actor's state of
mind that makes it extraordinarily difficult for him
to exercise control over his actions. On the other
hand, mitigation may also rest on considerations that
are taken to reduce directly the degree of wrong
rather than the degree to which the actor is held
blameworthy. Thus, a claim of mitigation might
perhaps arise in a case where, for example, the actor
intentionally broke the law in the course of a
legally justifiable action. In this respect,
mitigation can be explained by reference to the
conditions of justification. Although, in theory,
distinguishing between justificatory and excusative
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considerations at different levels of analysis may
seem quite straightforward, in practice it is often
difficult to make out the precise nature of the
proposed plea. As Hart explains:
Though the central cases are distinct enough
the borderlines between Justification, Excuse
and Mitigation are not. There are many features
of conduct which can be and are thought of in
more than one of these ways. [10]
One possible way to deal with these problems of
demarcation between justification and excuse may be
to look for the rationale of provocation by reference
to the particular offence against which as a
partial defence - or in the context of which - as a
factor in mitigation - provocation is raised. Thus,
by taking into account the hierarchy of criminal
offences in law and the moral weight these offences
are associated with, one might say that, in general,
provocation should rather operate on excuse basis
with respect to more serious offences. The assumption
here is that, in the face of a serious crime, only
the excuse of loss of self-control may furnish
morally acceptable grounds for extenuation. On the
other hand, justificatory considerations may be given
the priority when provocation is pleaded as a factor
in the mitigation of sentence with respect to minor
offences. [11]
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Problems arise as to whether one may still speak
of the proposed plea as one of provocation, if the
element of loss of self-control were dispensed with -
i.e. in a case where provocation is taken as
justification-based. What distinguishes provocation
from mere challenge is that the former, in a sense,
"causes" rather than invites the actor to react. In
this respect, the victim's affront constitutes
provocation precisely because it leads the actor to
retaliate in a state of mind that precludes him from
being totally in control of his actions. Thus, it
seems that both the victim's insult and - in relation
to this - the actor's impaired capacity for self-
control should be considered as necessary conceptual
elements of provocation. Therefore, one might
envisage the exclusion of either of these elements
only as regards its assumed role in extenuation, but
not as regards its position as a constituent element
of provocation. It seems correct to say that if
either of these elements were excluded in the latter
sense, one would not be able to speak of the
accused's plea as one of provocation. In the absence
of impaired volition, the case might perhaps bear
closer on excessive self-defence - when the latter is
viewed as a partial justification - provided that the
victim's wrongdoing constitutes a legal offence. On
the other hand, in the absence of conduct that is
seen as wrongful enough to amount to provocation, the
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actor's loss of self-control - if accepted as a
matter of fact - might be treated under another legal
excuse or, arguably, it might be considered as an
independent excuse on its own.
2. The Partial Justification Doctrine
The conception of provocation as a form of
partial justification is said to have deep roots in
the common law tradition. [12] This, one may argue,
explains the law's predilection for an independent
plea of provocation rather than subsuming these cases
under a general "heat of passion" or "loss of self-
control" defence. [13] Despite the important changes
brought about in the English law of provocation by
the Homicide Act 1957 - which, arguably, marks a
shift towards treating the defence as a partial
excuse - the overtones of the idea that provocation
constitutes a partial justification are still
ubiguitous in the case law. [14] According to F.
McAuley:
...while the defence of provocation may well be
a concession to the natural human failings that
are the lot of every defendant, it is submitted
that its true basis is to be found in the
contribution of the victim, in the fact that
his wrongful conduct was the cause of the
defendant's outburst. [15]
The aim of this section is to offer a critical
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account of of the partial justification doctrine and
examine its theoretical implications for the analysis
of provocation as a partial defence to murder. It
will be argued that treating provocation as a partial
justification is inconsistent with basic principles
of a criminal justice system, as well as morally
contestable. Although there are cases on provocation
which cast the issue in terms of justification, it is
more appropriate to take the defence as being
excusative in character.
The partial justification doctrine lays emphasis
on the assumption that it is the provoker who by his
untoward conduct triggers the actor's fatal response.
Provocation implies conduct objectively wrongful and
as such capable of raising justified anger,
culminating perhaps in some sort of violent reaction.
In this respect, the actor's response to provocation
constitutes, in a broad sense, an act of revenge.
[16] Although killing under provocation cannot be
totally justified - as, for example, in self-defence
- it is argued that the law should make allowances
for the victim's culpable contribution to his own
demise. In McAuley's words:
...the defence of provocation functions as a
partial justification rather than a partial
excuse. If it were merely a partial excuse, the
defence would be limited to a denial that the
defendant was entirely to blame for his
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actions, i.e. for wrongfully killing another
intentionally, by reason of the impairment of
his powers of self-control. As we have seen,
however, the defence entails a denial that the
defendant's actions were entirely wrongful in
the first place, in the sense that it implies
that the defendant was partially justified in
reacting as he did because of the untoward
conduct of his victim. [17]
The above approach consorts with the basic
assumption that, in general, justification pertains
to the question of whether an act should "externally"
be held wrongful/unlawful or not. Nonetheless, in the
present case, the question of justification refers,
rather, to the degree of wrongfulness/unlawfulness of
the act. From this viewpoint, as said before, the
requirement of impaired volition in provocation would
be redundant - at least as relevant to the rationale
of the partial defence. Notwithstanding that the
actor cannot here plead total justification, the
victim's provocative conduct furnishes the
preponderant reason for reducing the degree of
wrongfulness/unlawfulness of the killing. Arguably,
understanding provocation as a partial justification
presupposes that the victim is culpable for his
misdeed. It might be said that the degree to which
the actor's retaliation is justified depends both on
the wrongfulness of the provocation and on the
victim's culpability in this respect. [18]
Nonetheless, the identification of the proper level
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of liability logically precedes the possible
assessment of actor's degree of culpability on this
level. Whereas, in other words, for the reduction of
the criminal category of homicide a culpable act of
provocation should be established, the gravity of
provocation may be taken into account, among other
things, in determining the degree of punishment for
the lesser offence. However, in so far as the partial
justification doctrine presupposes a culpable
provocation, this doctrine could not apply where the
victim's culpability cannot be clearly shown. The
latter might obtain, for example, in a case where the
accused's fatal reaction was in fact preceded by an
exchange of provocative acts between the parties. If
the instigator of the situation cannot be identified,
the plea of provocation could not be accepted, at
least on the grounds of the partial justification
doctrine. [19] Arguably, the same would be the case
where the provoker is excusable, or where the actor
is mistaken about the real character of the
victim's acts.
Although the actor's life is not in danger,
provocation resembles self-defence in that in both
cases it is the deceased who triggers the fatal
incident. The aggressor's culpability is given an
important role as regards the legal justification of
killing in self-defence. Similarly, the provoker's
culpability is deemed relevant to the partial
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justification of his killing in retaliation. It is
asserted that an act of provocation may be seen as
weakening the provoker's right to life, although it
does not completely negate it. This position emanates
from the moral theory of justification which
postulates that one can forfeit his right to life if
he acts wrongfully against another (the "forfeiture"
theory). [20] As it applies to self-defence, this
theory suggests that the wrongfulness of killing the
aggressor is negated on the ground that the
aggressor's right to life is suspended. With respect
to provocation, such an approach might lead to the
conclusion that any wrongful conduct, regardless of
its degree, would suffice to render the wrongdoer's
right to life less worthy of protection, provided
that is deemed serious enough to constitute legal
provocation. Moreover, if the provoker's right to
life is downgraded, not only the addressee of the
provocation but anyone could take the provoker's life
and plead partial justification. [21]
Several objections could be raised against the
"forfeiture" theory as it applies to provocation. If
one accepts that the wrongdoer forgoes his right to
life according to the degree of his culpable
wrongdoing, it seems hard to envisage where to draw
the line as regards the sort of wrongful acts that
might be taken to undermine this right. Thus, one
might claim that even a minor wrongdoing can be
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seen as somehow "weakening" the actor's right to
life. Such an approach appears to contravene
fundamental moral principles regarding the sanctity
and inviolability of human life. On the other hand,
if only very serious wrongdoings were held to be
capable of undermining the wrongdoer's right to life,
for example, wrongdoings involving some sort of
threat to life or limb, the scope of the provocation
defence could get extremely narrow. Further, one
might argue that applying the "forfeiture" theory to
provocation leads to contradiction in so far as it is
admitted that the actor's response to provocation
remains seriously wrongful. Indeed, on the hypothesis
that a culpable wrongdoing weakens the wrongdoer's
right to life, both the actor's and the provoker's
lives should be viewed as being "downgraded". For
these reasons, the "forfeiture" theory seems not to
provide sufficient grounds of support for the partial
justification doctrine in provocation. The victim's
wrongdoing, culpable though it may be, cannot
unconditionally lead to the justification of any act
of retaliation, still less to the "partial"
justification of the provoker's killing. J. Dressier,
by drawing an analogy between self-defence and
provocation, argues as follows:
...it might be claimed that a provoker who does
not threaten the accused's life does not
wholly forfeit his right to life but that,
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nonetheless, from society's perspective his
life is entitled to less protection because of
his wrongful behaviour. We value his life less
than that of an innocent human being. Or,
perhaps, we might say that our interest in
protecting people from aggression is less
intense when the defendant's own wrongful acts
contributed to the attack. Such a claim has
superficial appeal, but how strongly do we
believe it? Do we really believe that a
person's life should be less valued in the law
because he slapped the face of the killer,
uttered some opprobrium, blew smoke in his
face, or committed a sexual impropriety with a
member of the defendant's family? Is human life
so easily alienated? It is one thing to
proclaim that the provoker should be punished
for his wrongdoing; it is another to suggest
that his life can be taken with "partial
impunity". [22]
Let us now examine whether provocation as a
partial justification might draw some support from
the other two main moral theories of justification,
namely, the theory of the lesser evil and the rights-
based theory of justification. Briefly, the
application of the lesser evil variation of the
justification theories presupposes, first, a
situation of conflict of interests wherein only one
interest can possibly be preserved at the expense of
the other; second, that the interests at stake can be
evaluated and compared according to certain objective
criteria; and, third, a rational agent who is called
upon to make a reasonable choice, that is, a choice
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in accordance with those objective criteria of
evaluation. Notwithstanding its prima facie wrongful
character, an act which preserves or promotes the
superior interest is deemed justified. [23] With
regard to legal justification, in particular, it
should be pointed out that the relevant judgement is
not confined only to the assessment of the competing
interests at stake, but it is informed also by the
reguirement to protect the legal order in general. It
seems clear that this theory of justification cannot
furnish any grounds for considering provocation as a
partial justification. In fact, the conditions of
provocation do not seem at all to meet the basic
prereguisites of this theory of justification, and
the very idea of partial justification seems out of
place here. Indeed, if the killing of the provoker
were regarded as less evil than taking the
provocation, something which is hardly the case, the
actor should rather be entitled to complete
exoneration. First of all, however, in provocation it
cannot be said that the actor is confronted with an
inescapable conflict of interests, as reguired for
the application of the present theory. Depending upon
the nature of the provocation, the actor may seek
redress in an appropriate - i.e. fully justifiable -
manner. As Dressier explains:
The lesser evil theory is also difficult to
comprehend in partial terms. If the taking of a
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human life in response to nondeadly provocation
is less evil or harmful than countenancing the
provocation (an unlikely conclusion at that),
the defendant should be acquitted of all
homicide charges; if the defendant's actions
are more evil, he should be punished fully for
taking a human life. [24]
The third moral theory of justification to be
considered rests upon the rights-enforcement
principle, or the principle of the vindication of
autonomy. According to this theory, one is entitled
to pursue and protect one's rights even, in extremis,
by taking the life of the transgressor. The partial
justification doctrine cannot claim any support on
this basis either. The enforcement of moral or legal
rights is not unconditional. On the contrary, those
rights would remain in force only when pursued within
certain limitations. Beyond these limitations, the
right would fall in abeyance - what remains being a
mere pretext of a right - and thus it could not
warrant moral or legal justification. [25] As
Dressier argues:
The rights theory of justification is the least
convincing basis in these circumstances [of
provocation]. What right would we want to say
the defendant is properly exercising when he
kills a provoker? It cannot be the right to
life, since the provoker does not jeopardise
the defendant's (or anyone else's) right to
life. If it is a dignitary right that the
defendant seeks to exercise, it should
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certainly come as a surprise to us that such a
right entitles the actor to take a human life
in order to enforce it. [26]
It seems, therefore, that none of the above
theories of justification is capable of buttressing
the approach to provocation as a partial
justification defence. Rather, considering the
entrenched understanding of provocation as a
concession to natural human frailty, the excuse
theory seems to be a more appropriate basis for the
defence. Although for the plea of provocation to be
sustained the actor has to show that he was somehow
wronged by his victim, the rationale of the defence
should be traced to the actor's loss of self-control.
In this respect, the victim's provocation furnishes
an acceptable reason for the actor's loss of control
rather than a reason for directly diminishing the
wrongfulness of his killing the provoker. The
formulation of provocation as a partial excuse will
be explored further in the following chapter.
One might claim that some support for the partial
justification doctrine may at any rate be drawn in
those cases where provocation appears to verge on
self-defence. This could obtain, in particular, where
the act of provocation entails some threat to the
actor's life or limb. [27] It is accepted that in
these cases the actor may rely on provocation only if
the plea of self-defence cannot be sustained. This
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would be the case, for example, if the actor exceeds
the limits of necessary force in self-defence.
Nevertheless, in such cases one may envisage an
important shift as regards the grounds of the actor's
defence - in one word, a shift from justification to
excuse. In English law, the position that in
excessive self-defence cases the admission of an
unlawful attack does not on its own entitle the actor
to a partial justification defence militates against
connecting the rationale of provocation with that of
self-defence (see chapter 5). Some further objections
can be raised against treating the two defences on a
common basis. The legal justification of self-defence
rests on the assumption that the act of defence
vindicates not only the actor's life but, in
addition, the legal order in general. Besides the
fact that in provocation the actor is not confronted
with an immediate danger, it would seem paradoxical
to associate the act of retaliation - an act by
definition unlawful - with the protection of legal
order. [28] Moreover, for the defence of provocation
to be accepted, it is not required that the victim's
conduct should constitute a legal offence. By the
same token, it is accepted that the victim's conduct,
unlawful though it may be, could not support a plea
of provocation if it had no impact on the actor's
capacity for self-control. [29]
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One might perhaps pursue another approach to
the question of wrongfulness concerning a provoked
killing by considering the matter with respect
to a variation of the doctrine of "double effect".
This doctrine has been associated with attempts
to elucidate the grounds upon which killing
in self-defence is justified. [30] The doctrine of
double effect postulates a distinction between two
effects of an act: the one effect pertains to what
the actor in fact intends in itself, or as a means to
an end; the other refers to what the actor may
foresee as a probable or inevitable consequence of
his action but he does not intend as such. In this
respect, one is invited to assess the act first by
viewing it in the abstract - i.e., without its
unintended consequences. This, in turn, may be
followed by a second assessment of the act in the
light of its unintended consequences. In a case of a
provoked killing, the double effect doctrine
might perhaps suggest to view the provoker's
death as an unintended consequence of an otherwise
intentional act of retaliation. From this viewpoint
it might be said that, taking into account the
actor's intention, the response to provocation would
be justified in so far as it pays the provoker his
due. If the provoker's killing was a foreseen or
foreseeable result of such a response, the actor
may be held accountable to a lesser degree. The
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actor would have no justification, however, if his
original intention was to kill the provoker.
Nevertheless, in so far as provocation is taken to
provide a defence for intentional killings, such an
approach to the matter is difficult to accept. The
doctrine of double effect has been criticised on
several grounds. It is argued, in particular, that no
distinction could possibly be drawn between intending
to do X and intending to kill, if the latter is
foreseen as an inescapable conseguence of the former.
According to S. Radish:
The doctrine of double effect does not provide
that knowing killings may not be serious crimes
and wrongs, but only that this weaker sense of
the sanctity-of-life principle is not
necessarily violated when they occur. This
weaker version, then, still leaves us
uninformed of the theory on which killings are
justifiable or acceptable when they are not
intentional in the strict sense. Beyond that,
however, the distinction is so alien to our
intuitive common sense as to be sophistical.
For if I shoot a man between the eyes because
he is assailing me with upraised dagger, it
seems strange to allow me to say I did not
choose to take his life, but that I chose only
to prevent the attack. Although the former was
not a logically necessary condition of the
latter, it was actually necessary in the
circumstances or I, at least, acted on that
assumption. Only the ghost of an absolute ban
on intended killing is left if it excepts such
a killing as this. The double-effect doctrine
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seems to me like a fiction in the law, serving
to preserve appearances for a principle that
has lost its sufficiency. [31]
Thus far, it was asserted that the idea of
treating provocation as a partial justification
defence, notwithstanding its moral connotations,
seems difficult to reconcile with fundamental
principles of legal justification. This is not to
argue, however, that this approach to provocation is
irrelevant to the development of legal doctrine, or
that it cannot be met in the current decisions on the
matter. One could cite various examples wherein
provocation has been considered - implicitly or
explicitly - as a justification-based defence. [32]
Nevertheless, in so far as the trend in the law -
as relating to society's moral attitudes - is towards
placing more emphasis on the sanctity of human life,
taking provocation as a partial justification should
lose ground. [33] However, to the degree that such an
approach to the defence remains part of a system of
criminal law, provocation is bound to be a source of
controversy. [34] The reason for this is that, as it
operates in this context, the idea of partial
justification conflicts with basic requirements of
criminal law, such as those relating to due process
and proportional punishment. In particular, the
availability of lawful means of protection against
illegal acts of provocation generally precludes
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"taking the law into one's hands". [35] Nonetheless,
treating provocation in terms of justification may
gain acceptance in those cases where provocation is
taken as a mitigating consideration in the face of
minor offences. This would depend, among other
things, on the nature of the criminal offence in
question, as well as the seriousness of the
provocation. [36] The remaining subdivisions of this
chapter explore how central problems in the law of
provocation may be conceptualized and dealt with from
the viewpoint of the partial justification doctrine.
In the course of this analysis, partial justification
will be contrasted with partial excuse.
3. Provocation, Misdirected Retaliation and Mistake
of Fact
The keystone of the partial justification
doctrine as it applies to provocation is that the
victim is partly responsible for his own death. The
actor's claim for extenuation rests here on the
victim's culpable contribution to his own killing.
With regard to this, it is asserted that in those
cases where the act of retaliation was accidentally
directed at an innocent third party the actor should
still be entitled to the defence, provided that his
intended victim was the author of the provocation.
[37] If the latter cannot be shown, however, the
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actor should be found guilty of murder. [38]
Nevertheless, in some cases of misdirected
retaliation, namely, those involving a mistake about
the identity of the provoker, one might raise the
question of whether the real basis of the actor's
defence to murder pertains to the conditions of
provocation or, rather, to those of mistake.
Considering the current position in English law, it
is accepted that in such cases the actor could still
rely on provocation, notwithstanding that his
retaliation was directed at the party other than the
provoker. By the same token, the actor would be
entitled to the defence if he was mistaken about the
real nature of the victim's conduct. In both cases,
the defence of provocation may be accepted only if
the actor's mistake is held to be reasonable.
Nevertheless, the overlap of provocation and mistake
in such cases has led some authors to envisage the
relevant plea as a specific variation of the defence
of mistake of fact.
...if the slayer is told of such great harm
which he had not heard before, this may be
sufficient for adequate provocation... even if
the statement is untrue - provided it is made
under circumstances calculated to cause it to
be believed and it is actually believed by the
slayer. This is merely a particular application
of the reasonable mistake of fact doctrine.
[39]
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Under the partial justification doctrine, it is
asserted that the issue of provocation in such cases
of mistake should be assessed on the basis of the
circumstances as the actor believed them to be. For
those cases of mistake where no act of provocation
took place one may use the term "putative
provocation". These may be distinguished from the
cases where an act of provocation did in fact occur,
but its author was someone else than the victim -
i.e. cases of misdirected retaliation due to mistake.
Both sorts of cases may be subsumed - in the
context of the present doctrine - under the heading
of putative partial justification. According
to McAuley:
...the non-occurrence of the provocative event
would seem, at least at first sight, to be
fatal to [the accused's] plea [of provocation]
from the point of view of the theory of
justification, as there would then be no prior
wrong on which he could rely as a basis for his
own retaliatory action. Yet this conclusion
seems counter-intuitive, as it removes the
defence from a defendant who would have been
entitled to it had the facts been as he
reasonably supposed them to be. ...For while
the paradigm case of a plea of partial
justification will, in the nature of things,
rest on evidence of wrongful conduct on the
part of the victim, it does not follow that
retaliatory violence is always unjustified in
the absence of such evidence. [40]
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As the above analysis suggests, in cases of mistaken
provocation the accused should still rely on a
partial justification defence, notwithstanding that
the victim's conduct did not objectively amount to
provocation. A similar position is put forward with
regard to putative justification (e.g. putative self-
defence), with the difference that the actor would
here be entitled to full acguittal. Nonetheless, it
seems guestionable whether in such cases the grounds
of the actor's defence should be traced in the theory
of justification. Indeed, as was said before, one may
envisage two different approaches to dealing with
problems of putative justification: first, to
consider the issue in the light of the circumstances
as they really were and hence to treat the actor's
plea under the excuse of mistake; second, to consider
the issue on the basis of the circumstances as the
actor believed them to be and thus to treat the
actor's plea as a matter of justification or - with
respect to provocation - partial justification.
Nevertheless, if putative partial justification cases
were subsumed under the excuse of mistake, such an
excuse should operate only in part, that is, only to
the extent to which the actor's response would be
justified. In so far as the act of retaliation
remains wrongful, the actor could not rely on a
complete excuse. The same would obtain with respect
to excessive self-defence, if a claim of partial
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justification is recognised on such a basis (see
chapter 5).
On the other hand, if the issue of putative
justification is dealt with as relating to
justification rather than excuse (i.e. on the basis of
the circumstances as the actor believed them to be),
provocation - as a partial justification - should
furnish the grounds for the actor's defence in such
cases. In this respect, one may draw an analogy
between putative provocation (putative partial
justification) and putative self-defence (putative
justification) by considering how the latter is
treated in common law. In common law the dominant
position seems to be that the right of self-defence
arises in any case where the actor believes that he is
under an unlawful attack. This is taken to denote that
the right of self-defence would arise even in those
cases where the actor's belief is mistaken, in so far
as such a mistake is deemed reasonable. As we shall
latter consider, this approach is contested on the
grounds that it confuses justification with excuse and
hence it misrepresents the rationale of legal
justification (see chapter 5).
Having examined the problem of mistake in
provocation from the viewpoint of the partial
justification doctrine, we may now come to discuss how
the same problem may be dealt with if the defence is
treated as a partial excuse. Taking provocation as an
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excuse-based defence, the focus of enquiry is on the
actor's loss of self-control as a result of the
provocation rather than on the victim's untoward
conduct as such. In this respect one might say that,
when the act of retaliation was directed at a
third party, the admission of loss of control would
entitle the actor to the defence, irrespective of
whether his intended victim was the author of the
provocation or not. [41] As R.S. O'Regan remarks:
To avail himself of the defence of provocation
the accused must have actually lost control of
himself and retaliated while in the heat of
passion. Once an accused loses his self-control
it is unreal to insist that his retaliatory acts
be directed only against his provoker. When his
reason has been dethroned a man cannot be
expected, in the words of a Queensland judge,
"to guide his anger with judgment". In fact an
attack on an innocent third party may suggest
very strongly that the accused did lose his
self-control. [42]
Under the excuse theory it seems correct to say merely
that, in so far as the actor was led to lose his self-
control by an act of provocation, he should not be
denied the defence even though his response was
directed against a person other than the provoker.
Nevertheless, it might still seem questionable to
assert that, in such cases, the actor should be able
to rely on the defence, even if his intended victim
was not the author of the provocation. As has been
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said, with regard to the partial justification
doctrine, should the latter be the case the actor
could not rely on provocation, for only if intended at
the provoker the act of retaliation would be partially
justified. In the context of the excuse doctrine,
although the focus is on the issue of loss of self-
control, a retaliation not intended at the provoker
may also exclude the defence, but on different
grounds. First, because it might indicate absence of
an intention to kill on the part of the actor. The
latter, as we have seen, is a necessary prereguisite
for the defence of provocation to be admitted. This
may obtain, for example, in a case where the actor
reacted to provocation in "blind rage". Here the actor
may be entitled to a lack of mens rea defence rather
than provocation (see chapter 3). Second, an
intention to kill a person unrelated to the provoker
might perhaps indicate that the actor was suffering
from an abnormality of mind. If this were the case,
the basis of the actor's excuse of loss of self-
control may shift from provocation to some other
defence, notably, diminished responsibility (see
chapter 6). Finally, the guestion of who the actor's
intended victim was may be relevant to whether loss of
self-control can be accepted as a matter of fact. One
may say, in one word, that if the actor's retaliation
is not intended at the author of the provocation, it
is questionable whether provocation can provide the
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basis for the excuse of loss of control. These points
will be laboured further in the course of our analysis
of provocation as a partial excuse later.
In those cases where the actor was led to lose his
self-control by a mistaken belief of provocation
(putative provocation), it is argued that he should
still be able to rely on an excuse. According to
Fletcher:
With regard to mistaken belief in excusing
facts, the subjective experience of pressure is
just as great, whether the danger [here the
provocation] is real or imaginary. This mistake
must be taken into account in some manner. [43]
Nevertheless, although the emphasis is now upon the
actor's loss of self-control, the guestion of
provocation should somehow still be answered.
Notwithstanding that the victim's conduct did not in
fact amount to provocation, one would have to consider
whether what the actor mistakenly perceived could
constitute provocation sufficient to buttress an
excuse of loss of control. In other words, the
question of provocation turns here on the actor's
misrepresentation of the victim's conduct.
Nonetheless, this question should be distinguished
from the issue of whether the actor's mistake can be
regarded as reasonable. One may argue that in such
cases for the actor's excuse of loss of self-control
to be accepted, a strong case of mistake needs to be
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made in the first place. In this respect, the actor's
plea could be seen as double-based, for it rests on
considerations of both mistake and provocation.
It might be argued, on the other hand, that loss of
control by reason of putative provocation should in
some cases entitle the actor to a partial excuse,
irrespective of whether his mistake was reasonable or
not. All that is reguired, in this respect, is to show
that what the actor perceived as provocation would be
sufficient to support an excuse of loss of self-
control. Unless the actor can put forward a lack of
mens rea defence in such cases, it may seem
contradictory, however, to require the "provocation"
but not the mistake to be reasonable. [44] Some
further aspects of the theory of mistake will be
examined in relation to provocation in chapter 4.
4. Proportionality and the "Reasonable Man": a First
Approach
The partial justification doctrine postulates that
the actor should be unable to rely on provocation
unless the victim's transgression is sufficiently
serious. It is argued that the traditional requirement
of proportionality in the law of provocation is most
at home under this doctrine. Indeed, the old rule in
common law that words alone cannot constitute legal
provocation has been taken to mirror the conception
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of the defence as justification- rather than excuse-
based. [45] As has been said in chapter 1, the
requirement of proportionality indicates that, for the
defence to be accepted, there must be a reasonable
relationship between the act of provocation and that
of retaliation. This requirement is embedded in the
assumption that a reasonable person reacts to
provocation accordinq to its degree. The more
outrageous and savage the provocation is the more
violently the actor should be expected to react.
McAuley explains the role of the proportionality
requirement under the partial justification doctrine
as follows:
Admittedly, the principle of proportionality is
generally invoked to deny the defence of
provocation to a defendant who has fatally shot
or stabbed an unarmed victim, or who has beaten
his victim to death in an orgy of violence. But
there is no reason in principle why it should
not also be invoked to deny the defence to a
defendant who kills his victim with a single
blow of the fist if there is evidence that the
latter's conduct did not warrant retaliatory
violence of this order, in a word, in cases in
which the victim's behaviour was insufficiently
serious to justify a killing of any kind. The
principle of proportionality can, therefore,
quite properly be regarded as an alternative way
of stating the classical requirement that
provocation must be serious to afford a defence
to a charge of murder. Indeed, given that it
emphasizes the justificatory component in the
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plea of provocation - the fact that the violence
used by an accused must be reasonably related to
his victim's wrongdoing, it is perhaps the best
way of stating this requirement. [46]
A recurrent problem in the theory of provocation has
been whether it is correct to speak of the requirement
of proportionality as relevant to the mode of the
actor's retaliation. In the context of the present
doctrine, it is argued that the question of partial
justification focuses on the mode of the actor's
retaliation as the cause of the provoker's death. In
this respect, only in those cases where the
provocation is deemed serious enough to "warrant" a
deadly response, should the killing be partially
justified. In so far as it is accepted that
provocation presupposes loss of self-control, the
partial justification doctrine does not exclude the
defence even if the actor retains some control over
his actions. According to McAuley:
It makes perfect sense for the law to assume
that an enraged defendant is capable of some
measure of rational control. Perhaps for this
reason it has traditionally been true that the
critical question in a case of provocation is
not whether the defendant has temporarily lost
control in some absolute, irretrievable sense,
but whether he was partially justified in
killing his victim in the circumstances. [47]
One may argue that, with regard to the justification
theory, the element of impaired volition or loss of
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self-control in provocation is hardly relevant to the
partial justification of the provoker's killing. In
the last analysis, what here really matters is whether
the provocation was serious enough to "objectively"
diminish the wrongfulness of the provoker's killing.
As pointed out before, speaking of an act intended to
kill but not of the ensuing killing as being partially
justified seems too sophistical - unless it indicates
that the actor had in fact no intention to kill (see
the discussion of the doctrine of double effect, p.21
supra). The issue of loss of control, relevant to
establishing provocation though it may be, has little
to do with the requirements of justification. Indeed,
with regard to the latter, it would be fallacious to
make the actor's plea of partial justification
dependent upon the requirement of loss of self-
control. The proposition that killing the provoker is
to some degree justified a) because of provoker's
transgression and b) because the actor lacks self-
control seems, as to its second premise, doubly wrong.
First, as has been mentioned before, moral judgements
of justification presuppose that the actor is in
control of his actions, for moral justification
focuses on the act as a product of the actor's
determination. In this respect, although an act may be
desirable, the actor could not claim moral
justification if he did not intend such an act in
itself (e.g., due to lack of self-control). Morally
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speaking, if the author of the provocation is
culpable, it might perhaps be said that "he got what
he deserved"; but this does not entail the moral
justification of the actor's response, unless it is
admitted that the actor was somehow in control of
himself. [48] Second, it was said that the focus of
legal judgements of justification is primarily on the
act and not on the actor. In this respect, if a
culpable provocation is taken to render the provoker's
killing less wrongful, one need not consider whether
or not the actor was in control of himself when
retaliated. Such considerations could only be relevant
to the actor's claim if provocation is treated as an
excuse. In so far as in the context of the defence of
provocation moral and legal justification would seem
to intersect, making the plea of partial justification
dependent upon the actor's loss of self-control is
contestable on both fronts. Thus McAuley seems to
contradict himself when he says that:
Undoubtedly, a defendant who kills after he has
regained his composure, or when the effects of
the provocation have more or less worn off, is
not entitled to the defence, as he can hardly
claim that it was the provocation which caused
his violent outburst. A defendant who kills in
these circumstances has plainly committed an act
of revenge and, consequently, is guilty of
murder. But it is submitted that a defendant who
can show that he killed in the face of
substantial provocation should, on this ground
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alone, be entitled to the defence, provided that
his conduct can be justified in the sense
suggested above. [49]
If the loss of self-control is excluded from the
rationale of the defence of provocation, however, one
could see no reason why even those who kill out of
sheer revenge should not shelter under a partial
justification defence, if they could show that they
were seriously wronged by the victim (except perhaps
that acts of revenge overtly challenge the validity of
the legal order). Indeed, as we shall later consider,
a similar guestion has arisen as relevant to the
partial justification of killing in excessive self-
defence cases (see chapter 5), as well as in certain
cases of cumulative provocation (see chapter 6).
If provocation is taken to furnish a partial
justification defence, one might perceive
proportionality as referring simply to the
relationship between the degree of provocation and the
degree of justification of the provoker's killing.
Thus, one might say that the more serious the
provocation, the more justified - or less wrongful an
act - the provoker's killing in retaliation would be.
Such an approach to the matter entails, first, that if
the provocation is deemed sufficiently wrongful, the
actor should be entitled to a partial justification
defence, whatever the manner of his retaliation may
be. [5 OA] In this respect, proportionality may be
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formulated as a "requirement" only in so far as it
indicates the threshold of wrongfulness which an act
of provocation should meet if it is to buttress a plea
of partial justification. Second, beyond this
threshold the degree to which the actor's retaliation
is justified may vary depending on the gravity of the
victm's provocation. In this respect, proportionality
is viewed not as a "requirement" but, rather, as an
issue relevant - among other things - to determining
the degree of punishment for the lesser crime. [50B]
By the same token, one might say that under the
justification doctrine the reasonable man standard
could only relate to the question of whether the
victim's provocation was sufficiently grave to
buttress a claim of partial justification. In this
respect, the provoker's killing should be considered
as partially justified only if a reasonable person
would view the provocation as being very serious. Such
an approach to the reasonable man standard does not
exclude taking into account certain individual
characteristics of the actor in so far as they are
considered relevant to determining the gravity of the
victim's provocation. Ashworth argues that:
Once it is accepted that individual
characteristics are relevant to an estimation of
the gravity of provocation, it is surely
possible to reinstate the principle that people
react to provocation according to its degree.[51]
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If is read in terms of justification, the above
position would imply that a deadly response may be
partially justified in so far as, in the face of
certain individual characteristics of the actor, the
provocation is deemed sufficiently grave (see chp.4).
Finally, one might say that in a case where the
author of the provocation is excusable, the actor may
not be able to rely on the defence if he was aware of
the provoker's excuse. The reason for this is that in
such a case, however wrongful the act of provocation
may seem, the actor's awareness of the provoker's
excuse may be regarded as militating against the
basic hypothesis of the partial justification
doctrine, namely, that the provoker deserves
punishment. If the actor is not cognizant of the
provoker's excuse, on the other hand, the case should
rather be treated as one of putative partial
justification (see section 3, supra).
Let us now consider how the requirement of
proportionality in provocation may be interpreted if
the defence is taken to operate as a partial excuse.
Here the actor's plea centres on the element of loss
of self-control. At first, in so far as the loss of
control is viewed as a matter of degree, one might say
that the more control the actor was capable of
exercising the less excusable his fatal reaction to
provocation should be. According to R. Cross:
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The law must recognize, as common sense does,
that thoughts of the conseguences of their
conscious and deliberate action may well not
flash across the minds of those under the
influence of such strong emotions as panic or
rage. Even if thoughts of the victim's suffering
do flash into the mind in these circumstances,
they could only produce a moral distinction from
a case in which they do not occur if they came
at a moment when the agent had sufficient
control of the situation to enable him to desist
from further action. [52]
Given that the partial excuse in provocation centres
on the element of loss of control, it may seem
contradictory to connect the requirement of
proportionality with the actor's mode of retaliation.
Indeed, such a connection may lead one to assume that
the actor could not rely on the excuse unless his mode
of retaliation roughly measures up to the gravity of
the victim's provocation. What is here confusing is
that, being put like that, the requirement of
proportionality seems to imply that, for the defence
to be accepted, the actor's capacity for self-control
need not be excluded. In other words, such an approach
is misleading because it tends to shift the focus from
the question of whether the actor lost his self-
control to that of whether he retaliated in kind.
Nevertheless, in so far as provocation provides a
partial excuse for an intentional killing, the
admission of control should be fatal to the actor's
defence. The question here is not whether the manner
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of retaliation was dissimilar to the provocation
received but, rather, whether the provocation was such
as to render the loss of control an acceptable excuse
for killing. Thus, one should distinguish between a
provocation that renders the actor's failure to
exercise control excusable, and a provocation that the
actor is always expected to resist. Failing to
exercise control and refrain from killing in the face
of a trivial provocation cannot be excused. Similarly,
serious though the provocation may have been, the
actor's defence would collapse if he did not in fact
lose his self-control as a result. [53] Considering
the actor's mode of retaliation may be important in
dealing with this latter guestion. As the above
discussion suggests, neither under the partial excuse
doctrine the requirement of proportionality could
plausibly refer to the fashion of the actor's response
to the provocation. In this context, proportionality
may only indicate that the excuse of loss of control
is dependent upon the degree of the provocation to
which the actor was subjected. [54] In addition to
this, if the defence is sustained, the gravity of the
victim's provocation may be taken into account, among
other things, in determining the actor's degree of
culpability within the purview of the lesser crime. In
this respect, it might be said that a more serious
provocation would attach less blame to the actor - for
losing his self-control and killing - than a less
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serious one, even though both sorts of provocation are
sufficient to reduce the legal category of homicide.
[55] With respect to the excuse doctrine, the
reasonable man may have a part to play in resolving
the guestion of whether the provocation received was
such that the actor should be expected to resist. If
the latter is the case, provocation could not support
an acceptable excuse of loss of self-control
irrespective of whether the actor in fact lost his
self-control or not. This may obtain, for example, in
a case where the provoker is excusable and the actor
is cognizant of the provoker's excuse. The issues
considered in this section will further be examined in
the course of the discussion of provocation as an
excuse in the following chapter. Different approaches
to identifying the role of the reasonable man will be
the subject matter of the analysis in chapter 4.
5. Concluding Note
This chapter examined how justification and excuse
relate to the defence of provocation, and offered a
critical account of the partial justification
doctrine. With regard to the role of provocation as a
partial defence to murder, it was argued that the
merits of treating the defence in terms of
justification are contestable. Although such an
approach to the defence might perhaps claim some moral
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grounds of support, it contravenes the rationale and
principles of legal justification. The implications of
the justification doctrine on the issues of mistaken
provocation (putative provocation), proportionality
and the reasonable man were explored in contrast with
those of the excuse doctrine. It was asserted that
neither theory of provocation makes room for treating
the issue of proportionality as pertinent in a
narrow sense - to the actor's mode of retaliation.
Rather, under the partial justification doctrine the
reguirement of proportionality indicates that the
provoker's killing may be partially justified only in
the face of a serious provocation. Under the excuse
doctrine, on the other hand, this reguirement relates
to the question of whether the gravity of the
provocation was such as to render the actor's loss of
self-control an acceptable basis for excusing.
By the same token, if provocation is taken as a
justification-based defence, the reasonable man
standard pertains to the determining whether the
provocation was serious enough to render the
provoker's killing partially justified. If provocation
is taken as a partial excuse, by contrast, the
standard relates to assessing whether the provocation
was grave enough to allow an excuse of loss of
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a thing, is a merely verbal one; it is a matter
of convenience of speech, and not the product
of any scientific analysis of the conception
involved. There is no logical distinction
between the act of killing a man and the
act of doing something which results (however
remotely) in his death.
Nonetheless, the proximity between an act and its
conseguence may be considered, among other things, in
determining whether the latter was within the actor's
intentions.
32. An example of such an approach to provocation is
offered by the previous Texas Penal Code (Art. 1220),
which treats the killing by the husband of his wife's
paramour as "justifiable homicide".
Homicide is justifiable when committed by the
husband upon one taken in the act of adultery
with his wife, provided that killing takes
place before the parties to the act have
separated. Such circumstances cannot justify a
homicide when it appears that there has been on
the part of the husband any connivance in or
assent to the adulterous connection.
(New Mexico and Utah Penal Codes have included
provisions similar to the above.)
33. McAuley criticises the departure of the modern
law from the justification doctrine in provocation in
these words:
Yet the modern tendency is to treat the issue
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of loss of control as central to the defence of
provocation... The sanguine view of this way of
looking at the defence is that it merely gives
a false impression of how the courts actually
deal with the issue of provocation. But it is
submitted that it also points to a trend which
may eventually lead to the complete
assimilation of the plea of provocation with
the defence of diminished responsibility.
Should this happen, the justificatory elements
in the plea, already neglected, would become
otiose, and an aspect of human behaviour with
which the ordinary common law of provocation is
already equipped to deal, unnecessarily
pathologised. However, this process is not
inevitable and, it is submitted, should be
resisted.
"Anticipating the Past: The Defence of Provocation in
Irish Law", supra note 15, p. 157. To this argument
Dressier replies as follows:
Now that scholars have demonstrated that the
defense [of provocation] is in need of a more
coherent rationale the question that remains is
whether the defense should be framed as an
excuse or as a justification. To provide an
answer, we must scrutinise moral theories of
justification and excuse far more carefully
than McAuley does in his article. If we do, I
submit that the defense is more easily and
satisfactorily explained in terms of excuse, on
the ground that an actor's (partial) loss of
self-control (partially) excuses his homicidal
action. The modern tendency in England and the
United States of America, therefore, to treat
the defense as an excuse is laudatory.
"Provocation: Partial Justification or Partial
Excuse?", supra note 22, p.480.
34. The reason for this controversy is that as a
partial justification provocation hinges
predominantly on the element of revenge. As Bar-Elli
and Heyd explain, this element is "logically
incompatible with any system of norms which by its
very nature must be rule governed. For the point of
such a system is the elimination of this personal
dimension, by shifting the authority and moral basis
of actions from the realm of subjective attitudes to
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impersonal rules and norms... The desire to take
revenge may be justified by the incapacity of the
legal system of justice to fully restore the previous
situation; but we cannot appeal to justice for help;
only for condonation. Revenge can never be part of
the system of justice; nor can it be justified as
"just". This does not mean however that revenge
cannot be morally justified."
"Can Revenge be Just or otherwise Justified?", supra
note 16, p.83.
35. As V. Hirsch and Jareborg point out, "Although
the victim might deserve punishment, the actor lacks
authority to inflict it. Penalizing malefactors is
not a legitimate role for an individual; it is a
state function, to be undertaken with appropriate due
process safeguards".
36. According to Ashworth:
Similar principles are relevant when
considering the effect of provocation on
sentences for crimes other than manslaughter
upon provocation. The less the intrinsic
gravity of the crime committed, however, the
less serious need be the provocation if it is
to have mitigating effect. This is exemplified
by cases in which a verdict of manslaughter is
based upon the "unlawful act" doctrine: Where
the offence is relatively grave the degree of
provocation must be fairly high in order to
mitigate the sentence, whereas in those cases
in which an intended assult resulted
unforeseeably in death a much less serious
provocation will have mitigating effect.
"Sentencing in Provocation Cases", supra note 18,
p. 561.
37. "...the firing at a person intended to be hit
would be manslaughter, then, if the bullet strikes a
third person not intended to be hit, the killing of
that person equally would be manslaughter and not
murder."
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Per Darling J. in Gross, (1913) 23 Cox CC 456.
38. And see McAuley, supra note 15, p.140.
39. R. Perkins, Criminal Law, (1957), pp.50-51.
40. McAuley, supra note 15, pp. 140-141.
41. And see Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law, (1988).
"Whatever the position in common law, however,
it is now clear that if there is evidence that D was
in fact provoked to lose his self-control, the
defence must be left to the jury even though the
provocative act was directed against another."
(p.331)
42. R.S. O'Regan, "Indirect Provocation and
Misdirected Retaliation", Criminal Law Review [1968],
p. 323.
43. G. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law, (1978),
p. 752.
44. According to G. Williams:
The reasonable man test does not necessitate
saying that the defendant's mistake must be
reasonable. It would be perfectly possible to
apply the test to the facts as the defendant
believed them to be (reasonably or not). What
the evaluative test is concerned to exclude is
unusual deficiency of self-control, not the
making of an error of observation, or of
inference on a point of fact... But the present
determination of the courts not to recognise
mistakes relating to defences unless they are
reasonable probably means that the law is now
otherwise.
Textbook of Criminal Law, supra note 16, p.543.
And see: Ashworth, "Reason, Logic and Criminal
Liability", Law Quarterly Review 91 (1975), 102.
Explaining the position in English law, the author
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points out that, with regard to crimes requiring
"specific intent", where the accused lacked mens rea
"the courts ensure that the accused is convicted of a
lesser offence. Where, however, there is no such
alternative verdict, the courts have not hesitated to
cut across the logic of mens rea and to convict the
accused..." (p.116)
[In English law] "Proof of "no mens rea" or "no
voluntary act" is insufficient: the courts will
investigate the reasons for the absence of mens rea
or voluntariness, and if the accused was at fault in
causing the incapacitating condition the defence
should not succeed." (p.126)
See also: P.Robinson, "Causing the Conditions of
One's Own Defence: A Study in the Limits of Theory in
Criminal Law Doctrine", Virginia Law Review 71
(1985) .
45. "Cases of intentional killing in hot blood under
the sting of some sudden physical provocation had
long been treated as the less heinous homicide of
manslaughter, but provocation by insulting words or
gestures alone was not accepted by the law as
enough."
Russell on Crime, (1964), p.519.
46. McAuley, supra note 15, pp.154-155.
47. McAuley, supra note 15, p.155.
48. See: W.D. Lamont, Law and the Moral Order (1981).
"Responsibility in Positive law is essentially the
same as moral responsibility in the sense that
responsibility implies rationality." (p.93)
49. McAuley, supra note 15, p.156.
50A. Indeed, the reasonable relationship requirement,
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in so far as it is associated with the actor's
mode of retaliation, seems hardly at home under
the justification doctrine - a doctrine that places
the emphasis on the element of justified revenge
in provocation cases. As G. Bar-Elli and D. Heyd
assert:
The fact that revenge is based on the
subjective interpretation and beliefs of the
victim rather than on publicly verifiable
procedure of judgement makes it even more
difficult to criticise an act of revenge as out
of proportion. We should also add that as
revenge is on the whole taken for acts which
are not always morally or legally wrong, the
criterion of just deserts is hard to apply to
it. No rules govern the practice of revenge and
hence no criteria of proportion can be
formulated. Desert consists of the satisfaction
of the conditions of successful revenge and
nothing beyond that.
"Can Revenge be Just or otherwise Justified?", supra
note 16, p.74.
50B. As Ashworth explains:
The forms of provocation which operate to
reduce murder to manslaughter vary from those
which are rather trivial to those which are
clearly very serious. Some of the cases may be
"nearly murder", others may be described as
"nearly self-defence". Where the degree of
provocation is low, this indicates a sentence
at the upper end of the range.
"Sentencing in Provocation Cases", supra note 18,
p. 555.
Indeed, considering the gravity of the victim's
provocation is important in making out whether
in a particular case the defence operates as
justification- or excuse-based.
51. Ashworth, supra note 7, p.305.
52. R. Cross, "The Mental Element in Crime", Law
Quarterly Review 83, (1967), p.215 at pp.225-226.
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53. "It may happen that a man is abnormally cool
under gross provocation but none the less extremely
resentful of any kind of personal affront; if he were
to kill at once, but in cold blood, he cannot be
excused by the fact that the acts of provocation
would have been expected to cause an ordinary man to
lose his self-control."
Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law, (1966), p.179.
54. Dressier asserts that:
The proportionality doctrine is understandable
in excuse terms: a person whose anger is
excusable, but whose violent response is
disproportional to the provocation, is to blame
for not exercising his limited capacity for
self-control to respond nonviolently.
"Provocation: Partial Justification or Partial
Excuse?", supra note 22, p.479 n.59.
Speaking of the actor's anger as "excusable" may be
confusing, however. In fact, the actor may be
partially excused on the ground of loss of control
only if his anger is deemed fully justified. In other
words, excusing here refers to the actor's
retaliation and not merely to his emotional state
that led him to lose control. Thus, a minor
provocation cannot buttress an excuse because is not
expected to raise anger to the degree that may
temporality overwhelm one's capacity for self-
control .
55. According to Cross:
When dealing with incidents which occupy a
split second, the guestion "did the accused
contemplate certain results?" is apt to be a
little unreal. The factors such as rage and
panic which lead to the loss of control on the
part of sane men can usually be provided for in
the assessment of punishment, but it might be
right to allow them to alter the grade of the
offence.
"The Mental Element in Crime", supra note 52, p.226.
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CHAPTER 3: THE EXCUSATIVE ELEMENT IN
PROVOCATION
1. Prefatory Note
The traditional rendering of provocation as a
concession to the failings of human nature resounds
the conception of the defence as a partial excuse.
[1] This theoretical approach to provocation hinges
on the notion of impaired volition or loss of self-
control. Its governing assumption is that provocative
conduct is capable of inflaming anger or indignation,
possibly culminating in the formation of an intent to
kill. [2] Although such killings are not totally
excusable, the agent's degree of culpability falls
short of that required to convict for murder.
According to Hart, the rationale of excusing in
provocation lies in the assumption that in such cases
compliance with the law would require the agent to
exert far greater effort than would be expected from
normal people in normal circumstances. [3] Another
approach to the issue of excusing here is to say that
the admission of loss of control blocks the inference
from the act of killing to the "character flaw"
associated with murder. [4] The present analysis
centres primarily on this latter approach to the
question of excuse in provocation.
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Admittedly, not any wrongful conduct would be
sufficient to support an acceptable plea of
provocation in law. Although every untoward act is
apt to incur anger or elicit some sort of response,
only serious wrongdoings are deemed capable of
vitiating a normal person's capacity for self-
control, and hence of amounting to legal provocation.
From the viewpoint of excuse theory, the gravity of
the provocation received is at issue as relating to
the actor's claim that he was temporarily bereft of
his self-control; there is no question here of
whether the wrongful and culpable character of
provocation should render the provoker's killing less
wrongful or partially justified. It is, rather, the
actor's lack of self-control by virtue of provocation
that accounts for the reduction of culpability and,
in English law, for the relegation of homicide from
murder to manslaughter.
The loss of control element in provocation upon
which the actor's excuse rests has long bewildered
legal practitioners and commentators, for it seems to
defy precise interpretation. As a first approach to
the issue, it might be said that loss of self-control
denotes a temporary impairment of voluntariness for
an otherwise intentional act. It was pointed out
above that, because the excusing condition in
provocation disputes the voluntary character of the
provoker's killing, the designation of a homicide
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committed under provocation as "voluntary"
manslaughter may seem confusing, that is, if the
notion of "voluntary" here is not further elucidated.
As the "hot anger" reguirement or the requirement of
acting "on the spur of the moment" manifests, the
temporary nature of the actor's loss of control is a
basic precondition for allowing an excuse on grounds
of provocation. Nonetheless, a broader interpretation
of the notion of loss of control has also been argued
for, particularly with regard to certain cases of
cumulative provocation (see chapter 6).
The excusative element in provocation centres
on the connection between self-control and voluntary
action. In fact, the notion of self-control might be
understood to denote either the actor's ability to
direct his external conduct - in other words, to act
in a strict sense - or the actor's capacity to
determine his choice of action. In the former sense,
self-control refers to intentional action primarily
as a prereguisite for ascribing authorship-
responsibility ; in the latter sense - the one most
relevant to the defence of provocation - self-control
pertains to an action which is both intentional and
voluntary as reguired, inter alia, for the
attribution of accountability-responsibility. [5] In
the theory of provocation, questions arise about how
the interrelation between a temporary loss of self-
control and the actor's general capacity for
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control can be understood on the assumption that the
defence constitutes a concession to the failings of
human nature. Further, as has been demonstrated in
the previous chapters, a longstanding debate
revolves around the question of whether the loss of
control should be perceived as a matter of degree,
and if so, how the degree of loss of control could be
related with the degree of the provocation. Indeed,
some authors argue that the requirement of acting in
the "heat of passion" or "on the spur of the moment"
does not entail that the actor should lack control in
an absolute sense, nor that the admission of a
certain degree of control should necessarily exclude
the defence of provocation. The problems besetting
the issue of proportionality in provocation have to
do, among other things, with the difficulty of
conceptualizing the connection between loss of self-
control and partial excuse. In order to work out a
cogent basis for resolving or, perhaps, re-defining
these questions one has to explore further the
grounds of the excuse in provocation and, more
precisely, the interrelation between human weakness,
provocation and loss of control. A closer scrutiny of
these issues from first principles might help pierce
the veil of confusion that has long surrounded this
area of legal doctrine and facilitate a more
comprehensible approach to the question of excusing
in law.
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The main task of the present chapter is to look
more closely at the nature of the excusative claim in
provocation and explore its relation to the question
of culpability for homicide. Sections 2, 3 and 4
circumscribe the moral grounds of excusing in
provocation. The discussion centres on the
relationship between human weakness, provocation and
loss of control or impaired volition and examines
different aspects of the issue in the context of the
excuse theory. Section 5 explores the characteristic
role of the, so called, "justificatory element" in
provocation as a prerequisite for allowing a partial
excuse. In this respect, this section examines how
the defence of provocation may be informed by the
"principle of resentment", an idea elaborated by A.
v. Hirsch and N. Jareborg.[6] Finally, section 6 sets
out the possibility of re-interpreting the subjective
element in murder in the light of the preceding
analysis of the excusative claim in provocation.
2. Human Weakness and Impaired Volition:
Building upon the Aristotelian Approach
To attain a complete perspective on the moral
basis of excusing in provocation, one would have to
take account of the key role the notion of human
weakness is endowed with in the philosophical
analysis of responsibility. Indeed, understanding
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the defence of provocation as a concession to the
failings or "realities" of human nature invites one
to consider how the element of human weakness
permeates and informs the excusative claim in
provocation. In the following sections we shall take
up this guestion, albeit avoiding getting caught up
in some of the perpetual enigmas that beset
philosophical investigation. As a starting point, the
present section examines how the notions of human
weakness and impaired volition are treated in
Aristotle's ethics and points out the subtle moral
distinctions that emerge. [7]
Aristotle adopts a differentiation between what
he calls as the "self-indulgent" man, that is, the
man whose choices and actions are guided by the wrong
principle, and the "incontinent" man. This
differentiation proceeds' from the basic idea that
incontinence - otherwise expressed as akrasia
inhibits the agent's acting according to a fully
fledged voluntary choice, in other words, a choice
which for the most part reflects the agent's moral
convictions. [8] The possibility of a discordance
between external conduct and moral belief is
manifested, among other things, by the fact that the
incontinent man is more apt to repent of what he has
done; by contrast, the self-indulgent man generally
persists in his choices. [9] Further, Aristotle
draws a distinction between two general kinds of
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incontinence, namely, impetuosity (propeteia) and
weakness (astheneia). [10] Impetuosity pertains to
cases where the incontinent agent, carried away by
his passions, acts upon impulse and without
deliberation. Weakness, on the other hand, relates to
those cases where the incontinent agent, although he
reaches the right choice after deliberation, fails to
conform his action to it. [11]
Moreover, Aristotle distinguishes the "continent"
man - as contrasted with the incontinent man - from
what he calls as the "temperate" man. He explains
that both the continent and the temperate man may
comply with the same rule, or may act according to
the right principle. The temperate man, however, has
no bad inclinations or urges to control, that is,
inclinations to act contrary to the rule because, as
Aristotle puts it, he does not feel any pleasure in
doing so. One might say that for the temperate man
the merits of observing the rule outweigh the
possible gains that might perhaps ensue from its
violation. The continent man, on the other hand,
although he may be tempted or predisposed to act
against the rule, does not allow himself to be
carried away by his inclinations. Patently, one may
speak of the continent but not the temperate man as
exercising self-control. By the same token, the
incontinent and the self-indulgent man resemble each
other in that they both are inclined to act contrary
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to the rule; they differ, however, in that the self-
indulgent man tends to act so primarily as a matter
of conviction, whereas for the incontinent man this
only evinces weakness of character. [12] In this
respect, it seems clear that speaking of loss of
self-control presupposes an incontinent rather than a
self-indulgent man.
Aristotle professes that people of keen and
excitable nature are in general more prone to the
impetuous form of incontinence because, being
subjected to passion, they tend to act without taking
time for deliberation. He calls one's attention to
the important moral distinction between the above and
those incontinent agents who, although they are aware
of the right choice after deliberation, fail to
regulate their actions accordingly. Aristotle
expresses the moral differentiation between the two
kinds of incontinence - i.e., impetuosity and
weakness - as follows:
...of incontinent men themselves, those who
become temporarily beside themselves are better
than those who have the rational principle but
do not abide by it, since the latter are
defeated by a weaker passion, and do not act
without previous deliberation like the
others ... [13]
Nonetheless, it should be pointed out that, according
to Aristotle, speaking of an impetuous act does not
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befit any case of acting upon impulse; such an act,
in addition, should be at odds with the actor's
genuine choice. An act is deemed not to consort with
the actor's genuine choice not only when it does not
reflect the choice the actor has already made; it
should also go against the choice the actor would
have made as a responsible moral agent, had he the
opportunity to deliberate. In this respect, one
envisages a moral distinction between the agent who,
due to his loss of self-control, fails to align his
action with what in normal circumstances would think
proper, and the agent whose action on the spur of the
moment does not in fact misrepresent his real
attitudes.
Aristotle recognizes that in both kinds of
incontinence - i.e. impetuosity and weakness - the
agent acts knowingly and intentionally,
notwithstanding that his action cannot be traced to
a fully-fledged voluntary choice. Other things being
equal, it is precisely the absence of a voluntary
choice that accounts for the incontinent agent's not
being morally assessed on a par with a choosing agent
who acts voluntarily. In Aristotle's words:
[The incontinent man] acts willingly (for he
acts in a sense with knowledge both of what he
does and of the end to which he does it), but
is not wicked, since his purpose is good; so
that he is half-wicked. And he is not a
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criminal; for he does not act of malice
aforethought; of the two types of incontinent
man the one does not abide by the conclusions
of his deliberation, while the excitable man
does not deliberate at all. [14]
Aristotle remarks that of the incontinent men
some may act as they do in pursuit of things which
are often good and noble in themselves, that is,
worthy of being chosen as such. What these men are to
be blamed for is not for pursuing these things but,
rather, for doing so in an inappropriate fashion.
Thus, one might speak of the incontinent agent as,
for example, "incontinent in respect of honour", or
"incontinent in respect of gain", or "incontinent in
respect of anger". By reference to those incontinent
in respect of anger, Aristotle says that they are
less to blame because their actions stem from some
sort of negative moral judgement that triggers off
and, in a sense, justifies anger.[15]For this reason,
the incontinent agent in respect of anger is less
blameworthy than the incontinent agent who succumbs
to a wanton impulse or appetite. In Aristotle's
words:
Anger seems to listen to argument to some
extent, but to mishear it...so anger by reason
of the warmth and hastiness of its nature,
though it hears, does not hear an order, and
springs to take revenge. For argument or
imagination informs us that we have been
insulted or slighted, and anger, reasoning as
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it were that anything like this must be fought
against, boils up straightway; while appetite,
if argument or perception merely says that an
object is pleasant, springs to the enjoyment of
it. Therefore anger obeys the argument in a
sense, but appetite does not. It is therefore
more disgraceful; for the man who is
incontinent in respect of anger is in a sense
conquered by argument, while the other is
conquered by appetite and not by argument. [16]
As Aristotle seems to suggest, excusing those who
succumb to anger and lose control of their actions
constitutes a concession to natural human attributes,
and it becomes possible precisely because these
attributes are deemed common to all men. The moral
distinction between the incontinent agent who acts
violently in a fit of (justified) anger and the one
who acts so as a result of wanton appetite is
expressed as follows:
...no one commits wanton outrage with a feeling
of pain, but every one who acts in anger acts
with pain, while the man who commits outrage
acts with pleasure. If, then, those acts at
which it is most just to be angry are more
criminal than others, the incontinence which is
due to appetite is the more criminal; for there
is no wanton outrage involved in anger. [17]
The reverberations of the Aristotelian position,
as delineated in the previous paragraphs, in our
enquiry for the character of the excusative claim in
the defence of provocation are noticeable. Patently,
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both kinds of incontinence - impetuosity and weakness
- can be taken to evince a reprehensible state of
character. As has been said, weakness refers to the
agent's failure to align his action with his best
judgement, whereas impetuosity pertains to the
agent's failure to subdue his passion and act
according to a considered judgement. With regard to
the guestion of excuse in provocation we are
interested most in the impetuous form of
incontinence, particularly in its relation to
"justified" anger. Indeed, Aristotle's account of the
connection between anger - as a result of a moral
judgement - and acting impetuously is of particular
importance in understanding the nature of the
excusative claim in provocation.
According to Aristotle, of the two kinds of
incontinent men those who act upon impulse and
without deliberation are in general less to blame
because their action in a way precedes the formation
of a fully informed choice. The underlying assumption
is that the impulsive agent, blameworthy though he
may be, often acts against his own all-things-
considered judgement. The above furnishes the grounds
upon which the requirement of acting "in the heat
of passion" or "on the spur of the moment" in
provocation may be understood. Furthermore,
Aristotle's explanation of why those who act
impetuously due to anger are less to blame captures
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well the excuse in provocation as a concession to
human weakness. Indeed, the connection between the
victim's untoward conduct and the actor's anger as
the cause of his loss of self-control is the keystone
of the excuse in provocation. Nevertheless, the actor
would be entitled to an excuse only if his anger at
the victim is deemed justified. In other words, it is
the moral justification of the actor's anger at the
victim that furnishes the "good reason" for allowing
an excuse of loss of control as a concession to the
common failings of human nature. This is precisely
what distinguishes the actor who excusably loses
control as a result of serious provocation from the
so called "bad tempered" man. [18] Patently,
provocation cannot provide a complete excuse.
Considering Aristotle's position, one might say that
the actor is still to blame not for expressing his
anger or indignation but rather for doing so in an
unacceptable manner. [19]
3. Provocation and Impaired Volition
As has been pointed out earlier, in provocation
the actor does not lose control to the extent that he
does not know what he is doing, or what his action is
aimed at - an assumption not overlooked in
Aristotle's treatment of impetuosity. [20] Indeed, it
is a fundamental prerequisite for pleading
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provocation as a partial defence to murder in English
law that an intention to kill or cause grievous
bodily harm has been established. One might say that
the admission of the defence of provocation
presupposes to demonstrate the "cognitive" element -
as a requirement of authorship-responsibility with
regard to the act of killing - of the subjective
condition of murder. If the actor's retaliation is
not accompanied with an intention to kill or cause
grievous bodily harm, provocation might perhaps come
into play as a mitigating consideration following
conviction of involuntary manslaughter. Further, in a
case of provocation where the actor is led to lose
control to such an extent as to be unaware of what he
is doing, or unable to exercise control over his
bodily movements, the actor might be entitled to
complete acquittal on the basis of a "lack of mens
rea" defence. [21] Nevertheless, in such a case one
cannot rule out the possibility of establishing
liability on a separate basis (for example, on
grounds of criminal negligence). [22] Other things
being equal, if the actor suffers a total loss of
self-control, automatism may provide the appropriate
basis of the actor's (complete) defence to murder. As
Todd Archibald explains:
...for automatism to be applicable, there must
be a complete loss of self-control and a
concomitant involuntary and unconscious state
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on the part of the accused. In provocation, a
loss of partial control is presupposed but only
to the extent that the accused gives way to his
inflamed passions. His cognitive processes are
not impaired nor is his physical ability to
control his conduct. [23]
Nevertheless, in those cases of provocation where the
actor suffers a complete loss of control, one might
perhaps view the victim's conduct as a triggering
factor of the excusing condition (i.e., automatism)
upon which the actor's defence to murder rests. Thus,
one might say that, although another excuse takes the
priority over provocation here, the latter might be
granted a role peripheral to or supportive of the
proposed defence.
In so far as complete loss of control implies
the exclusion of authorship-responsibility, one might
plausibly say that in provocation the actor does not
entirely lose control. The analysis of the notion of
loss of control in the theory of defences is informed
by the fundamental distinction between
involuntariness and nonvoluntariness. [24]
Involuntariness denotes total incapacity of directing
one's action or of exercising control over one's
bodily movements, as in cases of genuine inability to
do otherwise. [25] One might say that in such cases
the agent acts only in appearance because his ability
to command his external conduct is totally defeated.
[26] Nonvoluntariness, on the other hand, pertains
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to those cases where the agent, although he is able
to act in a strict sense, cannot determine the
character or course of his action due to external or
internal constraints on his freedom to choose (cases
of "overpowered will").[27]Patently, the excuse of
loss of control in provocation bears upon the
conditions of nonvoluntariness.[28JFletcher, adopting
the term "normative involuntariness" or "moral
involuntariness" as synonymous to nonvoluntariness,
describes the role of excuses as follows:
Excuses arise in cases in which the actor's
freedom of choice is constricted. His conduct
is not strictly involuntary as if he suffered a
seizure or if someone pushed his knife-holding
hand down on the victim's throat. In these
cases there is no act at all, no wrongdoing and
therefore no need for an excuse. The notion of
involuntariness at play is what we should call
moral or normative involuntariness. Where it
not for the external pressure, the actor would
have not performed the deed. In Aristotle's
words, he "would not choose any such act in
itself". [29]
The distinction between involuntariness and
nonvoluntariness is allied to that between compulsion
and coercion. The victim of compulsion lacks physical
control over his bodily movements, in other words, he
is not free to act. The victim of coercion, on the
other hand, although he is free to act in a strict
sense, is not free to determine or choose the course
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of his action. [30] Exculpatory claims growing out of
the conditions of compulsion primarily contest
authorship-responsibility. Exculpatory claims
emerging from the conditions of coercion call in
question accountability responsibility. From this
point of view, the classification of the various
exculpatory claims in law turns on the source and
nature of the relevant external or internal
constraints. H. Gross sets out the issue of
nonvoluntary action in the following way:
Instead of denying a prima facie imputation of
conduct to some occurrence, we admit that the
occurrence is an act - that is, an occurrence
for which someone might be held responsible.
But because the actor could choose only with
inordinate difficulty to do otherwise - or
could not choose to do otherwise at all - we
deny that he is in fact fully responsible, or
responsible at all. In this sense the following
are not (or are not fully) voluntary acts: (1)
acts done only because coerced by others; (2)
acts done only because of one's own
uncontrollable urges; (3) acts done only
because circumstances left no choice; (4) acts
done when one is in an abnormal mental state
that leaves one unable to appreciate what he is
doing. [31]
As has been pointed out, the excusative claim in
provocation is cognate with those grounded on
nonvoluntariness or, in Fletcher's words, "moral
involuntariness" . Although the provoked agent acts
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knowingly and intentionally, he is less to blame
because, being overcome by his inflamed passions, is
unable to choose freely. Freedom of choice as a
reguirement of moral/legal responsibility is held
therefore to presuppose, among other things, the
actor's being "master of his mind", or his acting in
a "normal" frame of mind. Considering Gross'
classification of nonvoluntary acts, one might say
that provocation shares characteristics from both
categories 2 and 4. Heat of passion and loss of self-
control import an sudden emotional disturbance so
that the contribution of reflection and moral
judgement in the psychological process towards the
formation of the will is precluded or substantially
diminished. [32] In the so called "impetuous acts"
the urge does not circumvent the conscious "self"
but, in a sense, passes through it. Because of its
intensity, however, the urge defeats the actor's
"moral resistance". [33] One might also
consider as relevant here the so called "short-
circuited reactions" . These pertain to cases where an
intense psychological urge is activated so abruptly
that in a way "circumvents" the conscious "self" and
affects directly the agent's motivational system. One
might say that in such cases the actor's moral
inhibitions are totally precluded rather than
overcome. Nonetheless, both "impetuous acts" and
"short-circuited reactions" should be distinguished
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from the so called "reflex-actions". The latter lack
a concrete psychological basis and therefore pertain
to involuntariness rather than nonvoluntariness. [34]
The "impetuous acts" and, arguably, the "short-
circuited reactions" are not irrelevant to the issue
of moral and legal responsibility, for both are taken
to constitute "external manifestations" of the
actor's character. [35]
What do we mean then when we say that the
provoked agent who acts "in the heat of the moment"
is not free to choose? To answer this guestion one
would need to look more closely at the interrelation
between free agency and self-control. It is asserted
that freedom of choice presupposes that what
motivates the agent to act in a certain way accords
with his all-things-considered evaluations. G. Watson
distinguishes between the agent's "valuational" and
"motivational" systems and offers the following
definition of the former:
[The actor's valuational system is] that set of
considerations which, when combined with his
factual beliefs, yields judgements of the form:
the thing for me to do in these circumstances,
all things considered, is a. To ascribe free
agency to a being presupposes it to be a being
that makes judgements of this sort. To be this
sort of being, one must assign values to
alternative states of affairs, that is, rank
them in terms of worth. [36]
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Moreover, Watson defines the motivational system of
an agent as that set of considerations which moves
the agent to action. In this respect, an action is
held not to be free if the agent's motivational
system is not aligned with his valuational system. In
Watson's words:
The possibility of unfree action consists in
the fact that the agent's valuational and
motivational system may not completely
coincide. Those systems harmonize to the extent
that what determines the agent's all-things-
considered judgements also determines his
actions. ...The free agent has the capacity to
translate his values into action; his actions
flow from his evaluational system. [37]
As has been pointed out earlier, a claim of
provocation may be accepted only if the victim's
conduct is considered to be sufficiently wrongful,
that is, capable of raising legitimate anger or
indignation. [38] At first glance, to consider the
actor's reaction to provocation as not being free in
the above sense might perhaps appear at odds with the
basic assumption that in such cases the actor's
response is preceded and precipitated by a negative
evaluation of the victim's conduct. One might say, in
other words, that what motivates the agent's response
to the provocation is precisely his disapproval of
the victim's untoward behaviour. Thus, in provocation
the actor appears making a choice to retaliate as a
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result of his negative assessment of the victim's
conduct. Nevertheless, although acute anger or
indignation does not preclude the agent's making a
choice (in a strict sense), it may seriously
undermine his capacity to weigh up or evaluate the
significance of his choice of action in the light of
its (intended) consequences. [39] With regard to
this, one might say that freedom of action as a
requirement of responsibility presupposes not simply
that what motivates the agent to act concurs with his
evaluations; it presupposes, in addition, that the
agent's evaluations that move him to action take
place in a "normal" frame of mind. As A. Mele points
out:
A self-controlled person is disposed to bring
his motivations into line with his evaluations
and to maintain that alignment. But there is
more to being self-controlled than this, for
one's evaluations themselves can be warped in
various ways by one's wants or motivations.
Hence, a self-controlled person must also be
disposed to promote and maintain a structure of
evaluations or values which is not unduly
influenced by his motivations. [40]
In provocation, although the actor's anger at the
victim that motivates him to respond results from his
disapproval of the victim's conduct, [41] the ensuing
urge to retaliate in a sense overrides the actor's
"evaluational system", or his ability to assess
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properly both the provoker's misdeed and his own
response to the provocation. [42] Thus, one might say
that the provoked actor is not fully free to choose
because his capacity for evaluation is misaffected
by the overwhelming emotional pressure to which the
actor is subjected. In this respect, the provoked
agent who reacts in an outbreak of anger is similar
to the victim of coercion who acts nonvoluntarily.
Nonetheless, although the admission of loss of self-
control in provocation is sufficient to support a
claim for extenuation, it falls short of excluding
responsibility altogether. Giving way to anger
justified though the anger may be - or allowing one's
freedom of choice to be forfeited by one's own
adverse motivations, furnishes sufficient grounds for
holding the actor responsible for his wrongful
reaction to provocation. This pertains to the general
rule that one should always hold one's anger in
check, even under the most severe provocation. The
actor retains responsibility for the lesser crime on
the assumption that, as a "normal" person, he was
capable of resisting his impulse to kill. [43]
So, to summarize, the excusative element in the
defence of provocation rests on the assumption that
provocative conduct may give rise to such an
emotional state wherein the agent's freedom of choice
is temporarily suspended. Thus, provocation is
understood as a condition likely to occasion a form
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of internal coercion that, although it does not
preclude responsibility altogether, curtails the
degree of culpability required for the major crime.
This kind of coercion may only support a claim for
extenuation - not for exoneration - because, contrary
to the sort of coercion implicit in total excuses,
is not considered as being "irresistible".
4. Provocation, Character and Culpability
It has been suggested that the excuse of loss of
control is in a sense interwoven with the so called
"justificatory element" in provocation, in other
words, with the requirement that the victim's conduct
should be sufficiently wrongful to raise justified
anger. [44] Thus, it seems correct to assume that
neither provocation without loss of control, nor loss
of control without provocation sufficient to raise
justified anger should entitle the actor to a partial
excuse on this basis. It has been pointed out,
moreover, that a successful plea of provocation will
diminish but not completely rebut the actor's
culpability for homicide. One might assume that the
actor's giving way to anger and killing "on the spur
of the moment" still manifests a reprehensible state
of character, albeit short of that associated with
murder. This section explores further the idea that
in such cases the remaining degree of culpability
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turns directly on an undesirable character trait as
manifested by the actor's submission to passion. The
proposition that provocation does not provide a
defence for the so called "bad tempered man" - the
one who loses control and reacts violently even to
the most trivial provocation - is also addressed
here. Taking a closer look at the basic hypotheses of
the character-orientated theory of criminal
responsibility may prove fruitful in deciphering the
question of culpability in provocation in its
relation to the issue of criminal liability for
homicide.
The position that in provocation the remaining
degree of culpability is accounted for an undesirable
character trait is informed by the theory of
responsibility which focuses on the relationship
between external conduct and human character.
This theory postulates that blame and punishment
pertain not directly to acts but, rather, to
character traits. [45] By character trait is
understood any socially desirable or undesirable
disposition or attitude that an act may be associated
with. [46] Although it is accepted that acts do not
always manifest character traits, the actor cannot be
held blameworthy and punishable unless his wrongful
conduct reflects a socially undesirable attitude.[47]
If it does, the degree of blame and punishment to be
attributed should be proportionate to the extent to
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which the actor's attidute is deemed undesirable. If
the actor's conduct is held not to mirror such an
attitude, blame and punishment would be
inappropriate, although certain (non-punitive)
measures preventive of similar conduct in the future
might perhaps be taken. Notwithstanding that
attitudes may be seen as volatile, the general
presumption is that, other things being equal, a
wrongful act does manifest an undesirable attitude.
In this respect, the role of excuses in law is to
block the normal inference from the wrongful act to
an undesirable attitude or character trait. It is
accepted that determining the possible relationship
between a wrongful act and a character trait makes it
necessary for us to consider, inter alia, the actor's
state of mind at the time of his act as indicative of
his ability to exercise control over his conduct.
Hence, one might say that a successful plea for
excuse on grounds of provocation blocks the normal
inference from the act of killing to the character
trait associated with the crime of murder.
Nevertheless, the excusing condition here cannot
prevent conviction for the lesser offence, for losing
self-control and killing is still taken to evince
a socially undesirable disposition or character
trait.
Under the theory of criminal responsibility at
issue, one could satisfactorily explain why losing
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self-control and killing in the face of trivial
provocations should not entitle the actor to
extenuation (that is, if no other excuse can be
brought forward) . One might say that if the
provocation is not regarded as serious enough to
raise justified anger to such a degree that may cause
a "normal" person to lose his self-control and kill,
the actor's response - on the spur of the moment
though it may have been - manifests the same
undesirable character trait as that ascribed to a
fully premeditated killing. The same applies in those
cases where the actor is deemed responsible for
creating the situation wherein the provocation takes
place. The above approach captures well the
traditional thesis that the defence of provocation
does not provide a shelter to the "bad tempered" man.
According to Dressier:
...under excuse theory, we do not (fully) blame
a person who (partially) loses self-control if,
but only if, he is not to blame for his anger
and for his homicidal actions which result from
it... A person who becomes sufficiently enraged
to kill because the decedent acted in a
nonwrongful manner arguably does not deserve to
be excused. At the least the nonwrongfulness of
the decedent's actions is highly pertinent in
determining whether the actor's loss of self-
control was excusable. Thus the individual who
becomes angry and responds violently when
another justifiably strikes him in self-defence
and the person who unjustifiably creates the
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situation in which the provocation gives birth
are blameworthy and should not be excused. [48]
The relevance of the character-based theory of
criminal responsibility to formulating a coherent
approach to the subjective condition in murder is
set out in section 6 of this chapter.
It was pointed out that if sufficient provocation
cannot be shown, or the actor is found responsible
for creating the conditions of provocation, the
admission of loss of control cannot on its own
entitle the actor to an excuse, that is, on the basis
of the provocation defence. One might argue,
nonetheless, that if a general loss of self-control
defence were recognized, establishing provocation
would not be necessary in order to reduce the actor's
culpability for homicide. However, where the actor's
loss of self-control cannot be attributed to
provocation, such a general loss of control defence
may hold good only in so far as an acceptable reason
for losing control can be brought forward. Patently,
"bad temper" or irascibility cannot furnish
sufficient grounds for allowing an excuse of loss of
control, or, as stressed earlier, for distinguishing
in culpability terms a killing committed "in the heat
of the moment" from a cold-blooded murder. [49] This
issue is discussed further in section 5, below.
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5. Provocation and Loss of Control: a Double Test in
Law?
In a stimulating article, Andrew von Hirsch and
Nils Jareborg advocate the replacement of the
traditional objective test in the law of provocation
with two tests which, in their view, capture better
the conditions of excusing in provocation cases. They
argue that the reasonable man-based test seems
inadequate, for what is at issue is not the
rationality or reasonableness of the actor's choices
but, rather, "the choices not being fully the
person's own". [50] The first of the proposed tests
revolves around the requirement of impaired volition
or loss of self-control; the second rests on what
they term the "principle of resentment". The actor's
plea of extenuation would satisfy the first test
whenever a strong case of impaired volition or loss
of self-control can be made. It is asserted,
nonetheless, that the scope of this test should
remain narrow, only to cover those clear-cut cases of
impaired capacity for self-control. The second test,
which is the true one of provocation as ordinarily
understood, may come into play if the first test
fails. A claim of extenuation will be warranted under
the "principle of resentment" if the actor can put
forward a good reason for feeling angry at the
victim. Patently, this would presuppose the actor's
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being able to show that he was seriously wronged by
his victim. If such a twofold test were adopted, thus
the argument runs, one would need not to speculate
about the way a "reasonable person" would have
reacted to the provocation received. [51] The authors
point out that speaking of the actor's anger as being
warranted according to the resentment principle does
not denote the justification of the ensuing act of
retaliation.
What is crucial to [the actor's] claim of
extenuation is his having a good reason for his
anger, stemming from some misdeed committed by
the victim against him or someone close to him.
Let us emphasize, however: It is only A's anger
that is warranted, not the deed that results
from it. The criminal act, we should recall, is
not justified, but only, perhaps, less culpable
because of the nature of the sentiment
involved. [52]
As has been said, in order to determine whether a
claim of extenuation on grounds of provocation
satisfies the resentment principle one would have to
consider the wrongfulness of the victim's behaviour
toward the actor. It is asserted that:
The most straightforward cases are those where
the victim's acts constituted criminal
behaviour of a significant nature. ...The
next cases comprise those where the victim
behaved toward the actor in a manner that
is not criminal, but nevertheless infringes
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commonly recognized standards of decent
behaviour. [53]
The authors argue that the resentment principle
need not be invoked in those cases where the actor
was deprived of his self-control in a sudden outburst
of rage. In such cases, it is pointed out, the
actor's plea of extenuation may be dealt with under a
general impaired volition or loss of control defence
rather than provocation. Nonetheless, for such a
defence to succeed the actor would have to put
forward a good reason for his loss of control, in
other words, a reason that would make it possible to
allow an excuse on this basis. It is suggested
therefore that one need not have recourse to the
resentment principle - as the basis of the test of
provocation - unless some form of forethought and
deliberation on the part of the actor is admitted. It
is precisely in these cases where, in the authors'
words:
...the "hot anger" requirement of common law
ceases to make sense. Since the claim no longer
is that the person had his capacity for choice
impaired, the momentary shock of the event is
immaterial. What now matters is A's being angry
for good reasons - and the sense of grievance
may grow. The anger is not just a momentary
emotional turbulence, and involves as much
cognition as feeling; it may last, reinforced
by the sense of having been aggrieved. [54]
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It is certainly correct to say that provocation
cannot entitle the actor to an excuse unless it is
shown that the actor suffered some wrong at his
victim's hands. One might argue, however, that
speaking of the excuse here as dependent solely upon
the satisfaction of the resentment principle may lead
to confusion as to the purported basis of the actor's
defence to murder. In so far as it is assumed that
the wrongfulness of the provocation cannot partially
justify the provoker's killing, to demonstrate that
the actor's anger at the victim was justified is a
prereguisite for excusing rather than the basis of
the excuse in provocation. Under the excuse theory
the central question is not merely whether the actor
was justified to feel angry or resentful; it is,
rather, whether those (justified) emotions
significantly impaired the actor's capacity to
exercise control over his actions. In this respect,
one might say that the principle of resentment
indicates a necessary but not a sufficient condition
for excusing in provocation. Although the actor's
sense of justified anger furnishes the required link
between provocation and impaired volition, it cannot
provide any grounds for excusing unless the actor did
in some way lose control as a result.
Although the authors are right in placing
emphasis on the, so called, "justificatory element"
as a condition for excusing, they fail to shed
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enough light on how the resentment principle relates
to the excusative element in provocation. Indeed, if
the test of provocation is taken to rest on the
principle of resentment alone, it would seem
difficult to distinguish between a voluntary act of
revenge and an excusable reaction to provocation if
in both cases the actor's anger at the victim were
deemed warranted or justified. [55] Certainly,
speaking of the actor's having a good reason for
feeling angry does not necessarily entail absence of
self-control. [56] In other words, to say that the
actor's choice of action was made in anger does not
always imply that the actor was, in some way,
carried away by anger. Nonetheless, it is only in the
latter case where the actor may be able to rely on an
excuse. In this respect, separating the test of
provocation from the reguirement of impaired volition
would appear to undercut the very basis of the
excusative claim in the defence of provocation.
Provocation - in so far as it is taken to furnish an
excuse - cannot operate without the element of
impaired volition even in those cases which do not
seem to satisfy the reguirement of acting "in the
heat of passion" or "on the spur of the moment".
Nevertheless, in the latter cases the grounds for
excusing might shift from provocation to diminished
responsibility if the actor's impaired capacity
for self-control is attributed to some sort
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of abnormality of mind - possibly precipitated by the
victim's wrongdoing - rather than to provocation.
Indeed, one might argue that the admission of
forethought and deliberation is incompatible with the
general assumption that only "normal" people can
shelter under the defence of provocation. This issue
is addressed further in our analysis of cumulative
provocation in chapter 6.
As has been said, a successful plea of excuse on
grounds of provocation presupposes, inter alia, that
the actor's anger at the victim is deemed justified.
In the article at issue it is argued that the actor
cannot have recourse to the resentment principle
unless the wrongful act was directed at him or
somebody closely related to him. Thus, it is
suggested that if the act of provocation was directed
at a third party not related to the actor, the latter
should not be able to rely on provocation.
Where the wronged individual is someone having
no particular connection to the actor, however,
the principle [of resentment] would not apply.
The actor might still be indignant - but the
notion of justified personal resentment no
longer holds. Having in no fashion been wronged
by the victim, the actor has no good reason for
responding with such anger that the normal
moral restraints are understandably
compromised. The actor cannot claim the
principle of resentment when he "punishes"
someone for wrongdoing directed at third
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persons. [57]
However, one may argue, the position that the
resentment principle could not warrant a plea for
extenuation when the victim's wrongdoing is directed
at a third party unduly restricts the scope of the
excuse in provocation. On the contrary, depending on
the gravity of the victim's wrongdoing, the actor may
be perfectly entitled to the defence of provovation
even though no paricular relationship between him and
the injured party obtains. It seems correct to say,
nonetheless, that in such cases the standard of
provocation should be expected to be considerably
higher than in those cases where the wrongful act is
directed at the actor or somebody closely connected
with him. One might say, in this respect, that only a
very serious wrongdoing may be deemed capable of
transcending the bounds of a narrow interpersonal
incident to constitute provocation sufficient to
buttress a partial excuse here. Consider, for
example, the case where A witnesses a severe physical
assault on a child. Although the wrongful act is not
directed at A, nor is he somehow related to the
child, one could see no reason why he should not be
able to rely on provocation if he killed the
assailant in a fit of anger. A's claim for
extenuation would be even stronger if he could offer
an additional, personal reason for his rage - for
example, if his own child was injured or killed
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under similar circumstances. It seems evident,
therefore, that the resentment principle - as the
test of provocation - may be applicable to cases
both of direct and of indirect provocation,
irrespective of whether there has been a special
connection between the actor and the injured party.
[58] As 0'Regan remarks:
An ordinary man who witnesses a brutal attack
on a small child, an elderly woman or a dear
friend may well lose his self-control whether
the person attacked be a relative or not. Once
this is conceded the limitation of provocation
to acts done to a relative seems arbitrary and
inconsistent with fundamental doctrine. It is
submitted that in all cases of indirect
provocation the correct approach is to ask not
whether the person attacked is a relative of
the accused but whether an ordinary man, seeing
what the accused saw, would have been provoked
in the same manner. [59]
Let us now consider a little further the idea
that the actor might be able to shelter under a
general loss of control defence in some cases where
the test of provocation is not met. In such cases, as
pointed out earlier, a plea of extenuation on grounds
of impaired volition should not gain acceptance
unless is supported by an appropriate excusing
condition. Thus, one might say that granting an
excuse turns on the requirement of impaired volition
in conjunction with the particular condition which is
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put forward as its "cause". Although certain such
conditions may be singled out to formulate general
defence categories, one might perhaps encounter an
excuse that may seem difficult to subsume under a
specific category. Thus, the introduction of a
general loss of control defence could be aimed at
accommodating excusative claims that would seem to
lie outside the scope of those "entrenched" excusing
conditions. One might envisage such a general excuse
as being open-ended, in the sense that, although it
rests on the reguirement of impaired volition, it
does not lay down a specific condition that causes
the actor's loss of control. Allowing an excuse here
would depend, among other things, on whether the
actor can bring forward an acceptable condition, or
set of conditions, that would account for his loss of
control. One might say that such a general excuse
may be introduced either to complement or even
replace - i.e. as engulfing - the existing
categories. For example, the Model Penal Code
provides the reduction of murder to manslaughter in
those cases where the accused acted "...under the
influence of extreme ...emotional distress for which
there is reasonable explanation...". [60] One might
argue that a defence of this kind would be most
appropriate in some cases of cumulative provocation
where the excusative claim appears to lie on the
borderline between provocation and diminished
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responsibility. In these cases, nonetheless, neither
provocation nor diminished responsibility may seem
to furnish the grounds for allowing an excuse. The
lapse of time between provocation and retaliation, or
the admission of forethought and deliberation,
militates against the "hot anger" requirement of
provocation. On the other hand, the assumption that
the actor is a "normal" person, or the relatively
temporary nature of his psychological impediment,
seems at variance with the conditions of diminished
responsibility. Here, the actor might perhaps rely on
a loss of control defence on the ground that his
long-term mistreatment at his victim's hands led him
to retaliate while being in a state of, one might
perhaps say, "transitory diminished responsibility"
(see chapter 6, infra).
Finally, one should note, the suggested departure
from the traditional objective test in provocation
may gain acceptance only in so far as the "reasonable
man" is understood as a standard of justification.
Indeed, it is this latter interpretation of the
standard which the authors seem to have in mind when
they argue that in provocation the plea of
extenuation pertains not to the rationality of the
actor's choices but, rather, to his impaired capacity
for self-control. It is acknowledged that the
"reasonable man" may be relevant to resolving the
question of whether the actor's anger at the victim
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was - under the principle of resentment - justified.
In the authors' own words:
[In provocation, the reasonable man] serves as
a proxy - although a clumsy and imprecise one -
for something that is essential to the
resentment principle: namely, that the actor
should have a good reason for his anger. [61]
It seems correct to say that the "reasonable man" may
have a role to play in answering the guestion of
whether the victim's conduct was wrongful enough to
raise justified anger - in other words, to amount to
legal provocation. As pointed out, however,
establishing an act of provocation - necessary for
allowing an excuse though it may be - would not
suffice unless the requirement of impaired volition
or loss of control is met.
So, to conclude, it was argued here that in the
context of the excuse theory one cannot make out a
case for the suggestion that the resentment principle
- as furnishing the true test of provocation - may
entitle the actor to an excuse even if the
requirement of impaired volition is not met. In so
far as the defence of provocation operates as a
partial excuse, the resentment principle could only
be relevant to establishing provocation as a good
reason for excusing the actor on grounds of loss of
control. In this respect, it seems correct to say
that, for the actor's plea of extenuation to be
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accepted, the "tests" of provocation and impaired
volition should both be satisfied. If a case does not
meet the "hot anger" requirement, considering the
wrong the actor suffered at his victim's hands may be
relevant to bringing forward another excusing
condition - notably diminished responsibility - that
may reasonably explain the actor's loss of control.
Further, the assertion that the test of provocation -
as informed by the resentment principle - would not
apply to cases where the wrongful act was directed at
a third party bearing no particular relation to the
actor does not carry much conviction. Such an
approach, if accepted, would exclude from the defence
cases of provocation where the actor's anger at the
victim seems to be perfectly justified.
6. Concluding Note: Provocation as a Partial Defence
to Murder
As has been asserted before, the excusative
element in the defence of provocation is accounted
for an assumption of nonvoluntary or, according to
Fletcher, morally involuntary action. In so far as
the actor's anger at the victim is justified on
account of the latter's provocation, an intentional
killing committed in the "heat of the moment" does
not reflect the disposition or character trait which
is normally associated with murder. On this basis,
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the concluding paragraphs of this chapter are aimed
at illustrating how the element of intent to kill
could be perceived as a necessary but not sufficient
prereguisite for establishing the malice aforethought
reguired for murder.
It was pointed out in chapter 1 that provocation
has been described as a defence which operates
outside the mens rea and actus reus of murder, i.e.
as an offence modification. [62] It was argued that
this approach to the defence, although it may seem to
accord with the basic assumption that provocation
presupposes rather than negates the element of intent
to kill, does not take us far. Rather, given that
provocation does not disprove the actor's intent to
kill or cause grievous bodily harm, one need to look
more closely at the guestion of how precisely a
successful plea of provocation rebuts a conviction of
murder. Having set out the rationale of provocation
as it relates to the excuse theory, we may now come
to reconsider the idea that provocation disproves the
malice aforethought for murder - and, in this sense,
operates as a failure-of-proof defence - without
denying the actor's intention to kill.
One might say that, for provocation to be treated
as a failure-of-proof defence, we would have to
return to the early law's interpretation of malice
aforethought as denoting premeditation or
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deliberation. A different - and perhaps more
comprehensive - approach might be to ascribe malice
aforethought to all killings committed in cold blood,
both wanton and premeditated (i.e. in the absence of
a justification defence). Nonetheless, neither of the
above approaches seems capable of explaining
satisfactorily how the excusative element in
provocation undercuts the reguirement of malice
aforethought for murder. Indeed, it has been
stressed, even a killing committed in hot blood, or
on the spur of the moment, could not be excluded from
murder, unless the actor can show that he was led to
lose control by reason of justified - due to the
victim's provocation - anger. The rejection of the
defence where the actor's furious reaction is
attributed to "bad temper" rather than to provocation
indicates that the killing reflects the same
disposition or character trait as if it was
deliberate or premeditated or committed in cold
blood.
In the light of the previous analysis, we may
say that provocation operates as a failure-of-proof
defence to murder in so far as malice aforethought is
held to signify a freely formed intention to kill.
And speaking of a freely formed intention to kill in
this context denotes nothing else than the absence of
a condition that may be taken to preclude the act of
killing from manifesting the actor's character or,
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more precisely, the undesirable disposition or
character trait connected with the crime of murder.
[63] In this respect, a successful plea of loss of
control on grounds of provocation will defeat a prima
facie case of murder - and hence the presumption of
malice aforethought - which is made out where an
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CHAPTER 4: ON THE OBJECTIVE TEST IN PROVOCATION:
ASSESSING THE ROLE OF THE "REASONABLE MAN"
1. Two Faces of the "Reasonable Man"
In English law, the defence of provocation is
understood to hinge upon satisfying both a
"subjective" and an "objective" condition. The
subjective condition involves the factual question of
whether the actor was provoked to lose his self-
control; the objective condition pertains to the
evaluative question of whether the provocation was
sufficient to lead a reasonable person to react "as
the the actor did" . It has been pointed out earlier
that, if there is some evidence that the actor was
provoked to lose his self-control, the question of
whether he reacted as a reasonable person is to be
determined by the jury. It is also for the jury to
decide whether certain individual characteristics of
the actor should be taken into account in applying
the test (see chapter 1).
The problems concerning the nature and function
of the "reasonable man" standard are not unrelated to
the ambiguity that besets the theoretical basis of
provocation. Indeed, one major source of difficulty
in deciphering the rationale of the defence lies in
the equivocal role of the "reasonable man" as a
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universal standard aimed at resolving questions of
both justification and excuse. [1] This first section
illustrates the double role of the reasonable person
with respect to justification and excuse and sets out
the possible interpretations of the standard as it
operates in the context of the partial defence
of provocation.
The figure of the "reasonable man" maintains a
tenacious hold on Anglo-American criminal law
doctrine. According to Fletcher, the recourse to the
reasonable person in resolving legal disputes permits
"the ongoing infusion of moral values into the law"
and, as such, constitutes an effort "to transcend the
sources of positive law and to reach for a higher,
enduring, normative plane". [2] Such an approach to
the "reasonable man", one may add, would seem to gain
acceptance particularly in the face of the ever-
increasing tendency towards enhancing the role of the
jury in determining questions of reasonableness.
Nonetheless, one could not readily predict those
considerations which inform the "reasonable man" as
the keystone of a universally applicable test, nor
could one prescribe the nature of the disputes to be
resolved on such a basis. The reasonable person
camouflages heterogeneous requirements of
justification and excuse - of wrongfulness and
blameworthiness - under the same inquiry and
for this reason makes it difficult to demarcate
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between fundamentally different perspectives of
liability.
With regard to the conditions of justification,
the "reasonable man" may be thought of as indicating
the course of action that should be, in the
circumstances, legally acceptable. In this respect,
the reasonable person embodies the principles that
inform and support judgements of legal justification,
recognising exceptions to the primary or prohibitory
rules. Thus, in a situation wherein a conflict of
values or interests becomes inevitable - as in a
case of necessity - the actor is called on to act as
a reasonable person, that is, to preserve the value
or interest which is considered as being objectively
superior. According to the lesser evil variation of
the justification theories, such an act, harmful
though it may be, should nonetheless be legally
permissible (see chapter 2.2). Further, acting in
pursuance of a legal right - e.g. the right of self-
defence - would not be legally warranted unless the
actor observes certain limitations or, one might say,
does not act "in abuse" of the right. In this
context, the reasonable person is referred to as
relevant to circumscribing the bounds within which a
justificatory legal right is regarded as being
properly exercised.
In the domain of excuse, on the other hand, the
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central question is whether the actor is fairly
expected to stand up to the stress of the
circumstances and refrain from acting wrongfully. The
reasonable person provides a yardstick in resolving
this question. Under the excuse theory, the
interpretation of an objective standard is for the
most part informed by considerations having to do
with what is referred to as the "realities" or
"failings" of human nature. One might say that the
slide from the notion of "reasonable" to that of
"ordinary" or "average" or "normal" person is
suggestive of a shift from justification to excuse,
for the latter notions seem more apposite to
accommodate the element of human frailty. Although
legal excuses are thought of as concessions to the
failings of human nature because it is assumed that
these failings are common to all people, the
confluence of factors that occasions the actor's
surrender to pressure - i.e., as a manifestation of
human frailty - could only be detected by reference
to the idiosyncrasies of the particular case. This
makes it necessary to endow the reasonable person
with certain individual characteristics of the actor,
namely, those that are deemed relevant to determining
- in an "objective" way - the degree of pressure to
which the actor was subjected. Only on such a basis
may it properly be asked whether the actor should
fairly be expected to resist the pressure and abstain
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from wrongdoing. Of the idiosyncrasies that may bear
upon the actor's capacity to withstand the compelling
situation only those for which he cannot be blamed
may be considered relevant to describing the ambit
of the applicable test. One might say that singling
out those characteristics that are material to the
assessment of the proposed excusing condition could
itself be perceived as a matter of objective moral
judgement. In this respect, it seems correct to say
that taking account of certain personal
characteristics of the actor does not in fact
militate against the basically objective orientation
of the test. Nonetheless, one should not lose sight
of the important distinction between individual
peculiarities that may be considered in the
application of the objective test and those that
would render such a test inapplicable. The latter
concern conditions which are taken to remove the
actor from the category of "reasonable" or "normal"
people. These conditions are pertinent to a different
class of criminal defences, namely, those that
revolve around the notion of abnormality of
mind rather than a general assumption of human
frailty. [3]
It has been noted in Chapter 2 that the rationale
of the partial defence in provocation may be informed
by either the justification or the excuse theory.
Under the justification theory, provocation furnishes
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the grounds for a partial justification defence on
the assumption that a severely wrongful act of
provocation reduces the degree to which the act of
killing the provoker is deemed morally undesirable.
Patently, given the all-or-nothing character of
judgements of legal justification, the reasonable
person in provocation does not indicate that the
course of action is legally acceptable. Rather, the
role of the reasonable person in this context lies in
the assessment of the gravity of the provocation.
Thus, one might say that only provocations that are
deemed serious enough to enrage or exasperate a
reasonable person may furnish the moral basis upon
which the actor would be entitled to a partial
justification defence. Indeed, one might argue, it is
from the viewpoint of the justification theory that
the so called "resentment principle" may best be
conceptualized (see Chapter 3.5). As has been said,
to the question of what sort of wrongdoings would be
most likely to satisfy this principle, a twofold
answer is being put forward: "The most
straightforward cases are those where the victim's
acts constituted criminal behavior of a significant
nature. ...The next cases comprise those where the
victim behaved toward the actor in a manner that is
not criminal, but nevertheless infringes commonly
recognized standards of decent behavior." [4] In
this respect, it seems correct to say that the
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reasonable person (as represented by the ordinary
member of the jury) epitomizes those commonly
accepted standards of decent conduct the violation of
which could support a plea of provocation according
to the resentment principle. It must be noted that
such an approach to the "reasonable man" does not
preclude taking into account certain personal
idiosyncrasies of the actor that are considered
relevant to determining the degree to which the act
of provocation should be deemed morally wrongful.
Nonetheless, it is important to note that, under the
justification theory, any reference to individual
peculiarities of the accused should have to do with
the moral assessment of the victim's conduct - i.e.
as it was directed at the accused - in relation to
the question of whether the act of killing should be
deemed partially justified. Arguably, the element of
impaired volition or loss of control is immaterial in
this respect (and see chapter 2.4).
Under the excuse theory, on the other hand,
provocation furnishes the necessary condition for
allowing a partial excuse on the ground of impaired
volition or loss of control. It has been asserted in
the previous chapter that from this viewpoint a plea
of extenuation cannot be accepted unless the
requirements of provocation and loss of control are
both met. The reasonable person provides a gauge in
resolving the question of whether the provocation
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offered was capable of arousing justified anger to
such a degree as to be likely to overcome - partly by
reason of human frailty - the actor's capacity for
self-control. In other words, only provocations that
are deemed serious enough to be expected to inflame
passion as a result of justified anger should render
the actor less to blame for losing his self-control
and killing. In this respect, the reasonable person
may be endowed with those individual characteristics
of the actor that are deemed relevant to determining
the gravity of the provocation and hence to making
out the degree of pressure to which the actor was
subjected. According to Ashworth:
To be meaningful, the "gravity" of provocation
must be expressed in relation to persons in a
particular situation or group. For this reason
it is essential and inevitable that the
accused's personal characteristics should be
considered by the court. The proper
distinction, it is submitted, is that
individual peculiarities which bear on the
gravity of the provocation should be taken into
account, whereas individual characteristics
bearing on the accused's level of self-control
should not. [5]
Thus, under the excuse theory, one might envisage the
reasonable person both as the embodiment of those
generally recognized standards of proper behaviour
and, at the same time, as the vehicle of the common
failings of human nature. [6] This portrayal of the
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reasonable person in provocation fits with the basic
assumption that, for a partial excuse to be granted,
the actor's anger at the victim should be morally-
justified. Arguably, if the latter condition does
not obtain, allowing an excuse as a concession to
natural human frailty would appear to be morally
contestable.
The following sections of this chapter centre on
the role of the reasonable person under the partial
excuse doctrine. In particular, the discussion
focuses on the possibility of treating the factual
and the evaluative guestions in provocation as being,
in a sense, interrelated or interdependent. Indeed,
one might say that resolving the factual guestion
"did the actor lose his self-control?" may often seem
to depend on the answer to the evaluative guestion of
whether the provocation received was sufficient to
lead a reasonable person to lose control. In
discussing this issue, certain perspectives of the
"reasonable man" standard as it relates to the
doctrine of provocation and that of mistake will be
comparatively examined. [7]
2. Proportionality and the "Reasonable Man"
Revisited
As was said in chapter 1, the dominant position
in English law after the 1957 legislation is that
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the issues concerning a plea of provocation, both
factual and evaluative, are to be determined by
the jury. In resolving the guestion of whether the
actor did in fact lose his self-control as a result
of provocation the jurors will most often ask
themselves whether they, as normal people, may have
given way to anger in the face of the victim's
conduct. On the assumption that the actor is a
reasonable or normal person, the jurors will usually
take into account those of the actor's peculiarities
that, in their opinion, should bear upon the degree
of wrongfulness of the victim's conduct (i.e. as such
a conduct was directed at the actor). [8] Their final
judgement may also be informed by considerations
which are not directly related to the "external"
wrongfulness of the victim's act. Those
considerations include, among other things, the
possible lapse of time between the provocative act
and the actor's retaliation. The jurors may take the
view that, under the circumstances of the case, they
themselves would not have lost control either because
the victim's conduct was not sufficiently wrongful or
because, wrongful though such a conduct may have
been, enough cooling time elapsed after the
provocation was offered. If this were the case, they
may arrive at the conclusion that, as a matter of
fact, the actor did not lose his self-control - i.e.
as a result of provocation - at the critical time
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when the killing took place.
Much debate has revolved around the problem of
distinguishing between the important role of the
"reasonable man" (as being represented by the
ordinary member of the jury) in answering guestions
of fact and its assumed position as a legal standard
of liability. [9] With regard to this problem, it has
been argued that the role of the "reasonable man" in
the doctrine of provocation provides "one more
illustration of the way in which a point of evidence
has been allowed to slide into a point of law, and of
the inevitable mischief which thereby results". [10]
According to Gordon:
Instead of being used as a way of testing the
truth of the accused's statement that he lost
self-control, the reasonable man has been
turned into an objective standard of self-
control. Even if the jury believe that the
accused, in fact, lost control to an extreme
degree, and that he killed because of this,
they must convict him of murder unless they
think that the reasonable man would have lost
control to that degree, a result which, it is
submitted, is clearly unjust, especially when
what is in question is not the objective
rightness of what was done but the degree of
punishment which should be inflicted on the
particular accused. If the accused's alleged
loss of self-control was something which the
jury feel was quite unusual and unexpected in
the circumstances this may properly lead them
to refuse to believe that he did lose control,
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but if they do believe it, its unexpectedness
seems unimportant - even the law must recognise
that the unexpected can happen. [11]
When a plea of partial excuse is at stake, the role
of the reasonable person pertains not simply to the
question of whether the actor did lose his self-
control but, rather, to whether he did so as a result
of (legal) provocation. Indeed, according to sec.3 of
the Homicide Act 1957, the judge should put the issue
of provocation to the jury if there is some evidence
"on which a jury can find that the person charged was
provoked ...to lose his self-control". Although
evidence of any sort of wrongful conduct on the
victim's part would suffice for the plea of
provocation to be raised, only those wrongdoings that
meet the conditions of provocation - as embedded in
the evaluative question - may support a partial
excuse on the basis of impaired volition or loss of
control. One might say that the factual question, in
so far as it focuses on the actor's loss of control
as a result of legal provocation, in a sense
presupposes answering the evaluative question of
whether the victim's wrongdoing amounted to such a
provocation. Patently, if the victim's wrongdoing
meets the requirements of legal provocation (as those
requirements are embedded in the "reasonable man"
test) and yet there is evidence suggesting that the
actor did not in fact lose his self-control, the
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actor should not be entitled to a partial excuse.
[12] Further, even if there is evidence upon which it
can be found that the actor did in fact lose control,
a partial excuse on the ground of provocation should
not be granted unless the victim's conduct satisfies
the conditions of provocation. As has been pointed
out in the previous chapter, under the excuse theory-
one could not give credit to a claim of loss of
control or impaired volition, unless an acceptable
excusing condition is demostrated as its cause. In
this respect, one might say that, in so far as the
"reasonable man" standard relates to establishing a
good reason or a basis for excusing, it would also
seem to be determinative of the factual guestion of
loss of control on that basis.
As noted in chapter 1, the doctrine of
provocation in English law has been perplexed by
problems concerning the interrelation of the
"reasonable man" and the reguirement or principle of
proportionality. Since the introduction of the
Homicide Act 1957 the reguirement of proportionality
is not treated as a rule of law but rather as a
consideration for the jury in applying the test of
provocation. This does not seem to have resolved the
problems surrounding the issue, however. In the heart
of the controversy lies the guestion of whether
the "reasonable man" test should be construed
as pertinent to assessing the actor's mode of
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retaliation in addition to his claim of loss of self-
control. In the cases e.g. of Wardrope (1960) [13],
Church (1965) [14], and the report in Adams (1961)
[15] it was stated that the requirement of
proportionality, as expressed in Mancini (1942) [16],
has not been abolished after the 1957 legislation.
And in Walker (1969), it was clearly pointed out that
"one vital element for the jury's consideration in
all these cases [of provocation] is the proportion
between the provocation and the retaliation." [17]
Exceptionally, in Southgate (1963) [18] it was
recognized that the role of the "reasonable man" is
not to assess the way in which the actor responded to
the provocation, that is, in so far as it is accepted
that the actor was in fact bereft of his self-
control. Nonetheless, in Phillips (1969) it was
pointed out that:
The test of provocation in the law of homicide
is two-fold. The first, which has always been a
question of fact for the jury assuming that
there is any evidence upon which they can so
find, is "Was the defendant provoked into
losing his self-control?" The second, which is
not of fact but of opinion, "Would a reasonable
man have reacted to the same provocation in the
same way as the defendant did?" In their
Lordships' view section 3 ...in referring to
the question to be left to be determined by the
jury as being "whether the provocation was
enough to make a reasonable man do as he (sc.
the person charged) did" explicitly recognises
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that what the jury have to consider, once they
have reached the conclusion that the person
charged was in fact provoked to lose his self-
control is not merely whether in their opinion
the provocation would have made a reasonable
man lose his self-control but also whether,
having lost his self-control, he would have
retaliated in the same way as the person
charged in fact did. [19]
As the above position seems to suggest, the
"reasonable man" test should focus not simply on the
question of whether the actor did lose his self-
control as a result of the provocation but also on
the way in which the actor retaliated. [20] Further,
it is indicated that, even if it is accepted that the
actor did lose his self-control, his plea of
extenuation should not succeed unless the actor
responded to the provocation in the same manner as a
reasonable person would be expected to respond. [21]
Nevertheless, in so far as the excuse in provocation
rests on the element of loss of control, the
"reasonable man" test may take account of the actor's
mode of retaliation only as relevant to establishing
this element. In other words, if the jury take the
view that the actor's response to the provocation is
markedly at variance with that expected from a
reasonable person, they might give no credit to the
actor's claim of loss of control (i.e. as a
prerequisite for allowing a partial excuse). [22]
Nonetheless, speaking of the requirement of
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proportionality - or the "reasonable man" test in
general - as applying on the actor's response even
after it has been admitted that he lost his self-
control seems confusing. [23] The interpretation of
the proportionality reguirement as pertinent to the
actor's mode of retaliation has been taken to consort
most with the approach to provocation as a partial
justification defence. In this respect, however,
establishing the loss of control element seems hardly
relevant to allowing a partial defence. According to
Alldridge:
It will be seen that a requirement of
proportionality is only consistent with
provocation as partial justification, and loss
of self-control is only consistent with
provocation as partial excuse. [24]
Nonetheless, as was explained earlier, even under
the justification theory, the proportionality
requirement in provocation could not plausibly
refer to the actor's mode of retaliation (see chapter
2.4) .
In the face of these difficulties, the Criminal
Law Revision Committee has proposed that the
"reasonable man" test in provocation should be re¬
formulated. It has been suggested that the jury
should be invited to consider whether, as seen from
the viewpoint of the accused, the provocation
received can reasonably be regarded as a sufficient
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reason for the loss of self-control. In resolving
this question the jury should take into account those
individual characteristics of the actor, including
any physical or mental disability from which he
suffered, which, in their view, bear upon the gravity
of the provocation offered. [25] G. Williams asserts
that, "[this] rewording [of the "reasonable man"
test] would not solve the problem for the jury, but
the committee thought it might express the question
in slightly clearer words". He remarks, nonetheless,
that " It is a logical improvement to make the word
"reasonably" refer to the jury's reasoning faculty
instead of attaching to what the defendant did". [26]
This approach to the issue consorts with the idea
that, under the excuse theory, any reference to
reasonableness or proportionality can only be
relevant to the question of whether - in view of
common human weakness - the provocation was such as
to render the actor's giving way to anger or losing
his self-control seem as a likely or not unexpectable
reaction.
So, to summarize, it has been said that, in
assessing a plea of provocation, the jury should
imagine themselves in the position of the actor and
ask themselves whether they, as reasonable or normal
people, may have lost control in the face of the
victim's conduct. If their answer is in the
affirmative, all that remains to be tested is whether
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the actor was in fact deprived of his self-
control at the time of his fatal response. With
regard to answering this latter question, the
possible lapse of time between provocation and
retaliation, as well as the manner in which the actor
retaliated are among those considerations that may-
furnish important evidence. [27] Thus, under the
excuse theory one may speak of interrelated
considerations that have to do with establishing
provocation as a good reason for losing control and
with the question of whether the actor did in fact
lose control as a result. From this viewpoint it
seems clear that what is at issue is not whether the
actor responded to the provocation in kind but,
rather, whether the provocation offered provides a
reasonable explanation - i.e. in view of human
frailty - for the actor's losing his self-control and
killing. Even if the latter were accepted, however,
the actor should not be entitled to a partial excuse
if the mode of his retaliation or other evidence
suggests that he killed his victim in cold blood.
Admittedly, in provocation giving way to anger or
losing one's self-control is but a matter of
probability. [28] Notwithstanding that the provoked
killer is less to blame, the general assumption in
the law is that losing control and killing could have
been averted on a higher feasible standard of self-
restraint. [29] This is precisely what makes the
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attribution of responsibility and punishment here
possible. As Ashworth points out:
It is one of the fundamental postulates of
English criminal law that individuals ought at
all times to control their actions and to
conduct themselves in accordance with rational
judgment. Loss of self-control is therefore
never capable of amounting to a defence to
criminal liability. [30]
The likelihood of losing one's self-control and
killing can be perceived as, in a sense, commensurate
or proportionate to the degree to which the
provocation is deemed wrongful. Admittedly, a more
severe provocation should reguire a reasonable or
normal person to step up his psychological effort in
order to maintain control over his actions. Although
every wrongful conduct that would pass the test of
provocation may be capable of supporting a partial
excuse if the actor's loss of control is not
disproved as a matter of fact, different degrees of
provocation should entail different degrees of
culpability. [31] This is certainly an important
consideration that the sentencer cannot ignore in
designating the appropriate degree of punishment for
the lesser offence. Moreover, the form and gravity of
the provocation can be determinative of the weight
certain considerations may have in establishing
whether the actor did in fact lose his self-control.
Thus, issues such as the actor's mode of retaliation,
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or the time which may have elapsed after the
provocation was offered are to be assessed as
relevant to the question of loss of control by
reference to the wrongfulness of the provocation. For
example, whereas in a case of a less serious
provocation the lapse of some time should militate
against the actor's claim of loss of control - i.e.
on the assumption that the time elapsed was
sufficient for a normal person to cool down - the
opposite may obtain in a case of a more serious
provocation.
3. Reasonableness as a Prerequisite for Excusing in
Provocation and Mistake of Fact: a Comparative
Examination
The problems concerning the interpretation of the
requirement of reasonableness in the context of the
doctrine of mistake are, to some extent, of similar
nature to those that face us in provocation. One
might say that in the same way as an unreasonable
mistake of fact should not absolve the actor from
criminal responsibility, a plea of provocation that
does not satisfy the "reasonable man" test should not
entitle the actor to a partial excuse. With regard to
both mistake and provocation it may seem problematic,
nonetheless, how one could separate the so called
"evaluative" from the "factual" aspects of the
relevant inquiry.
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Turning down a plea of mistake on the ground that
the mistake was "unreasonable" - i.e. a mistake that,
all things considered, a reasonable person would not
have made - may indicate the rejection of the actor's
claim as a matter of fact; it might also denote that,
even if such a mistake did in fact occur, the defence
cannot be accepted, for an unreasonable mistake may
be taken to manifest an extraordinary deficiency in
the actor's character (see chapter 3.4). One may
argue that an actual or "honest" mistake,
unreasonable though it may be, could nonetheless
still militate against the mens rea element of the
offence. Thus, for example, if the actor shot and
killed another actually believing that he was
shooting at a wild animal, the necessary mens rea of
murder could not be established, that is, even if the
mistake is not regarded as a reasonable one. On the
other hand, if the offence at issue is one of those
based on criminal negligence, the mistake should be
reasonable if it is to support a legal defence.
Indeed, in English law, although the current position
is yet to be clarified, it is asserted that in
general an "honest" mistake would suffice as a
defence to those offences which are contingent upon
establishing intention or "subjective" recklessness
(Cunningham). [32] It is argued, nonetheless, that,
notwithstanding the absence of intent, the courts
will often not hesitate to circumvent the logic of
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mens rea and convict of such an offence if the
actor's mistake is deemed unreasonable. [33] With
regard to those offences requiring negligence or
"objective" recklessness it is accepted that the
defence of mistake should fail unless the actor's
mistaken belief is considered to be reasonable. The
distinction between "reasonable" and "honest"
mistakes has been a source of confusion in the law.
This confusion is manifested by the inconsistency
of the judges' directions to juries in cases
of mistake.
One may say that, in so far as the accused is
assumed to be a normal or reasonable person, the jury
should assess the truth of his claim of mistake by
considering whether they themselves, as reasonable
people, may have fallen victims to such a mistaken
belief in the circumstances. If the jury take the
view that they could not have made such a mistake,
then they would most likely infer that neither the
actor was in fact mistaken. J. Hall explains the role
of the "reasonable man" as a test of facts in the
following way:
Given certain facts, we must, on the basis of
our experience in a given culture,
introspection, and the instant facts, conclude
that any and every rational human being in
those circumstances did or did not intend the
results. Consequently, on the level of the
elementary mental processes embodied in the
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adaptation of ordinary means to attain common
ends, all rational human beings, and thus the
defendant - barring mental or physical defects
may properly be said to have acted
intentionally under the circumstances where any
normal one of them could be said to have acted
intentionally. That is the rationale of the
"reasonable man" test as a method of inquiry.
...the inevitable limitations of such knowledge
do not support the dogmatic view that in the
vast majority of findings, based on rational
methods of investigation, there is no accurate
correspondence. [34]
In so far as the question of reasonableness is to
be answered in view of the circumstances of the
particular case as these are made out in the light
of the existing evidence, one might say that the
introduction of new evidence should normally alter
the "factual" basis upon which the the "reasonable
man" test would apply. In this respect, one might say
that of those factors that make up the the ground
upon which a claim of mistake would be assessed as a
matter of fact, only some, including certain personal
characteristics of the actor, may be singled out as
relevant also to the evaluative question of whether
such a mistake was reasonable. Nevertheless, as has
been said before, although in theory the distinction
between the factual and the evaluative aspects of the
inquiry - or between "honest" and "reasonable"
mistakes - might seem feasible, in practice this
distinction is not always easy to draw. The
239
interrelationship between the factual and evaluative
perspectives of the "reasonable man" test might seem
less difficult to canvass if one places emphasis on
the assumption that unreasonableness is a matter of
degree. Thus, one might say that, all things
considered, the more unreasonable the alleged mistake
is deemed, the less grounds there should be for such
a mistake to have actually occurred. On the other
hand, a mistake that may have been prevented on a
higher standard of care might still be admitted as a
matter of fact ("honest" mistake) if, in view of the
existing evidence, it could not be excluded as
likely to happen. Hall argues that:
The presumption should, of course, be that in
the absence of a plea of insanity, the
defendant is a "reasonable man". But just as is
now the practice in many jurisdictions in cases
of fraud, receiving stolen property and so on,
the defendant would, under the suggested
policy, be permitted to introduce evidence
showing that in fact he did not know or
realize, etc. As suggested, this will not
eradicate the objective test entirely so far as
factual questions are concerned, not only
because the jury will be influenced by
irrational factors but also because, in
appraising the evidence of the defendant's
actual state of mind, they will read into their
own experience of normal conduct and
understanding. Yet, it can hardly be doubted
that in many cases, the instructions given the
jury, concerning the test they are to apply,
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have considerable influence. [35]
Making out a distinction between the factual and
the evaluative perspectives of the "reasonable man"
standard in the context of provocation may seem more
problematical than in the defence of mistake, for
what is now at issue is not the intentional character
of the accused's act (i.e. as it relates to
establishing mens rea) but, rather, the actor's lack
of self-control with respect to an intentional
killing. As has been said, in cases of mistake the
reasonable person may be invoked both as a method of
inguiry in order to resolve the guestion of whether
the accused was in fact acting under a mistaken
belief (and hence he lacked mens rea), and as a
standard upon which the accused's mistake (once it
has been admitted as a matter of fact) is to be
assessed. In some cases in which the alleged mistake
is considered not to be reasonable the accused might
nonetheless still be able to rely on a lack of mens
rea defence or, one might add, to have his crime
"reduced" to one of criminal negligence, if it is
accepted that he was in fact acting under a mistaken
belief ("honest" mistake). By contrast, a plea of
provocation should fail unless the "reasonable man"
test is satisfied. Indeed, in provocation, it seems
correct to say that it should make no difference
whatsoever whether the actor did or did not in fact
lose his self-control - in the sense of acting in
241
hot blood - if the provocation offered was not such
as to be likely to lead a reasonable person (as the
test applies to the particular case) to lose control
over his actions; other things being egual, in
both cases the actor should not be able to rely on
a partial excuse.
The established position that the defence of
provocation should not provide shelter to the so
called "bad tempered man" invites one to make out a
distinction between acting in hot blood and losing
self-control (as required for allowing a partial
excuse). As has been explained in chapter 3, acting
"in the heat of the moment" may be regarded as a
necessary but not sufficient prerequisite for
allowing a partial excuse by reason of loss of
control in provocation. One might say that acting in
hot blood should not indeed be confused with loss of
self-control or impaired volition, that is, in so far
as the latter notion is understood to denote a
significant discrepancy between external conduct and
the actor's character. [36] From this point of view
it seems difficult to visualise how the "reasonable
man" in provocation might be called upon as relevant
to resolving the factual question (i.e. did the actor
lose his self-control?) without at the same time to
answer the evaluative question. This approach seems
correct in so far as the latter question is expressed
in the following way: was the provocation sufficient
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to lead the actor, as a reasonable or normal person,
to lose his self-control? In this respect it sounds
plausible to say that in provocation the reasonable
person is called upon as pertinent to both the
evaluative and factual perspectives of the inquiry.
In other words, in order to show that the actor did
in fact lose his self-control (not merely that he
acted in hot blood) as required for granting a
partial excuse it should be recognized that, in view
of the circumstances of the case, the provocation was
sufficient to lead a reasonable or normal person to
lose control. Nevertheless, as was pointed out
earlier, the satisfaction of the "reasonable man"
test cannot by itself indicate impaired volition or
loss of self-control as a matter of fact unless it is
accepted that the actor responded to the provocation
in "hot blood" or "on the spur of the moment".
Further, in the context of the defence of mistake
the reasonable person is referred to as indicative of
a general standard of care that, if met, the actor
should be exempted from blame and culpability
altogether. In provocation, on the other hand, the
"reasonable man" is called upon as a standard of
self-control with regard to reducing rather than
excluding the actor's blameworthiness and
culpability. As has been indicated, both as a
standard of care and as one of self-control the
"reasonable man" test should apply in view of the
243
circumstances of the particular case. These include,
among other things, those of the actor's
characteristics that are, in a sense, "objectively"
selected as relevant to determining the degree of
care or self-control that could fairly be expected
from the actor as a reasonable or normal person. In
this respect, one might say that falling victim to a
reasonable mistake of fact would normally preclude
any inference to a flawed character as required for
holding the actor blameworthy. On the other hand,
giving way to provocation that is deemed sufficient
according to the "reasonable man test and losing
control does not totally debar such an inference.
One might perhaps envisage some sort of analogy
between provocation and those cases of mistake where
the actor should not be entitled to complete
exculpation, i.e. where the mistake is deemed
unreasonable and yet true as a matter of fact. As has
been said, in these cases the admission of a mistaken
belief may debar conviction of an offence reguiring
mens rea (e.g. murder) but it should not preclude
liability for a lesser offence (e.g. manslaughter).
Some further aspects of the analogy or, possibly, the
interrelation between provocation and unreasonable
mistake will be explored in the context of the
discussion of the problem of excessive self-defence
in the following chapter.
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4. Concluding Note
Conduct that cannot be regarded as sufficiently-
wrongful according to the "reasonable man" test
should not be capable of supporting a partial excuse
on the ground of provocation. What sort of untoward
behaviour should be seen as crossing the threshold of
legal provocation is primarily a matter of moral
judgement and in this sense it cannot be determined
without getting an insight into the moral code that
is current in society. In this respect, the judgement
on provocation is informed by the demerit or
wrongfulness attached to certain conduct by looking
at it not in the abstract but, rather, in the light
of the circumstances of the particular case. As has
been pointed out, the fact that some of those
considerations that determine the gravity of the
provocation can be peculiar to the individual case
does not render them irrelevant to the "objective"
moral assessment of the relevant conduct.
It is recognized that of those wrongdoings that
may qualify as legal provocations according to the
"reasonable man" test some might constitute legal
offences as well. Nonetheless, it is accepted that
the criminal character of the victim's wrongdoing
does not necessarily warrant a successful plea of
provocation. [37] In some cases where the victim's
unlawful conduct entails a threat to life or limb one
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may be confronted with theoretical problems which
have to do with the overlap of elements of different
criminal defences. The following chapter takes up
these problems in the context of a comparative
examination of self-defence and provocation. In
particular, the analysis focuses on the issue of
excessive self-defence and explores the rationale of
the defence that might arise in such cases.
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CHAPTER 5: PROVOCATION AND SELF-DEFENCE;
NEIGHBOURING PERSPECTIVES
1. Comparative Notes
The present chapter draws together and develops
up questions of possible overlap between provocation
and self-defence and explores the matter on different
levels of analysis. First, attention is drawn to
theoretical issues arising out of a comparative
examination of the defences of self-defence and
provocation. Second, the analysis takes up specific
problems of demarcation in some cases lying on the
borderline between self-defence and provocation,
focusing in particular on the problem of excessive
self-defence. Following an examination of the
treatment of excessive self-defence cases in
different jurisdictions, the relevant issues are
discussed further in the light of the theory of
justification and excuse.
As has been said earlier in this thesis, the
partial defence of provocation rests on the
assumption that the actor suffered a serious wrong at
the victim's hands. Designating the threshold of
legal provocation postulates commonsense familiarity
about what sort of transgressions are capable of
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arousing such a degree of anger or indignation that
might expectedly defeat the actor's capacity for
self-control. [1] The resolution of the question of
provocation in law turns on the moral assessment of
the victim's conduct as it was directed at the actor
- an assessment that may be viewed as based on both
"objective" and "subjective" considerations (see
relevant disscusion in chapter 4). Thus, although
legal wrongdoings of a significant nature should for
the most part pass the threshold of legal
provocation, non-legal/moral wrongdoings may also
amount to provocation sufficient to support a partial
defence. [2] Over this threshold, provocations may
vary from the relatively trivial ones to those
involving very serious wrongdoings. Patently, legal
provocations involving different degrees of
wrongfulness would equally support a partial defence
to murder, provided that the requirement of loss of
self-control is satisfied. The gravity of the
provocation received is taken into account in
determining the appropriate degree of punishment for
the lesser offence. [3]
One might encounter cases where, depending on the
nature and degree of the victim's wrongdoing,
provocation may appear to verge on self-defence. [4]
In both provocation and self-defence the situation
giving rise to the conditions of the legal defence is
initiated - most often culpably - by the victim.[5]
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It is accepted that the aggressor's culpability in
endangering the defender's life holds a principal
role as regards the legal justification of using
lethal force in self-defence. [6] As has been
indicated in chapter 2, one might argue on a similar
basis that the provoker's culpability should also
account for the partial justification of his killing
in retaliation. [7] It has been pointed out that such
an approach to provocation implies that a provoked
killing attaches less blame to the actor than an
unprovoked one, irrespective of the actor's frame of
mind - or his capacity to exercise self-control - at
the time of his retaliation. The partial
justification doctrine might appear to gain
acceptance particularly in cases of provocation
involving a serious threat to the life or limb
of the actor - in other words, in those cases where
provocation borders on self-defence.
When provocation takes the form of physical
assault of such nature as would be expected to
arouse overwhelming passion in the person
attacked, it will not always be easy to
distinguish the victim's immediate retaliation
from a resistance by way of self-defence. It is
therefore not surprising that the early
authorities did not always keep homicide under
provocation separate from homicide in self-
defence. [8]
In chapter 2 it was argued that, notwithstanding
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the possible moral grounds of the partial
justification doctrine, the theoretical approach to
provocation as a partial justification defence is
incompatible with the rationale of legal
justification. Moreover, such an approach may seem to
offend fundamental moral principles concerning the
sanctity and inviolability of human life. Neither
of the three dominant moral theories of legal
justification - the "forfeiture" theory, the rights
theory, the lesser evil theory - seems capable
of providing enough support for the partial
justification doctrine. Nonetheless, although the
trend in the modern law is admittedly toward treating
provocation as a partial excuse, there is still some
backing - both in theory and in practice - for the
idea that provocation can operate as a partial
justification defence. [9]
As has been pointed out, any endeavour to elicit
support for the partial justification doctrine by
drawing an analogy between provocation and self-
defence runs into contradictions. Indeed, it is
accepted that resorting to lethal force in self-
defence can be justified not merely as an act aimed
at the protection of the defender's life, but
primarily as an act which vindicates the legal order
in general. [10] Although the vindication of legal
order pervades the rationale of self-defence as a
justification, this is not the case as regards
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provocation. It is recognised that any morally
wrongful act may be sufficient to buttress a valid
plea of provocation, even if such an act does not
constitute an offence in law. Indeed, it would be
paradoxical to correlate the provoker's killing in
retaliation - an act by definition unlawful - with
the vindication of legal order. The assumption of a
serious wrongdoing - legal and/or moral - on the
victim's part does not suffice by itself to support
the actor's plea of extenuation. For the defence of
provocation to be sustained it is necessary that the
act of provocation have had a negative effect on the
actor's capacity to exercise self-control at the time
of his response.
Clearly, in cases where the conditions of
provocation completely overlap with those of self-
defence, the latter defence - as a justification -
should normally take priority. [11] Indeed, the issue
of provocation need not be raised here. Nonetheless,
provocation may sometimes be a fallback to self-
defence where the conditions for the latter defence
to be accepted are not fully met. This might be the
case if the use of lethal force in self-defence is
deemed unnecessary or excessive in view of the threat
posed by the attack, or if the defender disregarded
his duty to retreat. In such cases, although some of
the conditions of self-defence may be satisfied, the
actor could not successfully claim justification.
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The actor might be able to rely on provocation
instead if there is sufficient evidence that the
attack caused him to lose his self-control and kill
in an outbreak of passion.
Besides its traditional understanding as a
justification defence, self-defence can also be
perceived as a form of excusing necessity on the
assumption that the imminent threat on the actor's
life vitiates his freedom to choose. [12] From this
viewpoint, the term "necessary defence" seems to
capture better the excusative element in the defence.
Treating self-defence as an excuse may gain
acceptance particularly in cases of non-culpable
aggression. [13] Such an approach to self-defence
should hold good in so far as the legal justification
of the act of defence is dependent upon the
aggressor's being culpable for the wrongful attack.
Thus, one might say that the use of lethal force in
self-defence should not be justified - it may only be
excused - when the actor has to defend himself
against non-imputable aggressors. [14] From this
point of view, self-defence would appear to share
common grounds with provocation as a partial excuse.
As has been explained in chapter 3, these excuses
operate on the assumption that the actor is not free
to choose, notwithstanding his being able to act.
Patently, what distinguishes self-defence as a total
excuse from provocation as a partial excuse is
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that in provocation the actor succumbs to a form of
coercion which is not regarded as being irresistible.
The agenda for the remaining subdivisions of this
chapter includes the examination of guestions which
emerge in cases lying on the borderline between
provocation and self-defence. For the most part, the
discussion revolves around the issue of excessive
self-defence and its relation to provocation.
Although all the questions concerning excessive self-
defence cases cannot adequately be dealt with in the
present work, we shall outline the contours of the
problem in law and search for answers on the basis of
the theory of justification and excuse.
2. Criminal Liability in Excessive Self-Defence
Cases
The problem of excessive self-defence arises in
cases where the actor employs more force than is
reasonably necessary in order to ward off an unlawful
attack. It is recognized that exceeding the limits of
necessary force in self-defence militates against the
actor's plea of justification. With regard to the
legal doctrine of justified defence, the principle of
proportionality delimits the degree of force to be
used in order to protect one's interests against
unlawful transgressions. This principle precludes
justification when the defender inflicts harm which,
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although necessary, is deemed too grave in relation
to the value or interest threatened by the attack.
[15] Nonetheless, determining the grounds of
liability in such cases raises a number of perplexing
theoretical and practical problems. [16]
In English law, the reasonableness of the force
used in self-defence is held to be an issue of fact
to be determinined by the jury. More precisely, it is
left to the jury to decide whether the prosecution
has proven beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant
exceeded the degree of force necessary to thwart the
aggression. It is recognised that this issue should
be decided on account of the circumstances as the
actor believed them to be. [17] If the prosecution
succeeds in establishing that the actor overstepped
the limits of necessary force, the plea of self-
defence will collapse, notwithstanding the admission
that the actor was actually subjected to an
unjustified attack. With respect to criminal offences
other than murder, if the plea of self-defence fails
by reason of the actor's excessive use of force,
evidence of an unlawful attack on the victim's part
may be taken into account in the mitigation of
sentence. Nonetheless, where the actor is charged
with murder, the dismissal of the defence on such a
basis would necessarily entail a sentence of life
imprisonment. In the leading case of Palmer, Lord
Morris of Borth-y-Gest opined as follows:
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The defence of self-defence either succeeds so
as to result in an acquittal or is disproved in
which case as a defence it is rejected. In a
homicide case the circumstances may be such
that it will become an issue whether there was
provocation... [18] [19]
It has been argued that treating self-defence as
an all-or-nothing defence might sometimes lead to
morally controversial decisions, especially in those
cases where the actor is charged with murder.
Nonetheless, in English law it is recognised that the
question of whether the degree of defensive force was
reasonable or not should be answered in the light of
the circumstances in which the decision to use force
was made. In other words, the jury should be directed
to take into account that, under the stress of the
situation, the defender - acting as a reasonable
person - might not have been able to make out the
appropriate degree of defensive force needed to ward
off the attack. In Lord Morris's words:
If there has been an attack so that defence is
reasonably necessary it will be recognized that
a person defending himself cannot weigh to a
nicety the exact measure of his necessary
defensive action. If a jury thought that
in a moment of unexpected anguish a person
attacked had only done what he honestly and
instinctively thought was necessary that would
be most potent evidence that only reasonable
defensive action had been taken. [20]
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As the above position suggests, a claim of legal
justification should be accepted if the degree of
force employed in self-defence is deemed reasonable
in view of the circumstances as the actor believed
them to be. In this respect, one may say that the act
of defence should be justified even where the actor
used more force than was in fact necessary. From this
point of view, one might envisage a distinction
between two types of cases where the accused should
normally be able to rely on a justification defence:
first, cases where the defensive force is deemed
reasonable on the admission that, in the face of the
actual threat posed by the attack, such a degree of
force was objectively necessary (i.e. in the
circumstances as they really were). Second, cases
where the force used in defence, although objectively
excessive or disproportionate to the aggression, is
deemed reasonable only because under the
circumstances the actor was unable to foresee the
objectively most appropriate response. The latter
would be the case, for example, where the actor
mistakenly believes that the attack poses an
immediate danger to his life and uses lethal force
against the attacker.
One might say that, in so far as the
reasonableness of the defensive force is assessed
by reference to the actor's state of mind in
the circumstances, the legal justification of
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self-defence would appear to hinge on certain
considerations which are clearly excusative in
nature. In this respect, it might perhaps be said
that, although the force used in self-defence is
regarded as objectively excessive, the defensive act
should be legally justified if the accused has fallen
victim to, e.g., an excusable mistake of fact. The
case of Shannon offers an example of how the legal
justification of self-defence may be contingent upon
excusative considerations. In this case it has been
pointed out that:
...if the jury concluded that the stabbing was
the act of a desperate man in extreme
difficulties, with his assailant dragging him
down by the hair, they should consider very
carefully before concluding that the stabbing
was an offensive and not a defensive act,
albeit it went beyond what an onlooker would
regard as reasonably necessary. [21]
One might envisage an analogy between the cases
of self-defence where the justification plea is
accepted on the ground that the accused could not
make out the exact degree of force reguired to fend
off the attack and those of putative self-defence.
Putative self-defence pertains to cases where the
actor resorts to force due to the mistaken belief
that he is under an unjustified attack. Because this
sort of mistake has to do with to the legal
justification of the act, one might say that
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it resembles mistake of law. It cannot be treated as
such, however, because it has to do not merely with a
different appraisal of the act in the circumstances,
but rather with the circumstances surrounding the
act. Moreover, because the mistake involved in
putative justification has to do with facts, it may
appear similar to mistake of fact. It is not the
same, nonetheless, because it pertains not to facts
material to the actus reus of the offence but,
rather, to facts in the presence of which the
wrongful act would be legally justified. From the
viewpoint of the justification-excuse distinction,
the approach to putative justification as an actual
justification in Anglo-American law has been argued
against as confusing. According to Fletcher:
The Common law and now the Model Penal Code
and its progeny interweave criteria of
justification and excuse in cases in which the
defending actor reasonably, but mistakenly,
believes that he is being attacked. Those
situations, which we shall call putative
self-defence, are regularly called cases
of justification. Assimilating a putative
justification to an actual justification
undermines the matrix of legal relationships
affected by a claim of justification. [22]
Fletcher goes on to argue that:
Mistakes as to justificatory elements, however,
do not affect either the violation of the norm
or the wrongful nature of acting in ignorance.
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If an actor believes that he is being attacked
and responds with force, his injuring the
putative aggressor is a wrongful but excused
battery. [23]
By the same token, one might argue, treating the
excessive use of force in self-defence as reasonable
and hence legally justified in a case where the actor
was mistaken as to the degree of force which was
actually necessary to stifle the attack contravenes
the logic of justification. Indeed, one might say
that such an approach to the matter constitutes a
further example of the tendency to collapse the
distinction between justification and excuse under
the requirement of reasonableness. [24] If it is
accepted that a lesser degree of force would have
been sufficient to stop the aggressor, the actor's
response should remain wrongful; the actor may well
be excused, however, if it is admitted that he was
unable to form a better judgement in the
circumstances. As has been pointed out, assessing a
claim for excuse involves a moral judgement about
what can be expected from normal people in certain
trying situations. From this viewpoint, the panic or
trepidation leading the actor to exceed (often by
reason of mistake) the actually necessary force in
self-defence should be regarded as relevant to
negating the imputation of the wrongful act to the
actor (excuse) rather than to negating the
wrongfulness of the act (justification).
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In self-defence, the psychological pressure that
expectedly arises when someone is confronted with an
immediate danger to his life or limb should be taken
into account in considering whether the actor's
mistake as to the degree of necessary force was
reasonable. This, obviously, does not render the
degree of force used under the mistaken belief
reasonable - that is, reasonable as normally
understood in relation to judgements of justification
(see chapter 4.1). In other words, reasonableness
here pertains to the guestion of whether the mistake
was such as to render the actor excusable for
exceeding the limits of necessary force in self-
defence. One might say that, other things being
equal, a mistake held to be reasonable in a trying
situation - such as that of self-defence - should not
be considered as such if made under "normal"
circumstances. It is debateable, nonetheless, whether
an unreasonable - in the circumstances of self-
defence - mistake would be sufficient to support a
plea for extenuation in some cases of excessive self-
defence. To answer this question one would have to
consider whether the actor's mistake, unreasonable in
the circumstances though it may have been, can still
be regarded as capable of negating the degree of
culpability required for murder (see relevant
analysis in sections 3 & 4 below).
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In English law it is recognised that the plea of
self-defence will fail if the prosecution succeeds in
establishing that actor intentionally exceeded the
degree of force that was reguired to stop the
aggressor. The same would be the case, one might add,
if the actor's excessive use of force is not excused
on the ground of a reasonable-in-the-circumstances
mistake of fact. In some cases of homicide where the
plea of self-defence is rejected, the defendant might
be able to rely on provocation to reduce his offence
from murder to volunrary manslaughter. [25] As has
been said in the leading case of Mclnnes:
...the facts upon which the plea of
defence is unsuccessfully sought to be
may nevertheless... go to show that
accused] acted under provocation. [26]
According to G. Williams:
...in every case in which the defendant
believes that he has to defend himself against
a serious attack, but for some reason oversteps
the limits of self-defence (because the attack
he fears is not sufficiently serious to justify
killing in self-defence, or because it is held
that he is unreasonable in fearing an attack,
or in fearing an attack of that degree of
seriousness, or in not realising that he has
some other escape) the circumstances can still
amount to provocation. [27]





apprehension of an attack might also be sufficient to
support a plea of provocation in such cases, even if
the attack did not actually occur. [28]
One might say that a serious physical assault
that involves a threat to life or limb seems the most
likely to support a partial excuse on the ground of
provocation, provided that the actor's loss of self-
control is not disproved as a matter of fact (see
chapter 4.2). When provocation is pleaded as a
partial excuse following an unsuccessful plea of
self-defence the actor in a sense admits that he
intentionally killed the attacker, but he claims that
this was a result of his being carried away by
justified - due to the victim's attack - anger. With
regard to criminal offences other than murder, the
rejection of the plea of self-defence on the ground
that the force used was excessive would entail the
actor's conviction of the relevant offence, although
provocation may be considered in the mitigation of
sentence.
So, to summarize, it has been pointed out that
Anglo-American criminal law doctrine often appears to
intertwine criteria of justification and excuse in
its treatment of self-defence. This becomes obvious
in cases of putative self-defence as well as in those
cases of excessive self-defence where the actor was
mistaken about the degree of defensive force needed
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to fend off the attack. Given that self-defence
operates as an all-or-nothing defence, if excessive
or unreasonable force was used, the actor's claim of
justification will be rejected. Nonetheless, in so
far as the question of reasonableness is resolved on
the basis of the circumstances as the actor believed
them to be, an actually excessive defence may be
regarded as reasonable and hence legally justified in
cases where the defender was in fact acting under a
mistaken belief. This implies that accepting the
actor's plea of justification in such cases would in
a way presuppose that the actor can put forward an
acceptable claim of mistake. From this viewpoint, one
might say that the reasonableness of the actor's
mistake (excuse) should in a sense be considered
before the question of whether the actor's response
to the attack was reasonable and therefore justified.
Nonetheless, a more coherent approach to the matter
would be to treat under the legal justification of
self-defence only those cases where the degree of
defensive force was actually necessary or
proportionate to the threat posed by the attack.
Cases of putative self-defence as well as those where
the actor by mistake exceeds the degree of necessary
force in self-defence should rather be dealt with
under the excuse theory. Finally, it has been said
that if the plea of self-defence fails by reason of
the actor's excessive use of force, the actor might
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perhaps be able to rely upon provocation to reduce
murder to manslaughter if the conditions of the
latter defence are satisfied.
3. Excessive Self-defence as the Basis of a Partial
Defence to Murder
As has been noted before, in English criminal law
doctrine it is accepted that the use of unreasonable
or excessive force in self-defence will normally
defeat the actor's plea of justification.
Nonetheless, the all-or-nothing character of the
defence of self-defence has been regarded as likely
to result in morally controversial convictions,
particularly in certain cases where the actor is
charged with murder. Indeed, in the past a different
approach to dealing with the problem of excessive
defence in such cases had been put forward, notably
in the Australian common law jurisdictions. It was
recognised that, if the actor were entitled to defend
himself against an unjustified attack and
intentionally killed the aggressor by using more
force than was reasonably necessary, his offence
should be reduced from murder to manslaughter. [29]
Arguably, the reduction of the offence on such
grounds would presuppose that the accused was unaware
of the fact that the defensive force was excessive.
Although some older English authorities allowed for
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a similar view, English law did not finally adopt
this approach. [30] The position that in some cases
of excessive self-defence the accused may be entitled
to a partial defence to murder was until recently
particularly influential in Australian law. [31] This
position has been expressed by Menzies J. in Howe as
follows:
The law is that it is manslaughter and not
murder if the accused would have been entitled
to acguittal on the ground of self-defence
except for the fact that in honestly defending
himself he used greater force than was
reasonably necessary for his self-protection
and in doing so killed his assailant. [32]
However, the above position has now been reversed
by the decision of the High Court of Australia in
Zecevic [33] which is said to have harmonized
Australian law with the law of England as the latter
has been expressed in Palmer. It has been argued,
however, that this change was necessary in order to
facilitate the jury's comprehension of the law and
not because the previous approach was in principle
wrong. [34] One of the problems with formulating
excessive self-defence as a partial defence to murder
has to do with the difficulty in applying here an
objective test such as the one pertinent to
provocation. Nonetheless, although there is no
currently accepted rule postulating the reduction of
murder to manslaughter in excessive self-defence
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cases, the jury is still entitled to return a
compromise verdict of manslaughter in such cases.
[35] Moreover, the fact that murder no longer entails
a fixed penalty of life imprisonment in Australian
law is seen as mitigating further the possible
negative effects of Zecevic.
One should note, nonetheless, that in England the
Criminal Law Revision Committee has recommended the
introduction of a partial defence to murder in
excessive self-defence cases - a defence similar to
that previously adopted in Australian law. [36]
Indeed, the CLRC's recommendation seems to go along
with the position expressed in Howe. It has been
proposed that:
Where a person kills in a situation in which it
is reasonable for some force to be used in
self-defence or in the prevention of crime but
the defendant uses excessive force, he should
be liable to be convicted of manslaughter not
murder if at the time of the act he honestly
believed that the force he used was reasonable
in the circumstances. [37]
In Scots law, the possibility of pleading
mitigation in cases of excessive self-defence led in
the past to terminological confusion between self-
defence and provocation. [38] In Crawford [39] it was
made clear, nonetheless, that self-defence can only
operate as a complete defence. However, Scots law
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does not rule out the possibility of reducing murder
to culpable homicide in excessive self-defence cases.
The reduction of the level of liability for homicide
in such cases may be accepted on the ground of either
provocation or non-murderous recklessness. [40]
According to Gordon:
There are, after all, no formal restrictions on
the type of circumstances which may operate to
reduce murder to culpable homicide; anything
which shows an absence of the mens rea of
murder will do... It is, of course, possible to
figure a case in which it was clearly proved
that the accused acted excessively and in cold
blood, and in that case he would be guilty of
murder, but such a case is likely to be found
only rarely. [41]
With regard to the above position, one might say
that murder will be reduced to culpable homicide on
the ground of provocation if it is accepted that the
aggression drove the actor to lose his self-control
and kill; this may be true, even if the attack did
not endanger the actor's life. [42] In the case that
it did, the general assumption should be that the
defendant acted under provocation. As Gordon points
out, such cases need not be treated separately from
those involving a serious physical assault albeit
short of threatening the actor's life.
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4. Provocation and Excessive Self-Defence: Doctrinal
Problems of Demarcation
Commentators have long been trying to work out a
cogent account of the nature of the partial defence
which might perhaps emerge in excessive self-defence
cases. A primary guestion has been whether excessive
self-defence should indeed be canvassed as furnishing
the grounds for an independent partial defence to
murder or not. As has been indicated, the conception
of self-defence as an all-or-nothing defence in
English law seems to militate against the formulation
of such a partial defence here (see Palmer, section 2
supra). If, nonetheless, excessive self-defence were
to operate as a partial defence - the previous
position in Australian law provides such an example -
it seems highly problematical what the character and
rationale of such a defence should be. Should
excessive self-defence be described as a partial
excuse based on considerations pertinent to the
actor's frame of mind at the time of his response?
Or, rather, should it be depicted as a partial
justification on the ground that the original
situation is set down to the victim's fault, in other
words, by laying the emphasis on the fact that the
actor was defending himself against an unlawful
attack? P. Smith argues as follows:
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The defence of excessive force is only-
connected with the defence of self-defence in
that the first requirement of the former
defence is that there should initially have
been a situation in which the accused would
have been justified in defending himself in
some way. Once that has been established the
defence of excessive force ought to be tested
on its own terms, i.e. did the accused believe
that the degree of force he used was necessary?
[43]
Further, it seems questionable what sort of
criminal liability should be ascribed to those who
kill by exceeding the necessary force in self-
defence, that is, if it were accepted that they are
entitled to a partial defence to murder. Should they
be convicted of voluntary manslaughter on the
assumption that the killing is intentional? Or,
rather, should they be convicted of involuntary
manslaughter on grounds of recklessness or criminal
negligence? Moreover, if excessive self-defence were
taken to reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter
how could one distinguish the partial defence here
from provocation? Drawing a line between the two
might indeed seem abstruse given that, in practice,
provocation often appears alongside excessive self-
defence. In other words, if both excessive self-
defence and provocation led to the reduction of
murder to voluntary manslaughter, one may ask,
on what basis treating excessive defence as an
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independent partial defence to murder may be
justified? [44] With regard to this latter question
one might perhaps say that the possible
interpretation of excessive self-defence as a partial
justification would render pleading provocation as a
partial excuse in such cases irrelevant.
One may argue that, at first glance, treating
excessive self-defence as an independent partial
defence to murder might best be conceptualised from
the viewpoint of the partial justification doctrine.
The reason for this is that speaking of a defence of
excessive self-defence invites one to view the
element of "defence" as taking the priority over any
excusative considerations, notably provocation or
mistake. To put it otherwise, portraying excessive
self-defence as a "defence" may seem to imply that
the mere fact that the accused was acting in defence
is sufficient to entitle him to extenuation,
regardless of the reason for his exceeding the limits
of necessary force. On the other hand, if the grounds
for extenuation in such cases were exclusively
associated with excusative considerations, such as
mistake or provocation, speaking of excessive self-
defence as a partial defence in its own right might
be confusing. If the idea of partial justification in
such cases is set aside, excessive self-defence
should rather be understood as a consideration
always militating against the plea of self-defence
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as a justification. On the assumption thus that
killing due to excessive use of force in defence can
never be justified - either partially or totally -
the actor may be entitled to extenuation or,
possibly, exoneration only on the basis of a partial
or total excuse respectively. One may say that such
an excuse should normally be raised following an
unsuccessful plea of self-defence, and it would be
aimed at rebutting that the actor's killing of the
aggressor by using excessive force manifests the
malice aforethought for murder. As has been suggested
above, the fact that the accused was acting in self-
defence has little to do with the rationale of the
partial excuse here. This seems true, notwithstanding
that the conditions of the relevant excuse germinate
in and are assessed under the circumstances of self-
defence. Further, one might argue that, under the
excuse theory, the problem of excessive self-defence
cannot be dealt with in a uniform way. That is to
say, the actor's killing of the aggressor by using
excessive force in self-defence may be excused
either totally or partially - on a number of
different grounds.
The possibility of confusing excuse and
justification as well as between different excuses
that may be relevant here seems responsible for the
difficulty of distinguishing provocation from a
partial defence of excessive self-defence.
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It has been asserted that if a partial defence of
excessive self-defence were taken to reduce murder
to voluntary manslaughter it would be difficult
to distinguish it from provocation. According to
C. Howard:
Provocation has the effect of reducing a prima
facie case of murder to manslaughter because it
is in substance a confession and avoidance. The
defendant who pleads provocation is in effect
admitting that he intentionally killed V but
asking that provocation be allowed as a partial
excuse. Excessive defence would be a true head
of voluntary manslaughter if the defendant were
similarly admitting an intentional killing and
asking that some element in the situation
should partly excuse his actions. The obvious
excuse would be that he was not the original
attacker. [45]
Howard remarks, nonetheless, that it is not
inconceivable to treat the victim's attack as the
real basis of the actor's plea for extenuation,
connecting thus excessive self-defence with
provocation. He claims that, if this were the case,
it would not sound implausible to say that excessive
self-defence should reduce murder to voluntary
manslaughter. Howard notes that the connection of
excessive defence with provocation would considerably
simplify the jury's task in such cases.
If the basis of both defences were the same,
exposition to the jury would be relatively
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straightforward. As long as they proceed on
different bases, the task of directing the jury
will remain... unnecessarily complicated.
Another advantage of producing a close parallel
between excessive defence and provocation would
be to facilitate the introduction of the idea
of excessive defence into the common law
jurisdictions to avoid distortion of the law of
provocation to meet cases more properly
classified as excessive defence. [46]
Howard goes on to argue, however, that drawing a
parallel between provocation and excessive self-
defence would be inaccurate if the partial defence of
excessive self-defence were connected with the claim
that the actor was mistaken as to the necessity of
using lethal force in the circumstances. If the
latter were the case, he claims, the reason for
extenuation would have little to do with the
assumption that the actor is not to blame for the
situation wherein defensive force had to be used. In
so far as no analogy between provocation and
excessive self-defence is recognised, thus the
argument runs, it would seem more sensible to treat
excessive self-defence as reducing murder to
involuntary rather than to voluntary manslaughter.
[47]
Although the association of excessive self-
defence with provocation on the ground that the
situation is set down to the victim's aggression
might seem correct, it is not clear why one should
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speak of the ensuing defence as a partial excuse.
Indeed, treating the victim's aggression as the basis
of the partial defence in both excessive self-defence
and provocation cases may seem to suggest that the
actor's response is partially justified rather than
partially excused. For the latter to be the case it
is required, moreover, that the victim's attack led
the actor to respond in such a state of mind that
precluded him from exercising proper control over his
actions. It has been argued earlier that the excuse
theory furnishes the most appropriate basis for
conceptualising the rationale of provocation as a
partial defence to murder (see chapters 2 & 3). One
might say that, under the excuse theory the partial
excuse of excessive self-defence may match that of
provocation only in those cases of excessive defence
where it is accepted that the attack led the actor to
lose his self-control. Here the actor admits that he
acted with an intention to kill, but pleads a partial
excuse on the ground of loss of self-control by
reason of provocation. In other words, if the actor
was provoked by the victim's attack to lose his self-
control and kill, he may be entitled to a partial
excuse on the assumption that the attack amounted to
legal provocation. The same may obtain, e.g., in a
case where it is accepted that the actor could have
escaped the need of using lethal force in self-
defence by taking an opportunity to retreat.
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Patently, if the accused's plea of provocation
succeeds, he should be convicted of voluntary
manslaughter.
On the other hand, cases where excessive self-
defence is set down to a mistaken belief about the
necessity of using lethal force in the situation
should for the most part be dealt with under the
defence of mistake. If the actor's mistake is held to
be reasonable in the circumstances, the actor should
be entitled to full acguittal. It has been asserted,
nonetheless, that there may be cases of excessive
self-defence where the actor's mistake, unreasonable
though it may be, should at least support a partial
defence. One might envisage such an approach to the
issue of mistake in self-defence only where the actor
is charged with murder and on the assumption that
even unreasonable mistakes can militate against the
requirement of malice aforethought. If the actor is
charged with a criminal offence other than murder,
such a mistake could not prevent conviction, but it
may be taken into account in the mitigation of
sentence. According to P. Smith:
The moral culpability of the man who honestly
believes that he needs to use lethal force to
defend himself - no matter how mistaken his
belief - is surely very much less than that of
a man who kills deliberately and in cold blood.
It is submitted that society ought to reserve
its major condemnation for the cold-blooded
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killer, and to have the mistaken victim of an
attack convicted of the same crime tends
to weaken this condemnation. [48]
Once it has been recognised that in excessive
self-defence cases unreasonable mistakes may be
capable of negating malice aforethought and thus of
supporting a partial defence to murder, it seems
guestionable whether such a defence should reduce
murder to voluntary or rather to involuntary
manslaughter. According to Howard, an intentional
killing committed under an unreasonable and yet
honest mistake should be treated under the heading of
involuntary manslaughter. Howard claims that the
association of excessive self-defence with voluntary
manslaughter would be inappropriate in so far as no
parallel is drawn between excessive self-defence and
provocation. He explains the issue in the following
way:
The argument is that the question whether the
defendant was criminally negligent should be
regarded as arising at the point of time when
he formed a judgment on the measures necessary
to defend himself from the danger threatened...
There appears to be no good reason why these
two separate aspects of the matter should not
be brought together... and test the whole
composite situation by asking whether in all
the circumstances D was criminally negligent in
adopting the course of action which he did. If
D were charged with manslaughter by excessive
defence, his liability would then be tested by
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reference to the question whether he was
criminally negligent in his over-assessment of
the measures necessary for his own defence.
If he was, then he would be guilty of
[involuntary] manslaughter. [49]
According to Howard, the admission that the actor's
killing of the aggressor was intentional presents no
problem in treating the case as one of involuntary
manslaughter. In his own words:
In regarding the situation as being one of
manslaughter by criminal negligence there is no
real difficulty in the circumstances that the
defendant acted intentionally. Much conduct
classified by the law as negligent is
necessarily in most of its aspects perfectly
intentional. The negligent driving of a motor¬
car is in most respects the entirely
intentional driving of a motor-car. [50]
Treating an intentional killing due to the
actor's unreasonable mistake about the degree of
necessary force in self-defence under the heading of
criminal negligence is, no doubt, correct. [51] What
seems confusing in Howard's analysis, however, is the
assumption that this approach to the matter should
necessarily militate against regarding such a killing
as voluntary manslaughter. One might say that Howard
fails to distinguish the issue of negligence from
that of intentionality here. His reference to the
negligent driving of a motor-car as an example of a
negligent and yet intentional action does not seem
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to lend support to his argument against voluntary-
manslaughter. It demonstrates, rather, that criminal
negligence can be associated with intentional as well
as unintentional wrongdoings. To illustrate this
point further, one might refer to the typical case
where the negligent driving of a motor-car results in
the (unintentional) killing of a pedestrian.
Patently, such a killing should be classified as
involuntary (unintentional) manslaughter. On the
other hand, it seems difficult to see why an
intentional killing due to the actor's being
negligent in defending himself should not be
categorized as voluntary manslaughter.
One may therefore say that, if a partial defence
to murder is recognised in those cases of excessive
self-defence involving an unreasonable mistake, the
actor may well be convicted of voluntary
manslaughter. This seems correct in so far as it is
accepted that the actor's killing of the aggressor
was intentional. Admittedly, this would presuppose a
broader understanding of the category of voluntary
manslaughter in law as covering also those
intentional killings committed by reason of an
unreasonable and yet "honest" mistake. In this
respect, what would distinguish such a partial
defence from provocation is that in the former case
the basis of the partial excuse is the actor's
mistaken belief about the need to use lethal force
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in the circumstances. Loss of self-control in the
sense of acting in "hot blood" is not here in issue.
In provocation, on the other hand, the plea for
extenuation focuses on the actor's loss of self-
control as a result of the victim's assault rather
than on a mistaken belief about the need to use
lethal force in the situation. Patently, although
both defences may be similar in rationale, they hinge
upon clearly distinct preconditions. [52]
As noted earlier in this chapter, excessive self-
defence cannot be dealt with in a uniform manner.
Thus, one may also envisage excessive self-defence
cases where the actor should be liable on the basis
of involuntary rather than voluntary manslaughter. In
such cases the assumption is that the actor's killing
of the attacker by exceeding the limits of necessary
force did not involve an intention to kill. Where the
aggressor's killing, although unintended, is regarded
as a foreseeable or foreseen conseguence of the
actor's response to the attack, a conviction of
involuntary manslaughter by reason of negligence or
non-murderous recklesness seems most appropriate.
Patently, in those cases of excessive defence where
the aggressor's killing was not intentional - hence
the conviction of involuntary manslaughter - one
cannot speak of a partial defence to murder as
understood e.g. in provocation. In this respect
Howard is correct when he says that:
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. . .by reason of the existence of an initial
case of self-defence D should be acquitted of
murder, and that if the consequence is that he
is guilty of manslaughter this should be
because he is guilty of manslaughter in any
event and not merely because his offence is
reduced from murder. [53]
5. Excessive Self-Defence and Partial Justification
Let us now examine more closely how excessive
self-defence might perhaps furnish the grounds for a
partial defence under the justification theory. To
begin with, one might say that excessive self-defence
may give rise to a claim of partial justification,
provided that the actor's response were aimed at the
prevention of an unlawful attack against which the
use of some force would be fully justified. From this
viewpoint, the use of excessive force in defence may
be taken not to annul completely the actor's claim of
justification. [54] In addition, one might say that,
under the justification theory, it would make no
difference whether or not the actor was aware of the
fact that the defensive force used was excessive, or
whether or not he was in control of himself at the
time of his response. All that matters is that the
excessive force was used against an unlawful attack,
and this would be sufficient to diminish the
wrongfulness of the actor's response. As G. Gordon
points out:
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It would be feasible to make unjustifiable
self-defence a valid plea in mitigation whether
or not the accused lost control as a result of
the attack made on him. A man can stand his
ground and fight instead of taking advantage of
an opportunity to escape whether or not he is
so provoked by the attack as to have lost his
self-control. If escape were impossible, he
would be acguitted, and would not have to show
that he lost control; and it may be said that
if escape were possible he should be convicted
only of culpable homicide, even if he did not
lose self-control. [55]
From this viewpoint, the basis of the actor's plea of
extenuation pertains to the assumption that, in so
far as the use of defensive force is initially
justified, the aggressor's killing should be regarded
as less wrongful. If excessive self-defence were
taken to provide a partial justification defence,
pleading a partial excuse such as provocation in
these cases would not be necessary. This ensues from
the general idea that in cases where the conditions
of excuse and justification concur the justification
defence should take the priority.
As has been said before, a basic assumption
behind the approach to excessive self-defence as a
partial justification is that the actor's response
is aimed at preventing a wrongful attack. One
might perhaps distinguish between a strong and a
weak version of the partial justification doctrine.
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According to the strong version, any wrongful attack
that would entitle one to resort to some degree of
defensive force would be sufficient to buttress a
claim of partial justification if the actor kills the
aggressor by using excessive force. According to the
weak version, on the other hand, the actor's killing
of the aggressor in self-defence may be partially
justified only in if the attack represents a grave
wrongdoing, e.g. if it endangers the actor's life.
In this respect, one might say that where the
victim's attack threatens a minor interest it would
be more appropriate to treat excessive defence under
a partial excuse - if the conditions of such an
excuse are present - rather than as a partial
justification. To offer an example, exceeding the
limits of necessary force and killing in defence of
property cannot be partially justified, although the
actor might perhaps be entitled to a partial excuse
on grounds e.g. of provocation. One should note that
if excessive self-defence is taken to provide a
partial justification defence to murder, provocation
as a partial excuse could be pleaded only in the
mitigation of sentence with respect to the lesser
offence.
Nevertheless, neither version of the partial
justification doctrine seems capable of providing
an acceptable basis for treating excessive self-
defence as a partial justification in law. The
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partial justification approach to excessive self-
defence seems unsatisfactory for reasons similar to
those that militate against regarding provocation as
a partial justification defence (see chapter 2).
Other things being egual, the intentional use of
excessive force in self-defence should always tell
against the actor's plea of legal justification,
notwithstanding the seriousness of the victim's
aggression. As Robinson points out:
The triggering conditions of a justification
defense do not in themselves give the actor the
privilege to act without restriction. To be
justified, the response conduct must satisfy
two reguirements: (1) it must be necessary to
protect or further the interest at stake, and
(2) it must cause only a harm that is
proportional, or reasonable in relation to
the harm threatened or the interest to be
furthered. [56]
6. Summary
So, to conclude, it has been argued that
excessive self-defence where it involves the
intentional killing of the aggressor may best be
treated under a partial excuse. Such a partial excuse
may be provocation or, possibly, a gualified excuse
of excessive self-defence, although the two must be
kept clearly distinct. With regard to the latter
defence, the basic assumption is that a mistaken
293
belief, unreasonable though it may be, may still
negate the malice aforethought required for murder.
It has been asserted, moreover, that in excessive
self-defence - as in provocation - the admission that
the actor's killing of the aggressor was intentional
invites one to consider the relevant partial defence
as reducing murder to voluntary rather than to
involuntary manslaughter. Nevertheless, one should
add, the question of whether the actor was in fact
mistaken as well as whether his (unreasonable)
mistake should be sufficient to negate malice
aforethought can only be decided in the light of the
circumstances of the particular case.
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NOTES
1. In Fletcher's words:
Determining this threshold is patently a matter
of moral judgment about what we expect people
to be able to resist in trying situations. A
valuable aid in making that judgment is
comparing the competing interests at stake and
assessing the degree to which the actor
inflicts harm beyond the benefit that accrues
from his action. It is important to remember,
however, that the balancing of interests is but
a vehicle for making judgment about the
culpability of the actor's surrendering to
external pressure.
Rethinking Criminal Law, (1978), p.804.
2. See Andrew Von Hirsch & Nils Jareborg,
"Provocation and Culpability", in Responsibility,
Character and the Emotions, Cambridge (1987), 241 at
pp.253-254.
3. A. Ashworth, "Sentencing in Provocation Cases",
Crim.L.R. (1975), 555. See, e.g.: Marryshaw, March
26 (1965) 2893/64); Kennedy [1968] Crim.L.R. 566;
Jones (1972) reported in The Daily Telegraph, July
18, 1972; Bell (1974) reported in The Guardian, Oct.
29, 1974.
4. Briefly, in self-defence and prevention of crime
the accused claims that his prima facie unlawful
conduct does not represent an actual violation of the
law because, under the circumstances, such conduct is
legally permissible. A justificatory defence may be
pleaded on the basis that the accused acted in order
to prevent the commission of an offence, to ward
off an unlawful attack against himself or another,
to effect a lawful arrest or to protect his or
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another's property. In English law, the Criminal Law
Act 1967 regulates these defences, until then covered
by common law rules. Section 3(1) of the Act provides
that a person may use such force as is reasonable in
the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in
effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of
offenders or suspected offenders or of persons
unlawfully at large. Arguably, as regards self-
defence, defence of others and defence of property,
the common law defence survives together with the
statutory one. See e.g. Cousins [1982] QB 526, [1982]
2 All ER 115; Devlin v Armstrong [1971] NI 13.
Nevertheless, in cases of putative self-defence or
where the aggressor is excusable only the common law
defence will apply, on the assumption that the
accused does not act in the prevention of crime in
such cases. See: A.W. Mewett, "Murder and Intent:
Self-Defence and Provocation", Criminal L.Q. 27
(1984-1985), 433.
5. According to Wasserman: "Self-defence owes its
peculiar force as a justification to the fact that
the aggressor is forcing a choice between lives at
the moment he is killed."
"Justifying Self-Defence", Philosophy and Public
Affairs (1985), 378.
6. As a justification, the defence of self-defence
focuses on the societal approval of the act rather
than on the blamewothiness of the actor. In G.
Williams' words:
Self-defence is classified as a justification
on the basis that the interests of the person
attacked are greater than those of the
attacker. The aggressor's culpability in
starting the fight tips the scales in favour of
the defendant.




Necessary defence is founded on the principle
that it is right and proper to use force, even
deadly force, in certain situations. The source
of the right is a comparison of the competing
interests of the aggressor and the defender, as
modified by the important fact that the
aggressor is the only party responsible for the
fight. This theory of the defence appears to be
a straightforward application of the principle
of lesser evils...
Supra note 1, pp.857-858; see also pp.557, 762, 769.
And see: P. Robinson, "Criminal Law Defences: A
Systematic Analysis", 82 Columbia L.R. (1982), 199.
7. See Finbarr McAuley: "Anticipating the Past: The
Defence of Provocation in Irish Law", Modern L.R. 50
(1987), 137.
8. Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law, (1966), p.172.
See e.g.: R v. Letenock (1917) 12 Cr.App.R. 221; R v.
Cobbett (1940) 28 Cr.App.R. II.
Nevertheless, although the conditions of self-defence
and provocation may concur, the theoretical bases of
these defences are clearly different - at least in so
far as provocation is perceived as a partial excuse.
As P.A. Fairall points out:
It is true that provocation and self-defence
may overlap. However, provocation and self-
defence are quite distinct and separate.
Provocation presupposes conduct by the deceased
depriving the accused of self-control. The
deceased's conduct is crucial to deciding
whether D was deprived of self-control, and
whether an ordinary person in the position of
the accused could have lost self-control. Anger
is a primary feature of provocation. Self-
defence is based not upon anger or loss of
self-control, but upon the moral imperative of
self-preservation. In self-defence, D has a
worthy motive, in provocation he has none. The
defences are quite different in rationale.
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"The Demise of Excessive Self-Defence Manslaughter in
Australia: A Final Obituary?", Crim.L.J. 12, (1988),
41.
9. G. Gordon points out that: "The tendency of the
modern law is in theory to allow the plea of
provocation only where the accused has lost control,
but the idea that provocation is a form of
unjustifiable self-defence is not altogether dead."
Criminal Law, (1978), p.769.
10. The superior interest which is protected by the
act of defence does not pertain only to the
immediately defended interest, which may be superior
but also inferior to the interest of the attacker,
but it pertains primarily to the vindication of the
legal order.
And see: N. Androulakis, Penal Law, vol.1, (1978),
p. 422 .
11. The general assumption in the law is that, since
justified action is not considered wrongful, there is
no need for pleading an excuse. As J. Hall points
out: "Justifiable action taken in states of necessity
is not regarded as coerced."
General Principles of Criminal Law, (1960), p.436.
12. For a historical approach to the theory of self-
defence as an excuse see: 3 Coke 55; 1 Hale 479-87;
Blackstone 184; Foster 275; 1 Hawkins 113. And see:
Constitutio Criminalis Carolina 139,140 (1532).
According to Robinson:
Nor is there necessarily any problem even with
recognizing two different categories of defense
under the same label at the same time and in
the same jurisdiction. A jurisdiction may
properly provide a "self-defense" justification
and a "self-defence" excuse. Such multiple
defenses may even occur in the same
provision... But when this is done, the
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potential for misunderstanding and confusion
increases significantly.
"Criminal Law Defences: A Systematic Analysis", 82
Columbia L.R. (1982), 240. See also: G. Fletcher,
"Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor: A
Vignette in Comparative Criminal Theory", Israel Law
Review 8 (1973), 367.
13. See N. Androulakis, supra note 10, pp.426-427.
14. Nevertheless, taking into account that an act of
aggression in such cases does not represent a threat
to the legal order, the accused may be entitled to
exculpation under a general excuse of necessity
rather than self-defence taken as an excuse. From
this viewpoint, patently, self-defence could only be
pleaded as a justification defence.
15. According to Fletcher:
The reguired balancing of interests of the
defender against those of the aggressor is
expressed in the unguestioned assumption that
defensive force must be reasonable and
proportionate to the threat. Though deadly
force might be necessary to avert a minor
assault...it is clearly disproportionate to the
threat and therefore impermissible."
Supra note 1, pp.859-860.
And as Robinson explains:
In the lesser evils justification, the
triggering conditions may be broader, but
this is counterbalanced by a stricter
proportionality requirement, which permits the
justification only if the actor causes a harm
which is not merely reasonably proportional to,
but actually less than the harm or evil
threatened. On the other hand, the less
demanding "reasonably proportional" language
commonly found in all other jurisdictions seems
preferable when the interests to be protected
or furthered are so abstract or otherwise
difficult to quantify as to make the
application of a stricter standard impossible.
It is true of all justifications that while the
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competing interests can be identified, they can
rarely be sufficiently quantified to permit
comparison in the proportionality assessment.
Supra note 12, p.219.
16. P. Smith, "Excessive Defence - a Rejection of an
Australian Initiative?", Crim.L.R. (1972), 529.
17. In English law a plea of self-defence can be
accepted even when the accused was in fact acting
under the mistaken belief that he was under attack.
See, e.g. Williams [1984], 78 Cr.App.R. 276, at 281:
"If the jury came to the conclusion that the
defendant believed, or may have believed, that he was
being attacked or that a crime was being committed,
and that force was necessary to protect himself or to
prevent crime, then the prosecution have not proven
their case."
18. Palmer v. R, [1971] AC 814, [1971] 1 All ER 1077.
See also Mclnnes, [1971] 3 All ER 295, [1971] 1 WLR
1600 .
19. "Where D, being under no mistake of fact, uses
force in public or private defence, he either has a
complete defence or if he uses excessive force, no
defence. If the charge is murder, he is guilty of
murder ore not guilty of anything... He may have
believed the force was rasonable but if, even by the
relaxed standard applied in this context, it was not,
he was making a mistake of law, which is not a
defence, and he is guilty of murder."
Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law, (1988), pp.247-248.
20. Palmer, supra note 18, per Lord Morris, p.832.
And see: Shannon, [1980] 71 Cr. App. Rep. 192, [1980]
Crim.L.R. 410; Whyte [1987] 3 All ER 416.
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21. Shannon, supra note 20, at p. 196.
22. Fletcher, supra note 1, pp.762-763.
According to the Model Penal Code, the right of
self-defence arises when "the actor believes that
such force is immediately necessary for the purpose
of protecting himself against the use of unlawful
force..." (Para 3.04)
In para 3.09 (2), it is provided that, for the
plea of self-defence to be accepted, the mistake must
be reasonable.
As Robinson explains:
Under such provisions, the actor who mistakenly
believes that his conduct meets the
requirements of a justification defence will be
justified, when it seems clear that such an
actor is properly only excused. His conduct has
not, in fact, avoided a greater harm or
furthered a greater good; it has not caused a
net benefit, but rather a net harm. On the
other hand, he may well be blameless,
especially if his mistake is reasonable."
Supra note 12, p.239.
23. Fletcher, supra note 1, p.696.
24. On this point see: G. Fletcher, "The Right and
the Reasonable", Harvard L.R. (1985).
25. See e.g.: De Freitas v. The Queen [1960] 2 W.L.R.
533; Shannon [1980] Cr.App.R. 192.
26. Mclnnes, [1971] 1 WLR 1600, 3 All ER 295.
27. G. Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law, (1983),
pp.545-546
28. See e.g.: Kessal (1824) 1 C & P 437, 171 ER
1263; Greening (1913) 9 CAR at 106; Letenock (1917)
12 CAR 221; Semini [1949] 1 KB at 409; Cornyn, The
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Times, March 4, 1964.
29. As expressed by Lowe J.: "if the occasion
warrants action in self-defence or for the prevention
of felony or the apprehension of the felon but the
person taking action acts beyond the necessity of the
occasion and kills the offender the crime is
manslaughter - not murder."
McKay (1957) ALR 648 at 649. In this case Barry J.
directed the jury as follows:
"If you think that (the accused) was honestly
exercising his legal right to prevent the
escape of a man who had committed a
felony...but that the means the prisoner used
were far in excess of what was proper in the
circumstances, then you should find him guilty
of manslaughter."
The full Court accepted the judge's direction. [1957]
V.R. 560. See also: Howe (1958) 100 C.L.R. 448;
Bufalo [1958] V.R. 363; Haley (1959) 76 W.N. (N.S.W.)
550; Enright [1961] V.R. 663; Turner [1962] V.R. 30;
McNamara [1963] V.R. 32, [1963] V.R. 402; Tikos
(No.1) [1963] V.R. 285; Tikos (No.2) [1963] V.R. 306.
In Viro ( 1978, 141 C.L.R. 88) Mason J. offered
the following account of the procedure toward a
decision in excessive defence cases: "1) It is for
the jury first to consider whether when the accused
killed the deceased the accused reasonably believed
that an unlawful attack which threatened him with
death or serious bodily harm was being or was about
to be made upon him. By the expression "reasonably
believed" is meant, not what a reasonable man would
have believed, but what the accused himself might
reasonably believe in all the circumstances in which
he found himself. 2) If the jury is satisfied beyond
reasonable doubt that there was no reasonable belief
by the accused of such an attack no guestion of self-
defence arises. 3) If the jury is not satisfied
beyond reasonable doubt that there was no such
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reasonable belief by the accused, it must then
consider whether the force in fact used by the
accused was reasonably proportionate to the danger
which he believed he faced. 4) If the jury is not
satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that more force
was used than was reasonably proportionate it should
acquit. 5) If the jury is satisfied beyond reasonable
doubt that more force was used, then its verdict
should be either manslaughter or murder, that
depending upon the answer to the final question for
the jury - did the accused believe that the force
which he used was reasonably proportionate to the
danger which he believed he faced? 6) If the jury is
satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused
did not have such a belief the verdict will be
murder. If it is not satisfied beyond reasonable
doubt that the accused did not have that belief the
verdict will be manslaughter." (pp.146-147)
The Australian law doctrine was followed in some
Canadian cases (see e.g.: Gee ( 1983) 139 DLR 587;
Brisson (1983) 139 DLR 685) but was finally rejected
by the Supreme Court.
A similar position has been adopted in Irish law
(see People (A-G) v. Dwyer [1972] IR 416).
30. See: Cook (1639) Cro. Car. 537; Whalley (1835) 7
C.& P. 245; Patience ( 1837 ) 7 C.& P. 775; Weston
( 1879) 14 Cox C.C. 346. In the cases of Whalley and
Patience lethal force was used in order to resist an
unlawful arrest, and in both the accused was
convicted of manslaughter. And see: Biggin [1918-19]
All ER, R.501. In all these cases the fact that the
accused used more force than that which would be
necessary has led to the reduction of the conviction
to manslaughter. The Judicial Committee rejected the
above cases, however. It has been asserted that: "If
in any of the above cases there is a suggestion that
a measure of dispensation or tolerance, where a
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death is intentionally and unnecessarily caused, is
to be found in the circumstances that someone is
acting on an illegal warrant or is executing process
unlawfully (Cook) it is not one that commended itself
to their Lordships."
Palmer,[1971] 1 All E.R. 1077, 1083D.
And see e.g.: Cascoe [1970] 2 All E.R. 833; Emelogue,
May 2, 1971, No. 7044/69 (unreported); Mclnnes [1971]
3 All E.R. 295, [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1600; Edwards [1973]
1 All E.R. 152; Attorney-General for Northern
Ireland's Reference, [1977] A.C. 105 at 148.
31. On excessive defence as a partial defence to
murder see: Morris and Howard, Studies in Criminal
Law (O.U.P.), chapter IV; Howard, Australian Criminal
Law, (1965), pp.80-83; Howard, "An Australian Letter:
Excessive Defence" Crim.L.R. [1964], 448; Morris, "A
New Qualified Defence to Murder", 1 Adelaide L.R. 23
( 1960).
32. The defence of excessive self-defence was
confirmed by the High Court of Australia in R. v.
Howe ( 1958) 100 C.L.R. 448. See also: Viro v. The
Queen (1978) 141 C.L.R. 88; Lawson and Forsythe
(1985) 18 A.Crim.R. 360.
The doctrine of excessive defence as has been
formulated in Howe applied mainly to cases of self-
defence. It is asserted, nonetheless, that the
doctrine should logically apply to any case where the
defendant is legally entitled to use force (i.e. in
the light of McKay [ 1957] V.R. 560; supra note 29).
And see: Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law, (1988),
p. 248.
In Howe it has been pointed out that the right of
the defendant to use force would presuppose that he
is the victim of an attack "of a violent and
felonious nature...so that [the defendant] reasonably
feared for his life or the safety of his person from
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injury, violation or indecent or insulting usage."
(at p.460) See also: L.H. Leigh, "Manslaughter and
the Limits of Self-Defence", Modern L.R. 34 (1971),
685 .
33. Zecevic, 1987, 71 A.L.R. 641. In this case it was
said that: "[In self-defence] The guestion to be
asked in the end is quite simple. It is whether the
accused believed upon reasonable grounds that it was
necessary in self-defence to do what he did. If he
had that belief and there were reasonable grounds for
it, or if the jury is left in reasonable doubt about
the matter, then he is entitled to an acquittal.
Stated in that form, the question is one of general
application and is not limited to cases of homicide.
Where homicide is involved some elaboration may be
necessary." (per Wilson, Dawson and Toohey J.J., at
p. 652 )
And see P.A. Fairall: "A mistaken belief as to
the degree of force required to repel an attack, real
or imaginary, actualised or imminent, will not excuse
the use of excessive force in self-defence, whether
or not the mistaken belief was honestly (or
reasonably) held."
"The Demise of Excesive Self-Defence Manslaughter in
Australia: A Final Obituary?", Crim.L.J. 12 (1988),
35 .
One of the problems associated with the defence
of excessive self-defence as has been formulated in
Viro ( 1978 141 C.L.R. 88) was this: a qualified
defence was open only to the accused who acted under
an "honest" mistake as to the necessary degree of
defensive force; on the other hand, such a partial
defence was not recognized in cases of putative self-
defence, that is, where the accused honestly believed
that he was under attack (putative self-defence). In
the latter cases the accused may be entitled to a
complete defence only if his mistake were deemed
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reasonable. In Zecevic, Deane J. referred to this as
a "basic and complicating conceptual anomaly." (at
p. 6 6 6)
34. See Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law, (1988), p.249.
As Gaudron J. pointed out in Zecevic (supra note
33): "The proposition that it is manslaughter, not
murder, where self-defence in relation to homicide
fails by reason only that disproportionate force was
used, is consonant with the formulation of the law of
self-defence as contained in the judgment of Wilson,
Dawson and Toohey JJ. and with the definitional
difference between murder and voluntary manslaughter
involving the presence or absence of malice
aforethought." (at p.669) And see supra note 33.
Similarly, Mason C.J. said that: "The doctrine
enunciated in Howe and Viro expressed a concept of
self-defence which best accords with acceptable
standards of culpability, so that the accused whose
only error is that he lacks reasonable grounds for
his belief that the degree of force used was
necessary for his self-defence is guilty of
manslaughter not murder." (at p. 646)
It has been asserted, however, that: "If the
Hight Court [in Zecevic] had meant to provide some
place for excuse theory in the law of self-defence,
it should have endorsed rather than abrogated the
doctrine of excessive self-defence. That the doctrine
is excusatory in nature is clear from its operation
of avoiding the full condemnation of the law on the
accused by taking into account his honest belief in
the necessity of the force applied by him. In other
words, while the accuased's use of disproportionate
force (his act) is frowned upon by society, he (the
actor) is, by virtue of his honest belief, regarded
as being less culpable than a murderer."
Stanley Meng Heong Yeo, "Proportionality in Criminal
Defences", 12 Crim. L.J. (1988), pp. 218-219.
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35. "There is no rule which dictates the use which
the jury must make of the evidence and the ultimate
question is for it alone." In Zecevic (supra note 33)
at p. 653. And see: Tajbor, (1986) 23 A.Cr.R. 189 at
201.
36. See: The Law Commission: Codification of the
Criminal Law, Law Comm. No. 143 (1985); Draft
Criminal Code Bill, s.s. 56,57,61.
37. Offences Against the Person, 14th report,
Cmnd.7844 (1980), para. 288.
The CLRC recommended the introduction of a
qualified defence in relation to private defence of
person and property and the prevention of crime. Such
a position was put forward in the light of the
Committee's proposal that murder should be retained
as a distict offence category pertinent to the most
heinous homicides. See: Smith and Hogan, Criminal
Law, (1988), p.249.
38. In HM Advocate v. Kizileviczius (1938 J.C. 60),
where evidence of excesive defence was brought
forward, Lord Jamieson distinguished between self-
defence leading to full acquittal, self-defence
leading to the reduction of murder to culpable
homicide and provocation leading to a reduction of
murder to culpable homicide. He explained that the
second category constitutes a plea of unjustifiable
self-defence requiring both that the accused's life
was in danger and that the accused acted in the heat
of the moment. See: Gordon, Criminal Law (1978),
p.769 .
39. Crawford v. H.M. Advocate, 1950, J.C. 67.
40. According to Gordon: "Recklessness is ...not so
much a question of gross negligence as of wickedness.
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Wicked recklessness is recklessness so gross that it
indicates a state of mind which is as wicked and
depraved as the state of mind of a deliberate
killer."
Supra note 38, pp. 735-736.
41. Gordon, supra note 38, p.769.
42. In H.M. Advocate v. Byfield and Ors (Glasgow
High Court, Jan. 1976, unrep. at 16-17) the current
position has been expressed by Lord Thomson in his
direction to the jury as follows:
...if you took the view that the defence of
self-defence was not established either
because, for instance, the force used in
retaliation was excessive or because although
the man was pertified, as he says, nonetheless,
he really ought to have been able to see there
was a way of escape and should have taken it,
in both those cases the self-defence would
fail; but in both those cases it would be open
to you to say "well, he shouldn't have done
what he did but it is not murder" and in
circumstances of that kind the verdict would be
culpable homicide. It is sometimes said that
this arises from an application of the
principles of provocation and you can apply
that to this case too. It comes, in a way, to
the same thing."
43. P. Smith, "Excessive Defence - a Rejection of
Australian Initiative?", Crim.L.R. (1972), 533.
44. It has been argued that the doctrine of excessive
self-defence " . . .where it does apply it will often
add little more than unnecessary complication to the
issues of self-defence and provocation."
I. Elliot, "Excessive Self-Defence in Commonwealth
Law: A Comment", 22 I.C.L.Q., (1973), 727.
45. Colin Howard, "Two problems in Excessive
Defence", Law Quart. Rev. 84 (1968), pp.356-357.
Howard argues that:
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...the situation in an excessive defence case
is entirely different (than in provocation).
The defendant is not urging that his excess of
force be excused because V was the original
attacker. He is arguing the guite different
case that he made a misjudgment as to the
necessities of the occasion. The basis of his
case is not that this misjudgment should be
partly excused because the original situation
was not his fault, but that such a misjudgment
does not meet the requirements of murder."
46. Howard, supra note 45, p. 357.
47. Howard, supra note 45, pp. 360-361.
48. P. Smith, supra note 43, pp. 533-534.
49. Howard, supra note 45, p. 359.
50. Howard, supra note 45, p. 359.
51. As M. Bayles points out: "As long as a mistake
blocks inference of an undesirable character trait,
it makes no difference how unreasonable the mistaken
belief may be. However, should the crime be one for
which there is a lesser offense of doing the act
negligently, then an unreasonable mistake should not
prevent conviction for the lesser offense. A mistake
is unreasonable if it may be avoided by the excercise
of reasonable care, so an unreasonable mistake
constitutes negligence."
"Character, Purpose, and Criminal Responsibility",
Law and Philosophy 1, (1982), 5.
See also: A. Donagan, The Theory of Morality,
( 1977 ): "Ignorance is culpable if and only if it
springs from negligence - from want of due care."
(p.134)
52. In Zecevic (supra note 33) Deane J. reasoned as
follows:
The two defences [provocation and excessive
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self-defence] are quite distinct. Excessive
self-defence may be available in circumstances
where there is no basis at all for a defence of
provocation. Indeed, in some cases there may be
an element of inconsistency between a genuine
(albeit unreasonable) belief that what was done
was done reasonably in self-defence (or defence
of another) and the loss of control which
ordinarily lies at the heart of a defence of
provocation, (at 664-665)
53. Howard, supra note 45, p.357-358.
54. Greek law offers an example of such an approach
to the problem of excessive defence. First, self-
defence (defence of others, etc) is treated as a
justification bearing primarily upon the vindication
of the legal order. According to Art. 22 P.C.:
1. An act of defence is not wrongful...
3. The proper measure of the defence is determined
according to the degree of dangerousness of the
attack, the kind of harm threatened, the manner and
intensity of the attack and the rest of the
circumstances.
According to N. Androulakis, the superior
interests which is protected by the act of defence
does not pertain only to the immediately defended
interest (e.g. property), which may be quantitatively
less important than the interest of the attacker; it
pertains, primarily, to the vindication of the legal
order against the unlawful act of aggression.
See: Penal Law, 1, (1978), pp.426-427.
Moreover, Art.23 P.C. provides that:
The person who exceeds the limits of the defence, if
the exceeding was intentional, is punished with a
reduced penalty (Art.83); if the exceeding was due to
negligence (he is punished) according to the relevant
provisions. He is not punished, however, and the
exceeding is not imputed to him, had he acted so due
to the state fear of confusion in which he found
himself as a result of the attack.
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With regard to the above article, one might say
that the use of excessive force in certain cases of
defence may be regarded as partially justified. In so
far as the the actor's response exceeds the limits of
necessary defence it retains its wrongful character
and as such it may lawfully be defended against (e.g.
by a third party). According to G. Magakis, however,
had the accused inflicted harm far greater than was
practically necessary in order to thwart the attack,
his act cannot be regarded as as an act of defence in
law. It is pointed out that setting a limit to the
right of defence ensues from the basic character of
the defensive act as an act protecting the legal
order in general. See: G.A. Magakis, Penal Law,
(1981); J. Manoledakis, "Defence in the Greek Penal
Code", Armenopoulos 1 (1981).
55. Gordon, supra note 38, p.768.
56. Robinson, supra note 12, p.217.
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CHAPTER 6; THE PROBLEM OF CUMULATIVE PROVOCATION
1. Prefatory Note
There have been difficulties in describing
cumulative provocation in law and how it may be
connected with a partial defence to murder. In
general, one might say that cases treated under the
heading of cumulative provocation are assumed to
involve a prolonged course of maltreatment of the
actor by his victim which culminated in the actor's
fatal response. A long course of domestic violence
which ends up in the killing of one spouse by the
other is held to provide the typical example here.
Nonetheless, one should distinguish between the cases
where the actor's retaliation was immediately
preceded and precipitated by some sort of provocative
conduct, and those cases where no such final
provocation did in fact occur. The partial defence to
murder that may ensue from cumulative provocation is
viewed as turning upon the whole of the victim's
wrongful behaviour towards the actor; it does not
hinge on a single act of provocation that may be
deemed sufficient by itself to trigger off a
punitive response likely to involve an intent to
kill.
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Under the excuse theory, however, it often seems
problematical whether the circumstances of cumulative
provocation furnish sufficient grounds for pleading
provocation as a partial defence to murder,
particularly where the actor's retaliation cannot
readily be connected with a final provocative event.
Further, even in cases where a final act of
provocation can be demonstrated, it may seem
questionable whether the actor's plea of provocation
should succeed. Indeed, the assumption that the
provocation was in the circumstances foreseeable, or
that the actor was in a sense not unused to the
victim's untoward conduct, may seem to militate
against granting a partial excuse here. In this
respect, the actor's claim of provocation would be
particularly weak in those cases of cumulative
provocation where the hot anger requirement is not
met. As G. Gordon points out:
It is doubtful whether a long course of
provocative conduct can found a successful plea
of provocation, unless there is also some final
act of provocation which, albeit because it
follows on the earlier provocation and is the
last straw, actually provokes a loss of control
- it is not sufficient that it should merely
provide an occasion for A to exact revenge for
the deceased's prior provocation. The fact that
the deceased had indulged in a course of
provocative conduct may indeed in some
circumstances militate against the plea of
provocation, as showing that A had become
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so used to this type of behaviour that it no
longer affected his self-control. [1]
In cumulative provocation, the time that may have
elapsed after the final provocation should normally
tell against the actor's plea of extenuation, for
it suggests that he acted with forethought and
deliberation. As has been pointed out earlier in the
thesis, other things being egual, the lapse of time
between provocation and retaliation weakens the
defendant's claim that he was provoked to lose his
self-control. One should note, nonetheless, that if
the actor finds himself in severe distress or
depression as a result of his prolonged ill-treatment
at the hands of the victim, his plea of extenuation
may be sustained on the basis of a different legal
excuse (see section 3 below).
Nonetheless, there have been cases of cumulative
provocation where the defendant's plea of provocation
was accepted, notwithstanding the absence of an
immediate wrongdoing on the victim's part, or the
admission of some sort of planning and deliberation
prior to the killing (see infra). One might argue
that those cases should most properly be treated
under the justification theory. As has been explained
in chapter 2, according to the partial justification
doctrine one need not adhere to the reguirement of
loss of self-control or impaired volition if the
victim's wrongdoing - as reflected either in a
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particular act of provocation or in a prolonged
course of untoward behaviour - is deemed sufficiently
grave as to render the wrongdoer's life, in a sense,
less worthy of protection.
The following sections of this chapter explore
how cumulative provocation might furnish the grounds
for pleading an excuse-based partial defence. The
discussion proceeds from the position, advocated
throughout the present thesis, that partial
justification should be avoided as a basis for
setting up a partial defence to murder (see chapter
2.2). As has been noted before, of the cases of
cumulative provocation the most problematic are those
in which the hot anger reguirement of provocation is
not met. One might say that such cases invite one to
consider a broader interpretation of the element of
impaired volition in provocation. A better approach
might perhaps be to treat cumulative provocation as
likely to bring about the conditions of different
legal excuses. In this respect, singling out the
relevant legal defence would depend upon the nature
of the excusative claim growing out of the
circumstances of the particular case. Considering the
position of cumulative provocation in English
criminal law doctrine will provide us with the
necessary background against which some of the
arguments put forward in the following analysis will
be tested.
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2. In Search of the Rationale of Excusing in
Cumulative Provocation Cases
In cumulative provocation cases the absence
of a provocative act immediately prior to the
killing and often the admission of forethought
on the actor's part may seem to undermine the
partial excuse of provocation. More precisely,
if a final wrongdoing triggering off the actor's
retaliation cannot be identified, his claim of loss
of self-control by reason of provocation would
appear to be unsupported. Moreover, any evidence of
planning and deliberation would normally militate
against the requirement of impaired volition as
understood in provocation. As has been expressed
by Devlin J. in his direction to the jury in
Duffy:
Severe nervous exasperation or a long course of
conduct causing suffering and anxiety are not
by themselves sufficient to constitute
provocation in law. Indeed the further removed
an incident is from the crime the less it
counts. A long course of cruel conduct may be
more blameworthy than a sudden act
provoking retaliation, but you are not
concerned with blame here - the blame attaching
to the dead man. You are not standing in
judgment on him. Circumstances which induce a
desire for revenge, or a sudden passion of
anger, are not enough. Indeed, circumstances
which induce a desire for revenge are
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inconsistent with provocation since the
conscious formulation of a desire for revenge
means that the person has had time to think.
[2]
Nonetheless, the position of cumulative
provocation in English law seems far from clear.
[3] In a number of cases where the defence of
provocation was raised on such a basis the jury was
directed to take into account the previous ill-
treatment of the defendant by his victim. [4] [5]
However, in many of these cases emphasis was laid on
the need to show the connection of the defendant's
retaliation with a final provocative event. [6]
Questions have arisen as to whether the position
expressed by Devlin J. in Duffy should now be
considered as being overruled by section 3 of the
Homicide Act 1957. As was said in the leading case of
Camplin, section 3 "...abolishes all previous rules
of law as to what can or cannot amount to
provocation". [7] With regard to this, it may be said
that it is now for the jury to decide as a matter of
fact if the victim's provocation, whether instant or
cumulative, is sufficient to reduce murder to
voluntary manslaughter. Little evidence can be
brought forward to support this position, however.
[8] Indeed, one might argue that such an approach
to the matter can be misleading. Although considering
the previous mistreatment of the actor at his
victim's hands may play an important part in
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assessing the gravity of the particular provocation
offered, such a consideration cannot on its own
support a partial excuse on the ground of
provocation. In other words, the circumstances of
cumulative provocation may be taken into account as
an issue peripheral to or supportive of the actor's
plea as focusing on a particular act of provocation.
From this point of view, one might say that the
defence of provocation should not be considered,
unless there is some evidence that the actor was
immediately provoked to lose his self-control.
Indeed, allowing the defence of provocation to be
considered in some cases of cumulative provocation
may be guestioned on the ground that evidence of
forethought and deliberation on the actor's part
should normally preclude putting the issue to the
jury in the first place. [9] The underlying
assumption here is that premeditated killings cannot
be dealt with or partially excused on the basis of
provocation as this would cut across the very logic
of the defence in law. Indeed, section 3 is
understood not to have altered the basic reguirement
of the defence, namely, the sudden and temporary
nature of the actor's loss of self-control. In the
absence of another excuse, a deliberate killing
should therefore be classified as murder, in spite of
the admission of serious provocation - whether
instant or cumulative - on the victim's part.
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Treating a case of cumulative provocation
involving a deliberate or premeditated killing under
the defence of provocation seems problematic in so
far as the hot anger reguirement is regarded as
being indispensable to the defence. With regard
to this, the Criminal Law Revision Committee has
recommended:
...no change in the present rule, whereby the
defence [of provocation] applies only where the
defendant's act is caused by the provocation
and is committed suddenly upon the provoking
event, not to cases where the defendant's
reaction has been delayed, but the jury should
continue to be allowed to take into
consideration previous provocations before the
one which produced the fatal reaction. [10]
The CLRC's proposal seems therefore to conform with
the position expressed in Duffy, namely, that the
defence of provocation is incompatible with the
admission of forethought and deliberation. It is
pointed out, nonetheless, that in so far as there is
evidence of an immediate provocation, cumulative
provocation should be taken into account as relevant
to determining whether the actor was sufficiently
provoked to lose his self-control. In other words, in
assessing the actor's plea of provocation the jury
should be directed to consider any previous
maltreatment of the actor by his victim as likely to
bear on the gravity of the particular provocation
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offered (i.e. as the latter relates to the question
of loss of control). [11]
Nevertheless, this position has been criticized
on the basis that the defence of provocation has been
circumscribed by the CLRC in too narrow a manner.
[12] The CLRC's approach to the defence, it is
argued, overlooks the fundamental requirement that a
conviction of murder should be avoided, unless the
killer fully deserves the social stigma that such a
crime entails. Notwithstanding the admission of
forethought and deliberation, a conviction of murder
in some cases of cumulative provocation might appear
to take no account of the contemporary sympathetic
attitudes towards the actor in such cases. [13]
Indeed, the CLRC's expressed position towards
narrowing down the scope of murder only to those
killings which deserve to be stigmatized as such may
seem to contradict the outright rejection of the
defence of provocation here. [14] Thus, according to
M. Wasik, strict adherence to the hot anger
requirement in some cases of cumulative provocation
may lead to convictions of murder that are deemed
morally unacceptable. In his own words:
...cases of cumulative provocation should fall
outside the scope of "new murder". The law
should recognize that there are degrees of
culpability even in deliberate killings. Whilst
evidence of forethought and premeditation must
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always tell against the defendant on sentence,
the more lenient approach evident in some
sentencing cases, which regards cumulative
provocation as mitigating the offence rather
than making it more serious, is recommended.
The traditional view of provocation as a
"concession to human frailty" is clearly
important both on liability and on sentence,
but in the cases [of cumulative provocation]
there must be proper weight given to the
justificatory as well as the excusative
element. [15]
Admittedly, the tendency in English law is
towards treating the defendant in cases of cumulative
provocation with leniency. Often the judge is
prepared to accept the defendant's plea of not guilty
to murder but guilty of manslaughter directly. Thus,
one may cite cases where the actor was convicted of
manslaughter in spite of evidence suggesting that he
did not kill his victim "on the spur of the moment".
[16] Considerations of cumulative provocation might
lead the jury to acguit the actor altogether or to
convict him of manslaughter, if conviction of murder
is thought of as being difficult to justify. [17]
However, the reduction of murder to manslaughter in
cumulative provocation cases may often have to do
with the extreme distress or depression in which
the actor found himself as a result of his long ill-
treatment at the victim's hands. [18] A recurrent
problem in this respect pertains to the difficulty
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in determining the precise nature of the claim of
extenuation which grows out of the conditions of
cumulative provocation.
Wasik puts forward three possible ways in which
the problem of cumulative provocation might be met in
law. First, such cases could be dealt with under the
existing partial defence of provocation. This, he
argues, would presuppose adopting a broader approach
to the matter by taking account not only of the
excusative but also of the justificatory element in
provocation. From this perspective, cumulative
provocation may not reguire a sudden and temporary
loss of self-control - as a result of provocation -
as an indispensable reguirement of the defence. Here,
one might say that the defence of provocation is not
incompatible with the admission of some sort of
planning or deliberation, particularly where the
actor's resentment against his victim is justified
because of a long-lasting maltreatment of the actor
by the victim (and see chapter 3.5).
A different way of dealing with cumulative
provocation cases in law might be by subsuming these
cases under the defence of diminished responsibility
or, one may add, under a combined defence of
provocation and diminished responsibility. However,
according to Wasik, such an approach to the issue
may result in stretching the defence of diminished
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responsibility too far beyond its purpose. Finally, a
third alternative might be to lay aside the existing
defences altogether and treat cumulative provocation
under a separate general defence to murder.
Nonetheless, the ambit of such a defence should be
drawn wide enough to encompass a variety of
extenuating circumstances that may allow the
reduction of criminal homicide from murder to
manslaughter. From the above three possible solutions
to the problem of cumulative provocation, Wasik
opts for the first as comparatively the least
troublesome. [19]
One may argue, nonetheless, that cumulative
provocation should not be labelled as pertinent to
any particular legal defence. Rather, it should be
considered as a situation likely to give rise to the
conditions of different legal defences. Thus, instead
of widening the scope of the existing categories in
order to accommodate all cumulative provocation
cases, it would seem less problematic if one
distinguishes between the different claims that
may arise in such cases. Those claims might be
either extenuation or, possibly, exoneration [20],
depending on the nature of the defence raised.
One may say that the majority of the claims of
extenuation growing out of a situation of cumulative
provocation would meet the conditions of the partial
defences of provocation and diminished responsibility
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or, arguably, of an intermediate legal defence
sharing characteristics of both. Nevertheless,
neither provocation nor diminished responsibility
would on its own be sufficient to provide a uniform
basis for dealing with all cases of cumulative
provocation in law. Further, there would be too high
a price to pay in terms of coherence and clarity if
the scope of either defence were unnecessarily
stretched in order to cover the variety of claims
that may arise from the circumstances of cumulative
provocation.
In order to determine whether a claim of
cumulative provocation can be relevant to the partial
defence of provocation, one has to consider whether
the conditions of this defence are satisfied.
Under the excuse theory, this would presuppose
evidence that the actor retaliated in the heat
of the moment and that his reaction was triggered
off by some sort of provocative conduct on the
victim's part. The gravity of the provocation offered
should be considered by reference to the
circumstances of cumulative provocation. But in
cumulative provocation cases the question of
provocation should be resolved on the basis of the
objective test as the latter applies to normal
people. According to Ashworth:
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...the significance of the deceased's final act
should be considered by reference to the
previous relations between the parties, taking
into account any previous incidents which add
colour to the final act. This is not to argue
that the basic distinction between sudden
provoked killings and revenge killings should
be blurred, for the lapse of time between the
deceased's final act and the accused's
retaliation should continue to tell against
him. The point is that the significance of the
deceased's final act and its effect upon the
accused - and indeed the relation of the
retaliation to that act - can be neither
understood nor evaluated withour reference to
previous dealings between the parties. [21]
Thus, in such cases, the crucial act of provocation,
however trivial it might appear, can be regarded as
in a sense epitomizing or reflecting in the actor's
eyes all the previous mistreatment he suffered at the
victim's hands. From this point of view, such a
provocation may be considered as being serious enough
to support a partial excuse. Nonetheless, as we shall
later consider, pleading provocation is not the only
possible course of defence here. Other things being
equal, similar conditions might be capable of
supporting a plea of diminished responsibility or,
possibly, a joint plea of provocation and diminished
responsibility (see section 3, infra).
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Under the excuse theory, the partial defence of
provocation rests on the element of loss of control
or impaired volition. In this respect it is correct
to say that the circumstances of cumulative
provocation can be taken into account as relevant to
establishing the required connection between the
crucial provocative event and the actor's loss of
self-control. It seems clear that, in so far as in
such cases the actor's plea is that of loss of
control by reason of provocation, cumulative
provocation does not invite one to treat the partial
defence as justification- rather than excuse-based.
Speaking of a shift towards the justificatory element
in cumulative provocation cases may be misleading
here since it would camouflage the important
distinction between providing a good reason for
partially excusing the actor by virtue of his loss of
control and partially justifying the actor's killing
of the provoker in retaliation. As argued in chapter
3, the acceptability of the partial excuse of
provocation depends upon the actor's being able to
show that he was seriously wronged by his victim.
With regard to this, giving special weight to
the situation of cumulative provocation can be
relevant only to determining the wrongfulness of the
crucial act of provocation as it was directed at the
actor.
326
Provocation is traditionally regarded as
providing a partial excuse only to "reasonable"
or "normal" people. [22] With regard to this,
establishing impaired volition as a prereguisite for
excusing in provocation is contingent upon the
satisfaction of the hot anger requirement (see
chapter 4.3). Indeed, given that the actor is deemed
"reasonable" or "normal", any evidence of forethought
and deliberation on his part should normally militate
against his claim of impaired volition by reason of
provocation. Further, in so far as the actor is held
to be "normal", pleading provocation presupposes
evidence of loss of self-control - in the sense of
acting in the heat of the moment. This seems to
exclude from consideration under the provocation
defence those cases of cumulative provocation where
the actor killed in cold blood. Other things being
egual, the actor in such cases might be able to rely
on a different legal excuse - notably diminished
responsibility - but, arguably, not one that rests on
the assumption that he is a "reasonable" or "normal"
person. According to G. Williams:
Provocation is traditionally a defence for
"normal" people. Abnormal people can shelter
under it, but only on the same conditions as
apply to normal ones. If they want their
abnormality to be taken into account they must
raise a defence appropriate to them - insanity
or diminished responsibility. [23]
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Nonetheless, in some cases of cumulative provocation
the actor may be able to set up a combined defence of
provocation and diminished responsibility. This
possibility is explored further in the remaining
subdivisions of this chapter.
3. Cumulative Provocation and Diminished
Responsibility
As has been indicated above, there may be cases
where the conditions of cumulative provocation would
enable the actor to plead diminished responsibility
or, possibly, to set up a combined defence of
provocation and diminished responsibility. Diminished
responsibility may provide the legal basis for
excusing in cases where the actor's claim of impaired
volition has to do with an abnormality of mind,
possibly attributed to the circumstances of
cumulative provocation. [24] It is recognised that in
such cases the burden of proof would lie on the
defence. Having been subjected to a long course of
cruel and violent behaviour, the actor might have
found himself in such state of grave distress
or depression as to have his capacity for self-
control substantially diminished. As G. Williams
explains: "the defence [of diminished responsibility]
can include even a difficulty in controlling one's
actions, provided that it is due to an abnormality
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of mind." [25]
The partial defence of diminished responsibility-
centres on the assumption that the actor's impaired
capacity for self-control is due to an abnormality of
mind. It is asserted that diminished responsibility
does not invite one to recognise a third,
intermediate level between responsibility and
complete lack of responsibility. In other words,
speaking of a substantial impairment of the capacity
for perception or self-control does not imply that
the actor could only "partially" perceive the
wrongful character of his act, or that he could only
"partially" control his actions, for such an approach
seems logically untenable. One might say that
diminished responsibility constitutes, rather, a
special type of being responsible which presupposes
capacity for both perception and self-control. Due to
the actor's condition, however, perceiving the
character of his actions or exercising self-control
is considered to be extraordinarily difficult, that
is, "as compared to normal people normally placed".
[26] This is precisely what justifies a reduced
penalty in such cases. [27]
Pleading diminished responsibility instead of
provocation in a cumulative provocation case may seem
more appropriate where no final provocative event can
be demonstrated, or where planning and deliberation
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is not precluded. The same might obtain in a case
where the conduct that triggered off the actor's
fatal response cannot be regarded as capable of
amounting to legal provocation (i.e. on the basis of
the "reasonable man" test as it applies in the
circumstances of cumulative provocation). In this
respect, cumulative provocation may be understood as
a consideration capable of supporting the actor's
plea of diminished responsibility, something which
can also be the case as regards provocation.
However, while establishing that the actor was
suffering from an abnormality of mind is a basic
prerequisite for allowing a partial excuse, the
definition of mental abnormality has been the subject
of a longstanding debate in legal doctrine. [28] The
confusion surrounding the notion of mental
abnormality in law has to do, among other things,
with the difficulty of drawing distinctions between
different mental or psychological states and
assessing them in terms of responsibility. [29]
In English law, the question of whether the
defendant was suffering from an abnormality of mind
is in effect left to the discretion of the jury, the
judge asking them to consider whether, in their view,
the defendant should be regarded as being normal or
not. In the leading case of Byrne, [30] evidence
suggested that not only did the defendant know what
he was doing, but that he was also fully cognizant
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of the wrongful character of his act. His plea of
diminished responsibility was allowed, nonetheless,
on the ground that, due to his condition, it was
particularly difficult for him to exercise self-
control. It is recognized that, under sec. 2 of the
Homicide Act 1957, an abnormality of mind could be
associated with a variety of reasons, such as
retarded development of mind, disease or injury.
Whether the actor's mental responsibility was, due to
such an abnormality of mind, substantially
diminished, is a question of fact to be determined by
the jury. Such a wide approach to the matter would
seem to render diminished responsibility a suitable
defence for covering a number of cases involving a
situation of cumulative provocation.
4. Pleading Provocation and Diminished Responsibility
Together
Setting up a combined defence of provocation and
diminished responsibility might be available to the
defendant particularly in those cases of cumulative
provocation involving a final provocative event.
In such cases the actor might also be able to raise
either provocation or diminished responsibility
alone. The final section of this chapter takes up
the issue of pleading provocation and diminished
responsibility together and looks into the logic
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and rationale of such a partial defence to murder.
According to the Criminal Law Revision Committee:
It is now possible for a defendant to set up a
combined defence of provocation and diminished
responsibility, the practical effect being that
the jury may return a verdict of manslaughter
if they take the view that the defendant
suffered from an abnormality of mind and was
provoked. In practice this may mean that a
conviction of murder will be ruled out although
the provocation was not such as would have
moved a person of normal mentality to kill.
[31]
Nevertheless, the position that a combined defence
of provocation and diminished responsibility may be
most relevant if there is evidence suggesting that
the actor was both provoked and suffering from an
abnormality of mind runs up against a main
difficulty. As Morris and Blom-Cooper point out, "a
verdict of manslaughter on both grounds is surely
illogical, since the defence of provocation
presupposes a reasonable man driven to the act of
killing, whereas unreasonableness is endemic in the
defence of diminished responsibility. [32] In
English law, a number of cases may be cited
suggesting that the apparently conflicting
assumptions upon which provocation and diminished
responsibility operate have not prevented juries or
judges from recognising such a combined defence.
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[33] The Court of Criminal Appeal in Matheson
adopted the following position on this issue:
It may happen that on an indictment for murder
the defence may ask for a verdict of
manslaughter on the ground of diminished
responsibility and also on some other ground
such as provocation. If the jury returns a
verdict of manslaughter, the judge may and
generally should ask them whether their
verdict is based on diminished responsibility
or on the other ground or on both. [34]
As a defence strategy, pleading provocation and
diminished responsibility together is considered to
be to the defendant's advantage. The reduction of
murder to manslaughter on the basis of such a
combined plea rests on the assumption that the
defendant suffered from some sort of abnormality of
mind and was provoked. This would render admissible
medical or psychiatric testimony that the jury would
not be allowed to consider if the defendant had
chosen to raise provocation alone. [35] Indeed, if
the latter were the case, the jury would have to
assess the defendant's plea by deliberating upon the
question of how a reasonable or normal person might
have reacted to the provocation offered; it is
accepted that answering this question lies within
the sphere of the ordinary juror's experience. [36]
As Lord Simon explained in Camplin:
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...whether the defendant exercised reasonable
self-control in the totality of the
circumstances... would be entirely a matter for
consideration by the jury without further
evidence. The jury would, as ever, use their
collective common sense to determine whether
the provocation was sufficient to make a
person of reasonable self-control in the
totality of the circumstances (including
personal characteristics) act as the defendant
did. [37]
And as Lawton L.J. pointed out in the Court of
Appeal in Turner, "Jurors do not need psychiatrists
to tell them how ordinary folk who are not suffering
from any mental illness are likely to react to the
stresses and strains of life." [38] Nevertheless, in
the recent case of Campbell [39] the court permitted
the defence to introduce psychiatric testimony
regarding the defendant's state of mind in order to
assist the jury in determining the question of
provocation. It has been argued, however, that in
this case the issue was restricted to whether the
particular defendant and not a reasonable or
ordinary person may have lost his self-control due
to the provocation offered. Nevertheless, in spite
of medical evidence that the defendant was suffering
from an abnormality of mind, the defence chose not
to raise diminished responsibility but to rely
solely on provocation. The plea of provocation was
rejected and, following a conviction of murder,
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the defendant appealed on the ground that, given the
medical evidence, the trial judge should have
directed the jury as to the issue of diminished
responsibility. The appeal was dismissed, however,
on the basis that diminished responsibility can only
be raised if the defence accepts the relevant
burden of proof. By contrast with provocation, in
diminished responsibility the burden of pleading as
well as the burden of proof lies with the defence.
[40] Tf the defence opts for pleading provocation
and diminished responsibility together, it is
recognised that it should bear the burden of proof
only as to the latter defence. The combined plea of
provocation and diminished responsibility entails a
further advantage for the defendant as regards the
sentence. As G. Williams points out:
Success in the combined defence of provocation
and diminished responsibility has an advantage
for the defendant in respect of sentence: it
may result in a more lenient outcome than a
defence of provocation alone; and it is
virtually free from the risk of life sentence
that attends a defence of diminished
responsibility by itself. [41]
It should be noted that, in most cases where
provocation and diminished responsibility are raised
together the jury may find it difficult to keep the
issues separate. This seems true, particularly with
regard to some cases of cumulative provocation in
335
which the elements of provocation, abnormality of
mind and loss of control may be viewed as being
interrelated or interdependent. According to A.
Samuels:
The Home Office division between "abnormal"
(diminished responsibility) murders and
"normal" (other) murders is legally logical
but may be misleading if the public come to
believe that the two categories are readily
distinguishable. The provoked killer may not
gualify under diminished responsibility, but
he is often hardly to be described as normal.
[42]
One might say that the reason for pleading
provocation and diminished responsibility together
is not unrelated to the uncertainty besetting the
"reasonable man" test in provocation. For the most
part, this uncertainty has to do with the difficulty
in differentiating between individual peculiarities
of the actor that may, in a sense, be incorporated
in the "reasonable man" standard and those
peculiarities that lie outside the scope of the
standard. [43] Thus, pleading a combined defence of
provocation and diminished responsibility seems most
likely in those cases where it is unclear whether
certain individual characteristics will be taken
into account in applying the test of provocation.
[44] Although raising provocation and diminished
responsibility together - as a defence strategy -
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may be explained as pertinent to the uncertainty
surrounding the objective test in provocation,
upholding the actor's plea on both grounds may be
difficult to justify. In such cases the acceptance
of the actor's plea of loss of control by reason of
provocation might be seen as in a sense conditional
upon establishing diminished responsibility. In
other words, the actor may be entitled to a partial
excuse here if it is accepted that he was provoked
to lose control precisely because he suffered from
an abnormality of mind. In this respect, the claim
of loss of control turns primarily on the conditions
of diminished responsibility rather than on the
"reasonable man" test as it applies to provocation.
Although, under the test, the victim's act cannot
amount to legal provocation, the actor's losing his
self-control and killing may be partially excused in
so far as it can be established that the actor was
suffering from an abnormality of mind. A more
sensible approach to the matter might be to treat
these cases solely under the defence of diminished
responsibility, regarding provocation merely as a
factor triggering off the act of killing.
A verdict allowing provocation and diminished
responsibility together might perhaps seem most
appropriate where the conditions of both defences
are in a way satisfied. Indeed, one might envisage
a case of pleading provocation and diminished
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responsibility where it is accepted that the actor
was both suffering from an abnormality of mind and
was sufficiently provoked (i.e. according to the
objective test as it applies to normal people). In
such a case it seems clear that if the actor had
chosen to rely only on provocation his plea would
have been successful on this ground alone. The same
would have happened, had the actor chosen to plead
only diminished responsibility. A verdict of
manslaughter on both grounds would here appear most
relevant, unless perhaps the actor's loss of control
could somehow be connected with either provocation
or diminished responsibility exclusively.
So, to summarize, if there is evidence that the
actor suffered from an abnormality of mind and was
provoked - something most likely to obtain in a case
of cumulative provocation in that the cumulative
provocation led to an "abnormal" state of mind -
it is accepted that murder may be reduced to
manslaughter on the basis of a combined defence of
provocation and diminished responsibility. Such a
plea would allow the jury to consider medical or
psychiatric evidence, inadmissible if provocation
alone was raised. Further, it is recognised that
such a combined plea of provocation and diminished
responsibility might be successful on either basis
or on both. It has been asserted that one must
distinguish between the cases where accepting the
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actor's being provoked to lose control in a sense
presupposes establishing diminished responsibility,
and those where it is unclear which the exact basis
of the partial excuse should be. A verdict of
manslaughter on both grounds would seem most
appropriate with regard to these latter cases.
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Provocation has been a source of controversy in
Anglo-American criminal theory. Different arguments
have been put forward, varying from the total
elimination of provocation as an independent defence
- to be considered only as a factor in the mitigation
of sentence - to its expansion by creating new
categories of crime. This controversy partly issues
from the confusion that has long dogged the law of
homicide, with which the defence has traditionally
been associated. The characteristic function of
provocation as a partial defence to murder has to do
with subtle distinctions in the category of homicide
distinctions still waiting for clarification.
Besides that, however, there are questions peculiar
to the nature of provocation that exacerbate the
difficulties in making out its rationale as a defence
in law. Both legal practitioners and commentators
have been confronted with the problem of elucidating
the relation of provocation to the standards of
criminal liability on the basis of a comprehensive
theory.
The starting point of this thesis was the claim
that the questions besetting the legal doctrine of
provocation might prove more decipherable if examined
in the light to the distinction - long overlooked in
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Anglo-American law - between justification and
excuse. It was argued that, although the
classification of provocation as either
justification- or excuse-based is still a matter in
dispute, considering the distinction offers fruitful
grounds for conceptualising the character of the plea
and its relation to criminal liability. The
elaboration of a more cogent approach to provocation
with regard to the theory of justification and excuse
has been the governing task of the present work.
Moreover, the thesis highlights - on the basis of
provocation - the merits of this sort of analysis
towards developing a more coherent system of
criminal liability.
The analysis began with distinguishing between
when provocation is pleaded as a partial defence to
murder, aimed at the relegation of the offence
category, and when pleaded to reduce the level of
punishment following a conviction of a criminal
offence other than murder. Although, in a broad
sense, the analysis of justification and excuse may
apply to both aspects of provocation, the thesis was
focused primarily on its function as a partial
defence to murder. The enquiry proceeded from the
basic assumption that both a provocation and loss of
self-control are equally indispensable elements of
the provocation defence. It was asserted that the
problems in uncovering the rationale of the defence
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arise from the fact that the first element relates to
justification, whereas the second to excuse. Does the
defence operate as a partial excuse by virtue of the
actor's lack of self-control or, rather, as a partial
justification on the assumption that provocation
reduces the objective wrongfulness of the accused's
act? This was the central question throughout the
thesis. As pointed out, in English law, the 1957
legislation appears to mark a shift towards the
partial excuse doctrine. Nevertheless, considering
the discrepancies in the case law, one might say that
the defence eludes a uniform description as either
partial justification or partial excuse.
Without ignoring the implicit role of the
justificatory element in the law of provocation, it
was argued that the partial justification doctrine
lacks sufficient grounds of support. None of the
three moral theories of legal justification
considered - the forfeiture theory, the rights
theory, the lesser evil theory - seems to lend enough
backing to this approach to the defence. Indeed, such
an approach appears to be inconsistent with primary
principles regarding the sanctity and inviolability
of human life. It was pointed out, moreover, that
treating provocation as a justification-based defence
would amount to granting considerations of revenge a
place in the system of criminal law. However, such
considerations have no place in a rule-governed
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system of norms, for revenge is by its very nature
unruly and personal.
The formulation of the provocation defence as a
concession to human weakness reflects its
understanding as a partial excuse. The defence
operates as an excuse on the assumption that
provocative conduct is capable of raising such a
psychological pressure as to render the actor's
compliance with the law extraordinarily difficult.
Nevertheless, this sort of coercion can support only
a claim for extenuation because - by contrast to the
coercion reguired for a total excuse - it is not
regarded as irresistible. It was stressed that,
although provocation debars culpability for murder,
it cannot prevent conviction for the lesser offence,
for the act of killing in retaliation still
manifests a socially undesirable character trait.
In order to circumscribe the purview of
provocation as a partial defence, one has to shed
light on the important differentiation between murder
and voluntary manslaughter. It was pointed out that
the difficulty in distinguishing between these two
categories of homicide issues - among other things -
from the narrow interpretation of the subjective
condition in murder in purely cognitive terms.
Indeed, the fact that both murder and voluntary
manslaughter are taken to involve an intentional
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killing has led some to consider the fixed penalty-
provided for murder in English law as the only good
reason for retaining provocation as an independent
defence.
It was argued that the conception of provocation
as an independent - or failure-of-proof - defence
requires a wider interpretation of the subjective
element in murder, including considerations both of
cognition and control. On the other hand, speaking of
provocation as an offence modification would require
one to view murder and voluntary manslaughter as
independent offence sub-categories of intentional
homicide. It was asserted that the approach to
provocation as an offence modification appears best
suited to a system which recognises different degrees
of murder.
A plea of provocation is contestable both as to
whether the victim's conduct amounted to provocation
and as to whether the actor lost his self-control as
a result. If an act of provocation is not
established, the claim of loss of control cannot be
accepted - that is, on the basis of the provocation
defence. Notwithstanding that the victim's conduct
amounted to provocation, the defence would also
collapse if evidence suggests that the actor did not
lose his self-control as a result. In other words,
upholding the defence presupposes demonstrating the
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necessary connection between provocation, loss of
self-control and the act of retaliation. It was
argued that, if the defence is taken as a partial
excuse, the question of whether the victim's conduct
amounted to provocation relates to establishing a
good reason for the actor's loss of self-control.
This pertains to the acceptability of the excuse
offered and not to the partial justification of the
provoker's killing in retaliation. It is the element
of loss of control - or impaired volition - upon
which the rationale of provocation as an excuse-based
defence rests.
Further, it was suggested that, under the excuse
theory the "reasonable man" test pertains to
answering the question of whether the provocation
offered was such as to render the actor partially
excusable by reason of loss of control. This would
require one to consider what sort of affronts
people are expected to resist, or what sort of
offensive conduct is deemed likely to lead one to
lose control. This issue should be decided by taking
into account those characteristics of the actor that
bear upon the gravity of the provocation offered.
Nonetheless, in selecting those characteristics one
is again bound to apply some sort of objective
criteria - criteria that may to some extent vary from
one community to another. Emphasis was placed on the
position that in assessing a plea of provocation one
354
need not speculate about how exactly a "reasonable
person" would respond but, rather, about whether a
"reasonable person" would be likely to lose control
when faced with the sort of affront the actor was
confronted with. If provocation is established, what
remains to be considered is whether the actor was in
fact not in control of himself at the time of his
response. To answer this question, the actor's mode
of retaliation might furnish important evidence.
The comparative analysis of the objective
standard as it operates in provocation and mistake of
fact indicated that, besides the role of the standard
in deciding the acceptability of the proposed excuse,
the "reasonable man" may also be understood as
relevant to testing the actor's claim as a matter of
fact. It was suggested that these different aspects
of the "reasonable man" - including its aspect as a
criterion of justification - should in theory be kept
distinct. In practice, nonetheless, when the
accused's plea of provocation is rejected on this
ground, it might often be difficult to distinguish
e.g. between not excusing the actor for losing his
self-control and not giving credit to the actor's
claim that he in fact lost control.
With regard to both the partial justification and
partial excuse theories of provocation the
requirement of proportionality cannot refer to the
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actor's mode of retaliation. According to the partial
justification theory, this requirement suggests that
the act of retaliation may be considered as less
wrongful only if the actor was subjected to serious
enough provocation. As it relates to the excuse
theory, on the other hand, the requirement of
proportionality implies that, for the loss of self-
control to give the actor a partial excuse, the
provocation offered should have been sufficiently
grave. It was pointed out that, under the excuse
theory, the issue of proportionality has also to do
with the assumption that the likelihood of losing
one's self-control increases according to the
seriousness of the provocative act. This
consideration may also be important in deciding
whether the loss of control by reason of provocation
occurred as a matter of fact, as well as in
determining the degree of punishment for the lesser
offence, if the partial defence is accepted.
It has been asserted, moreover, that provocation
due to a mistaken belief should give the actor a
partial excuse - on the ground of loss of self-
control - provided that the requirements of both
mistake and provocation are met. It was pointed out
that, if provocation were taken as a partial
justification, the accused's defence should be seen
to rest on the excuse of mistake rather than on
provocation. Nevertheless, in such a case mistake
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would seem to operate only as a partial excuse
(putative partial justification).
The propinquity of provocation and self-defence
is often commented on. Provocation might be the
appropriate defence in some cases where the plea of
self-defence fails on the ground that the actor
exceeded the degree of force necessary to fend off
the attack. It was argued that, in so far as the use
of excessive force is not regarded as partially
justified, those cases may be treated either under
provocation or under a partial defence of excessive
self-defence. The latter defence, which is in essence
a defence of mistake, hinges on the assumption that a
mistaken belief as to the degree of defensive force,
unreasonable though it may be, may still militate
against the malice aforethought required for murder.
Given the intentional character of killing in such
cases, it seems more logical that this defence
should be deemed to reduce murder to voluntary
or intentional - rather than to involuntary
manslaughter.
The apparent absence of the loss of control
element in certain cases of cumulative provocation
renders such cases difficult to subsume under the
excuse doctrine. Indeed, it is in these cases where
the interpretation of the provocation defence as a
partial justification may seem most at home. It was
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argued that, instead of shifting the emphasis to the
justification theory, those cases of cumulative
provocation which do not satisfy the loss of self-
control reguirement should be treated under another
legal excuse - notably, diminished responsibility. It
is recognised that if evidence suggests that the
accused suffered from an abnormality of mind and was
provoked, provocation and diminished responsibility
may be pleaded together. Such a combined defence
might be accepted on either basis or, possibly, on
both. Nonetheless, one should distinguish between
cases of accepting provocation by reason of
diminished responsibility, and those where it seems
unclear which the ground for granting a partial
excuse should be.
Having summarised some of the main themes of this
thesis, one must point out that its aim was not to
cover all the issues concerning the legal doctrine of
provocation, nor to provide an exhaustive account of
the case law on the matter. Rather, by using
provocation as an example, the ultimate ambition of
this investigation into the theory of justification
and excuse is that it may contribute towards the
elaboration of a more comprehensible approach to
problems of criminal liability. In this sense, by
drawing upon current legal practices, the thesis lays
down possible grounds for reconceptualising or,
perhaps, redefining these practices.
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